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To mothers all around,  
those who bear us, those who raise us, the ones who find and guide us later in life, the ones 
that we may become ourselves. 
 
And to those struggling for lasting peace, justice and reconciliation in Zanzibar in small and 
big ways. May your struggles be fruitful one day.
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Abstract 
Political conflict and polarization in Zanzibar have been examined by different scholars and 
from different (inter)disciplinary angles, often, however, to the exclusion of female voices. 
Trying to mend this bias by exclusively exploring women’s perspectives, using mainly 
qualitative, in-depth interviews, I was able to identify the centrality of motherhood and 
mothering to the gendered standpoint of Zanzibari women, also in connection to their attitudes 
towards ‘the political’. Consequently, this thesis explores the roles the institution of motherhood 
and mothering as practice play in women’s navigation of (political) uncertainty and conflict in 
the islands.  
To establish the context in which this navigation takes place and to mend misconceptions 
about female (non-)participation in Zanzibari electoral politics, the active roles women have 
filled in the island’s political history are highlighted. To be able to understand the ‘maternal 
standpoint’, my respondents spoke and navigated from, local ideologies and experiences of 
motherhood and mothering are explored. The Swahili terms uchungu (bitterness) and 
kuhangaika (‘to roam about and struggle’) are central here, expressing the sacrifice that is often 
expected and performed by mothers. 
I develop the concept of ‘maternal navigation’ which takes into account the practices of 
actors who not only strategize to ‘get by’ and ‘get on’ as individuals but navigate uncertainty 
on behalf of and through others. This helps to make sense of my respondents’ practices as they 
consider risks and vulnerabilities while negotiating prevalent social, cultural, economic and 
political circumstances, for the sake of bringing about the best possible results for their children 
and families.  
In the political context, motherhood and mothering are shown to have a variety of sometimes 
contradictory influences, e.g. in connection to the promotion or dismissal of political peace-
building. Mothers are also shown to develop specific maternal strategies in face of the risks of 
politics in the islands to safeguard themselves, but – most importantly – their families and 
children against political dangers and exposure. Overall, the complex and ambivalence force 
motherhood and maternal subjectivities represent in the political sphere and in relation to the 
navigational activities of Zanzibari women is highlighted. 
 
Key words: Zanzibar, political conflict, gender, motherhood, mothering, uncertainty, 
navigation 
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(1) Introduction: “I am a mother, who has a family, so I fear these problems.”  
‘Zanzibar’ is a name that many people immediately associate with peaceful sandy beaches, 
sleepy old town alleyways, and quiet villages in-between swaying palm trees. In fact, the most 
common response I got from people when I mentioned that I would do the research for my 
master thesis in Zanzibar, was a variation of ‘Oh, well that is going to be some nice ‘fieldwork’ 
then!’ – tongue-in-cheek air quotes included. However, beneath the surface of the tranquil 
island paradise lies another Zanzibar, which can be a place of trouble, problems and almost 
unescapable uncertainty to its inhabitants, as my research assistant Saida expressed very well:  
[E]ven me personally, I can say [that] I am a bit apprehensive about CUF taking a 
position because I fear that there will be trouble maybe. You see, eh? Because I don’t 
know. Because – will CCM really agree to leave from power just like that? You can ask 
yourself that. It is not something that is easy. So, me myself, I will be saying [that] I fear 
CUF taking a position because it can cause problems. And I am a woman. But in addition, 
I am a mother, who has a family, so I fear these problems. So, I feel if it will be that there 
is peace, well, they [CCM] should just continue. But I also have [these] thoughts, I say 
[to myself], on the other hand, some day really, this situation that every day CCM wins, 
CCM wins, will it not maybe happen one day, that those of the opposition will also come 
to bring trouble?1  
The risks and dangers Saida acknowledged here to exist in Zanzibar mainly relate to electoral 
politics and the contest between the incumbent party CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi – Party of 
the Revolution) and the oppositional camp – up until recently dominated by CUF (Civic United 
Front) (cf. ICG 2019: 8-9; Nassor & Jose 2014: 248). Even though the linguistic, religious and 
cultural set-up of the Zanzibar archipelago offers many potentialities for forging unity, as a 
majority of Zanzibaris share a common language (Kiswahili), religion (Islam), history and 
culture, electoral issues regularly and bitterly divide the populace (cf. Moss & Tronvoll 2015: 
91-92; Sheriff 2001). Since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1995, political contest 
has more often than not led to tension, division and, at times, violence (ICG 2019: 1, 4-5; Minde 
et al. 2018: 165). Regional disparity between the archipelago’s main islands Unguja – the tourist 
hotspot and island with most of the important (government) infrastructure – and Pemba – the, 
in many ways, marginalised ‘opposition island’ – has also played a role (Bakari 2001: 145; 
Moss & Tronvoll 2015: 94). In any given general election, Zanzibaris vote for their own 
president and representatives in the Zanzibari House of Representatives (HoR), as well as for 
 
1“[…] hata mimi binafsi naweza kusema nachelea CUF kutake position kwa sababu naogopa kutakuwa kuna 
vurugu pengine. Umeona eh? […] Eh, kwa sababu sijui. Eh, kwa sababu- kweli CCM itakubali kwamba itoke tu 
madarakani hivyo hivyo? Unaweza kujiuliza. Si kitu ambacho kiko rahisi. Kwa hiyo mimi kama mimi nitakuwa 
nasema naogopa CUF kutake position kwa sababu inaweza ikasababisha matatizo. Na mimi ni mwanamke. Lakini 
vile vile ni mama ambaye nina familia, kwa hiyo naogopa matatizo hayo. Kwa hiyo naona kama kutakuwa kuna 
na amani, basi na waendelee tu wao. [....] Lakini vile vile napata mawazo nasema upande mwengine, baadhi ya 
siku, kweli situation ya kwamba kila siku inashinda CCM, inashinda CCM haikikitokea pengine siku moja hawa 
wa opposition wakaja wakaleta vurugu pia?” (Interview 1 with Saida, Dar es Salaam, 01-03-2019) 
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the president and Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania, that they have been a semi-
autonomous part of since 1964 (Minde et al 2018.: 164-165; Nassor & Jose 2014: 248).  
Overall, the Zanzibar archipelago is characterized by its complex society and culture, having 
evolved over centuries of contact with various groups, often traders from the Arab world and 
elsewhere. Its position as a hub of the East African slave trade in the 19th century under the rule 
of the Omani sultanate, as well as increasing immigration from mainland East Africa in more 
recent times, added to its unique multicultural profile. (Boswell 2008: 296-297; ICG 2019: 2-
3; Minde et al. 2018: 164) Abdul Sheriff writes in this respect that,  
[…] [Zanzibar] is a cultural mosaic that has a pattern and a meaning that would be lost if 
the pieces were separated and identified individually as African, Arab, Indian, etc., it can 
only be identified as Zanzibari. (Sheriff 1995; cited in Bakari 2001: 47) 
However, certain pieces of this mosaic, as well as episodes of some of Zanzibar’s more painful 
history, have indeed been severed from the whole and manipulated for political purposes in the 
past (ICG 2019: 2-4). If one stays in Zanzibar long enough and is attentive to subtle (or not so 
subtle) signs and symbols, one will certainly notice the impact of political polarization and 
‘troubles’ on everyday life and the public space, even if ‘election season’ isn’t currently 
ongoing, as during my fieldwork stay. Certain quarters or street corners in the island’s capital 
Zanzibar City, for instance, are known and clearly marked to symbolize their belonging to either 
one of the two main political parties2 (cf. Bakari 2001: 180-181; Loimeier 2007: 27): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oftentimes, even families are internally divided over political and electoral issues (see e.g. 
Cameron 2002: 318). Many Zanzibaris are thus faced with the task of navigating political 
 
2 To me, this observation was also reinforced by some respondents’ claims to live in either an ‘opposition’ or 
‘incumbent’ area (cf. e.g. Interview 1 with Bi Farida, Unguja, 31-10-2018; Interview 2 with Bi Pili, Unguja, 14-
11-2018). 
Fig. 1: CCM-'Agitation Board’ and party flags at Maskani ya 
Kisonge, Zanzibar City; see Annex 1 for a translation of the 
inscription (Photograph by the author, 19-02-2019). 
Fig. 2: CUF flag and poster at Jaw's 
Corner, Stone Town, Zanzibar City 
(Photograph by the author, 13-12-
2018). 
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tensions – and the uncertainty of whether, when, and in which circumstances they will flare up 
again – in their daily lives; just as Saida outlined above.  
I first became interested in the intricacies of Zanzibari politics after witnessing the ‘election 
drama’ of 2015/2016 during a semester abroad at the University of Dar es Salaam. On that 
occasion, the October 2015 general elections on the Zanzibari side of the union – allegedly 
clearly won by the opposition – were controversially cancelled and repeated in early 2016 (ICG 
2019: 5-6), leading to the current 96,55% majority for the incumbent party in the House of 
Representatives (cf. SMZ 2019: 16). Reading up further on Zanzibari elections, politics and the 
associated ‘troubles’, I noticed that the voices of a particular group were underrepresented in 
most of the scholarship: Zanzibari women were only seldomly included in the samples of 
different authors, and if so, in vanishingly low numbers3. Planning the fieldwork for my master 
thesis, I set out to start to close this research gap by speaking exclusively to ‘ordinary’ Zanzibari 
women (i.e. non-politicians/non-party activists) about the state of politics. I intended to gather 
personal stories going beyond the often mentioned, but somewhat generic symptoms of political 
polarization in the archipelago – the ‘not greeting, not visiting people from the other side, not 
attending weeding and funerals etc.’ (cf. e.g. Moss 2017: 177-179) –  to find out how individual 
women experienced political tensions in their everyday lives in inter-election times. I also asked 
myself whether women had any distinctly ‘female’ strategies of managing political 
polarization, and – given that women are often seen as ‘natural peacebuilders’ (cf. Eastmond 
2010: 10; Helms 2010: 17) – whether they were in fact acting as such. Could it even be that 
Zanzibari women held the secret key to finding a way to sustainable peace in the islands?  
Arriving on Zanzibar’s shores in September of 2018, however, I quickly noticed that the task 
that I had so confidently set myself was not half as easy as I thought. Not only was I faced with 
obstacles imposed by the Zanzibari government – a lengthy and non-transparent process of 
gaining research permission – but also challenged in understanding how to best approach the 
sensitive topics of polarization, political conflict and interfamily and -community discord in a 
manner that would elicit more than taciturn, evasive or generic answers from the women I 
approached. To add to this, the state of civil rights and freedoms on both sides of the Tanzanian 
union was on a downward spiral all throughout my stay (and beyond) (cf. e.g. ICG 2019: 6-10). 
Political uncertainty prevailed, and people seemed even more apprehensive than usual to share 
their perspectives and opinions with an outsider like me. This seemed to be especially true for 
those ‘ordinary’ women I had originally wanted to talk to: in informal conversations and 
 
3 Out of the few authors who explicitly specify the gender of their respondents in more recent studies, both Moss 
(2016: 322) and Bernhof Olsen Kildal (2016: 93-94) record only around 10% female informants respectively. 
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interviews some stalled whenever I tried to steer talk towards ‘siasa’ (politics), while others 
outright refused to be interviewed at all (Fieldnotes 22-10-2018).  
Meeting and talking to Faiza, a young working woman who would later become a good 
acquaintance of mine, gave me some indications as to why this was the case. Sitting together in 
a café in Stone Town’s Forodhani Gardens, she disclosed that ‘[w]omen fear politics. They 
want to take care of their affairs in peace.’ (Fieldnotes, 17-10-2018). Having just gone through 
my own decidedly un-peaceful ‘affairs’ at the office responsible for issuing research permits 
(Fieldnotes, 08-10 to 17-10-2018), I believed to understand what she was hinting at: In 
Zanzibar, the decision to become openly involved in party politics, ‘exposing’ one’s political 
leaning in a different way, or simply being perceived to be opposition-friendly, can have dire 
repercussions in terms of the delivery of government services. The state’s institutions are deeply 
entangled with the incumbent party (Bakari 2011: 251; Moss & Tronvoll 2015: 96-97), which 
can make ‘taking care of affairs’ such as applying for an ID or a birth certificate extremely 
tedious or even impossible at times. This holds equally true for Zanzibaris of both genders, but 
Faiza was clearly implying that Zanzibari women had specific fears in this regard.  
Our conversation that day gave me a first important impulse in thinking about the complex 
decisions Zanzibari women must make in the current political context of the islands from their 
specific gendered positions in society. The more interviews I conducted and transcribed, the 
clearer it became to me what constituted a large proportion of the distinctiveness of my 
respondent’s standing: many of them highlighted the centrality of motherhood and mothering 
to their self-definition, when identifying critical issues in their environment that needed political 
attention, as well as in their assessment of the political situation and their positioning in it. The 
quote above from my interview with Saida –also lending inspiration to the title of the thesis – 
expresses this specific standpoint perfectly: ‘I am a woman - and in addition I am a mother.’ 
Within this thesis, I will argue that this maternal stance is the position from which a majority 
of my female Zanzibari respondents thought, spoke and navigated politics in the archipelago. 
These insights led me to draft up the following research question to guide this thesis:  
How do Zanzibari women navigate (political) uncertainty and what role do motherhood 
as institution, and resource, as well as mothering as practice, play in their navigation? 
 
(1.1) Structure and Main Objectives of the Thesis 
The objectives of this thesis are two-fold and result from different circumstances and contexts: 
first of all, it is important to me to re-establish the due place of women in Zanzibar’s political 
past and present, in order to understand the context of my respondents’ political actions or 
5 
 
inactions, thoughts and perspectives. Past publications often have had an androcentric focus4 
and tended to overlook female contributions – as do many male politicians and commentators. 
As Susan Geiger so aptly argues in her study on female activism in the struggle for 
independence in Tanganyika,  
[t]he marginalization of women in [the] historiography of [nationalism in Africa] reflects 
a now-familiar pattern: the accumulation of androcentric bias in the written record – both 
primary (produced by colonial officials, missionaries, and travelers) and, more recently, 
secondary (produced by Western as well as African scholars). Women’s political actions 
and history are ‘disappeared’ in a cumulative process whereby successive written 
accounts reinforce and echo the silence of previous ones. (1997: 9-10; my emphasis) 
This is certainly equally true for the scholarship on Zanzibar’s distant and close (political) past 
(cf. e.g. Alpers 1984, 677-678; Fair 1994: 15; Stiles & Thompson 2015: 9-10). Even female 
scholars may fall victim to this trend: studying Marie-Aude Fouéré’s analysis of the circulation 
of, and debates about YouTube clips allegedly depicting the mass-killings of Arab Zanzibaris 
during the Zanzibar Revolution in 1964, I was quite annoyed to read that  “[…] the ethnographic 
material presented here reflects a specific viewership made up of urban, educated, computer-
literate, middle-aged men residing or working in Stone Town and its close vicinity […]” 
(Fouéré 2018: 321, my emphasis). Had I not had an insightful conversation about these clips 
with one of my primary informants, Bi Rehema, and her young niece during a visit to their 
home, in which they included knowledge of these images in their considerations of what an 
outbreak of violence would mean in Zanzibar today (Fieldnotes, 11-12-2018)? As other authors 
before her, Fouéré – who does not give her readers an overview of the gender distribution within 
her sample, and only cites evidence from conversations and interviews with men – effectively 
silences women’s voices and perspectives; whether inadvertently, because of the difficulties in 
talking to Zanzibari women that other authors also faced (see Keshodkar 2013: 89; Moss 2016: 
321, 326) or because she purposefully did not approach them, cannot be known. Assuming 
however that the audience of these clips is exclusively male just because the majority of one’s 
respondents were, is a grave mistake in my opinion and representative of the androcentric short-
sightedness of many works on Zanzibari history and politics. In Chapter 2, I thus set out to re-
establish women’s active participation in Zanzibari politics in different roles and functions since 
their onset in 1957.  
 
4 Exemplary are for instance Mohamed Bakari’s unreflecting constant use of male pronouns throughout his 2001 
work (cf. e.g. pp. 6, 108 fn. 24, 251), or Jonathon Glassman’s discussion of teacher’s attitudes (read: male teacher’s 
attitudes) towards the rural population and their influence on the development of nationalist thinking in colonial 
Zanzibar (2011: 80-83), without ever taking into account the markedly different behaviour and mindset of female 
teachers (cf. Decker 2014). 
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My second main objective is connected to the theme of motherhood and concerns the 
similarly harmful trend in scholarship to silence, distort, oversimplify and sentimentalize the 
voices and thoughts of women as mothers (cf. Bush Trevino 2010: 1005; Ruddick 1989: 127). 
Susan Lyn Schalge – analysing mothers’ actions and practices in the dire circumstances of Dar 
es Salaam’s informal settlements in the late 1990s – put it well by arguing that “[w]hat women 
as mothers do, how they do it and how they define themselves are complex issues that must be 
untangled and investigated, rather than assumed […]” (2004: 152). To that end, and to 
understand the ‘maternal standpoint’ my respondents acted and thought from, feminist ideas 
about terms like motherhood as institution and mothering as practice are discussed and clarified 
in my theoretical framework in Chapter 3. Since the economic, social and political context of 
motherhood and mothering is considered vital to their analysis (Abbey & O’Reilly 1998: 14-
16, 24-25; Bakare-Yusuf 2003: 5; Collins 1994: 45, 62; Glenn 1994: 3-4, 26; Jenkins 1998: 
210), I establish ‘uncertainty’ as the overarching background against which mothering practices 
and experiences in Zanzibar are to be read. Using Henrik Vigh’s concept of social navigation 
(2009, 2010) as a steppingstone, I develop the concept of ‘maternal navigation’ to make sense 
of some of the (political) actions and considerations of my respondents. Chapter 4, giving 
insights into my methodological orientation and struggles, especially regarding government 
intervention and the ‘loud’ silences that permeated my fieldwork experience, adds to an 
understanding of the context of uncertainty in which my female respondents made decisions to 
speak out or stay silent. In the last two chapters, I focus on my empirical data, exploring and 
analysing local notions of motherhood, ‘good’ mothering and concrete mothering practices, as 
influenced by the overarching political and economic context of uncertainty. In the final chapter 
of this thesis, I examine what role motherhood as institution and mothering as practice played 
in some of my respondents’ navigation of ‘the political’, showing the ambivalent and complex 
force this part of their gendered identity represented. 
Overall, by allowing  women of different ages, degrees of political involvement and different 
backgrounds ‘to speak for themselves’ – staying close to their utterances in interviews and 
informal conversations in my analysis – I hope to be able to portray the complexity of their 
experiences, and to further deconstruct simplistic notions of the silenced, othered, and 
victimized (Muslim) woman in Western writings (cf. Hirsch 1998: 2, Demovic 2007:48). Being 
strongly committed to conducting research from a feminist standpoint, wanting to explore an 
already investigated phenomenon from the viewpoints of women, interpreting and 
understanding social realities based on their experiences (cf. Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 238-
239), I hope to bring a fresh perspective to the body of literature that already exists. Introducing 
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the novel angle of motherhood and mothering, I believe to be adding a truly innovative element 
to the study of Zanzibari politics. 
While composing this thesis, I have come to realize that, although I set out on fieldwork in 
order to close ‘gaps of knowledge’, this feat might, in fact, be impossible to accomplish. As 
James Clifford writes: “There is no whole picture that can be ‘filled in,’ since the perception 
and filling of a gap leads to the awareness of other gaps.” (1986: 18). My account of 
motherhood, mothering and politics in Zanzibar can only ever be the partial snapshot of a 
dynamic and ever-changing practice, institution and context, and the humble beginning of 
further scholarly examinations of Zanzibari women’s experiences and perspectives – as 
mothers, but also in countless other functions and roles. At the same time, questions about 
fatherhood, fathering, and male gender identity began suggesting themselves to me stronger 
and stronger the more I wrote about the significance of motherhood and mothering to women 
– this could be a possible area for future research on gender and gender relations on the Swahili 
Coast (and elsewhere). The empirical material introduced and analysed here, need thus to be 
seen “[…] as an argument in efforts to make a case for a particular way of understanding social 
reality, in the context of a never-ending debate.” (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 304; my 
emphasis). 
 
(1.2) Some Notes on Terminology, Pseudonyms, and Translations 
Zanzibar is an archipelago, consisting of three different main, inhabited islands – Unguja to the 
South, Tumbatu just off Unguja’s Northern coast, and Pemba to the North. When I refer to 
‘Zanzibar’ or ‘Zanzibari’, I usually mean to make more general statements about the entire 
archipelago (insofar that is possible), while I otherwise try to take care to differentiate between 
Pemba and Unguja5. Another important terminological differentiation is that between Zanzibar 
City/Town and Stone Town – the former denotes the whole urban centre and capital of the 
archipelago on Unguja, while the latter stands for the old town at the Westernmost tip of the 
city. 
All the names used in this thesis are pseudonyms which I assigned to my respondents after 
my return to the Netherlands. As common in Zanzibar, I refer to most of the married women 
amongst them as ‘Bi’ (Mrs.; e.g. “Bi Rehema”), as I also would when addressing them in real 
life. Some women however, like Faiza and my research assistant Saida, although married, were 
 
5 Although parts of the family of one of my main respondents hailed from Tumbatu, and certainly more research 
is needed on this part of the Zanzibar archipelago, time restraints prevented me from travelling there myself. 
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close to me in age, and the nature of our relationship was such that it would have been strange 
to address them as ‘Bi’ – both in writing and in real life.  
All translations from Kiswahili, if not marked otherwise, were undertaken by me with 
reference to a number of standard monolingual (Murungi 2013; Wamtilia 2016), Kiswahili-
English (TUKI 2001, Mohamed 2011, Knappert & van Kessel 2010) and Kiswahili-German 
dictionaries (Lazaro 2017, Höftmann & Herms 2010). Furthermore, Kiswahili is a language 
which is often abridged, with frequent omissions of certain parts of the grammatical structure. 
In my translations, I have thus often made additions in squared brackets for better readability 
and comprehension. The original quotes can always be found in the footnotes, and any 
translation errors are strictly mine. 
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(2) The Emergence of Zanzibar’s Political Sphere and Women’s Places in it 
As mentioned in the introduction, modern Zanzibari electoral politics have been tarnished by 
tensions and conflict, periodically arising around multiparty-elections (1957-1964 & 1992-
present) since their onset in 1957; occasionally even leading to deadly violence and violence 
specifically targeted at women (e.g. in 1961, 1964, & 2001). Several attempts at reconciliation 
and power-sharing have failed or have not been sustainable: the most recent example being the 
discontinuation of the initially successful Government of National Unity (GNU) after the 
contested 2015/16 electoral stalemate on the islands (ICG 2019: 1-2, 4-5; Minde et al. 2018: 
165).  
In the following, I will spell out the historical emergence of the political sphere in Zanzibar 
since the beginning of electoral politics in 1957, in order to establish the broader context of 
current political instability and uncertainty in the archipelago. By integrating women’s active 
involvement into the narrative at different points in time, I hope to reinstate their due place in 
these developments. This chapter thus serves as a background against which my respondent’s 
experiences with and navigation of ‘the political’ in Zanzibar will be read. 
 
(2.1) The Stage is Set: Electoral Politics from 1957 to 1961 
The onset of electoral politics in Zanzibar lies within the colonial period: After the Zanzibar 
sultanate became a protected Arab state under British colonialism in 1890, a Legislative Council 
(LegCo) was established in 1926 – as a law-making and advisory body with limited powers. At 
first, only European, Indian, and Arab men6 could be appointed as representatives for their own 
‘race’.  In 1946, the first ‘Shirazi’7 member joined. (Bakari 2001: 54-55; Glassman 2011: 43) 
 
6 There are several claims that in 1949 a woman, Christabel(la) M(a)jaliwa, joined the LegCo (cf. Annex 2; 
Zanzibar Kwetu 2008). Decker (2014: 132-133) and Loimeier (2009: 334) mention Majaliwa as a member of a 
committee formed by the Department of Education in 1953; they do not make mention of her being a LegCo 
representative. Aboud and Shamte (2019: 4) assert that Majaliwa was an ‘unofficial’ LegCo delegate from 1960 
onwards. Notwithstanding these inconsistencies, it is evident, that she was deeply involved in the public and 
political life of Zanzibar at the time. In January 2018, the website of the President’s Office announced that 
Majaliwa posthumously received a “Revolution Medal” (SMZ 2018). 
7 Terms denoting racial or ethnic belonging, like ‘Arab’, ‘Shirazi’, ‘Swahili’ or ‘African’ need to be treated with 
caution in the Zanzibari context. In the past, a number of authors have tended to assume undue essentiality here, 
while in more recent times, the inherently flexible, context-dependent and ambivalent nature of such terms of self-
identification has been highlighted (see e.g. Fair 2001: 28-29; Larsen 2004: 123-124). Due to widespread practices 
of intermarriage and the relative prestige – or stigma – attached to certain labels (which also shifted over time), 
island inhabitants may define themselves as belonging to several different identity groups at different points in 
time, or in different contexts (Fair 1998: 75). ‘Shirazi’ is a term that is especially contested. It originates from the 
practice of coastal inhabitants to claim ancestry from Persia. In Zanzibar, ‘indigenous’ islanders of mixed heritage 
used this autonym to distance themselves from (labour) migrants from the mainland, especially in the 1920s and 
30s when Zanzibar saw a surge in migration. Similarly, labelling oneself as Arab enhanced (and enhances) status, 
while it was however never “[…] the clearly bound category that many islanders would later imagine it [to be].” 
(Glassman 2011: 38; see also Bakari 2001: 63-71; Glassman 2000: 405; Glassman 2014: 234-235; Loimeier 2018: 
40, fn. 5; Larsen 2004: 127). During my fieldwork, few people identified as ‘Arab’, no one as ‘Shirazi’ and most 
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In 1957 the system of racial representation and appointment was abolished, and the first 
direct LegCo elections took place in June. This marked the beginning of nationalist, multiparty 
politics in Zanzibar which initiated a turbulent phase of strong political competition and 
confrontation; mostly between the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP, founded in 1955) and the 
Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP, founded in 1957), commonly remembered as the Zama za Siasa (Time 
of Politics). Members, leaders and ideologues of both parties used racializing and exclusionary 
rhetoric – the ZNP invoking an ideal of ustaarabu (civilization, literally: becoming Arab), and 
the ASP employing idioms of race and autochthony (‘alien Arabs’ vs. ‘indigenous Africans’) – 
to determine who should not be part of the Zanzibari polity after independence: the ‘washenzi’ 
(savages) from the African mainland (mostly recent labour migrants), or the ‘Arab internal 
aliens’. Much of this rhetoric predated the first election, developing roughly in the inter-war 
period; Jonathon Glassman claims however that with the onset of electoral politics, and the 
almost constant campaigning that it brought along, racialized language and modes of thought 
spread widely throughout the archipelago. Additionally, accusations about the others inherent 
criminality and plans for violence further enforced these processes of mutual dehumanization. 
(Glassman 2011: 58-61, 91, 148-150, 160, 212)  
Party membership in the Zama za Siasa was racialized: ASP was perceived as the 
‘mainlander/African’ party, while ZNP was seen as an ‘Arab’ party. Both first and foremost 
competed for the votes of indigenous islanders (‘Shirazi’) who were ambiguous about their 
identity and did not assume a sense of ‘automatic’ belonging with either broad category due to 
geographic conditions and different experiences with Omani-Arab rule, settlement and land 
ownership: While many ‘Shirazi’ in Unguja felt that they had been marginalized from the fertile 
land by ‘Arab’ landlords and thus tended to sympathize with ASP, ‘Shirazi’ in Pemba had less 
antagonistic relationships with the Omani elite and often felt drawn to ZNP. (Bakari 2001: 47-
57; Brown 2010: 619; Glassman 2011: 23-63; Newbury 1983: 254-262, 269) The amount of 
internal fragmentation and power struggle within the parties, and the oversimplification 
inherent to the ‘African’ vs. ‘Arab’-dichotomy became obvious later, when further parties 
developed from party splits, and allied themselves with the respective counter side: the Zanzibar 
and Pemba People’s Party (ZPPP) split off from the ASP in 1959 and formed a coalition with 
ZNP; the Marxist Umma Party split off from the ZNP in 1963 and joined the ASP in government 
after 1964. (Bakari 2001: 57-58; Glassman 2011: 154, 174; Wimmelbücker 2003: 473) 
 
simply as Zanzibari. Within this thesis I put such identity-terms into single quotation marks, to indicate their non-
essentialist nature. 
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It was within these turbulent times that women were first granted voting rights8. After two-
fact finding missions in 1956 and 1959, women first cast their ballots in 1961, at the height of 
political tensions, and not in one, but two highly contested elections within that same initial 
year. (Decker 2014: 136-141) Corrie Decker asserts that the campaign for women’s suffrage 
was largely hijacked by male members of the nationalist parties for their own purposes, i.e. to 
gain members and electoral margins (ibid. 129-131; 141, 155). For her female respondents, who 
were schoolgirls or young teachers at the time, enfranchisement was not a watershed moment: 
they did not remember campaigning for or celebrating it (ibid. 148-149; 223, fn. 111). I would 
nonetheless doubt the implied conclusion that party politics and voting were not important to 
any women at the time. Mohammed Bakari (2001: 177) cites several colonial reports from the 
period before enfranchisement that speak to a marked interest of women in political affairs, and 
of their involvement in politically motivated social boycotts:   
Traders, cultivators, labourers, fishermen, even housewives were affected. Villagers 
argued among themselves. Funerals and religious ceremonies were boycotted by rival 
political parties! Women even pawned their clothing in order to raise the bus fare to 
political meetings. (citing a 1958 report by the Senior Commissioner; emphasis mine) 
[In the period between 1959 and 1960,] [t]he political struggle occupied the minds of the 
people of Zanzibar to the exclusion of everything else. Both men and women took full 
part in these activities.” (citing the British Colonial Report 1959-1960; emphasis mine) 
Decker does in fact admit that there were ‘some’ other women who were politically active 
during the Zama za Siasa, “[…] attending rallies, establishing party-oriented organizations, and 
giving speeches to women about party membership” (2014: 131) but, nevertheless, her 
respondents – part of a slowly growing educated female elite who would have been the ‘logical’ 
participants in nationalist and suffragette activities (cf. Geiger 1997: 42; Glassman 2011: 80) – 
for the most part stayed away from politics. Decker argues that the struggle of female teachers 
and students at the time was not necessarily for political rights but for economic self-reliance 
and concomitant new definitions of female heshima (honour), which they had to defend against 
conservatives’ concerns about female education and professionalization. Additionally, young 
female teachers were often posted to unfamiliar rural areas where they did not have social 
networks and thus had little interest in spoiling relations with the local parents and students due 
to party politics. Further, as most women in Zanzibar and along the Swahili coast, they defied 
simplistic notions of racial or ethnic identity9 which might have made them less responsive to 
 
8 According to Maoulidi (2011: 43) this did not immediately coincide with the ability to also stand for office. 
9 Fair (1998) characterizes women’s flexibility in regard to ethnicity or race in terms of their ‘procreative powers’: 
since ethnic belonging of children was usually determined patrilineally, women were able to transform their 
children’s ethnicity through (often multiple) interethnic marriage(s) and reproduction (87-89). If it was to their 
advantage, women also adjusted their own ethnic identity (Fair 2001: 98). Women were thus much more intimately 
acquainted with the fluidity of ethnic and racial identities than most men (Decker 2014: 158). 
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the exclusionary rhetoric and identity politics of the nationalist parties. (2014: 12, 14, 20, 101, 
131-132, 145, 154-155, 158) 
I would argue that expecting the young, educated and professional elite to be at the forefront 
of (female) nationalist and political efforts, and disregarding the activities of other societal 
groups, can be quite short-sighted. Susan Geiger already demonstrated this in her study of 
female activists in the struggle for independence in Tanganyika: in Dar es Salaam, for instance, 
it was mostly middle-aged, Muslim ‘Swahili’ women with low levels of education who joined 
the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU) in the 1950s – at a certain point even 
exceeding male members, who, if employed, feared losing their jobs due to party membership 
(1997: 1, 53). Usually divorced and in at least their second marriage, engaged in informal (often 
collaborative) economic activities and in ngoma groups10, Geiger’s informants enjoyed higher 
mobility than younger women, more flexibility than (male) employees, and had ready-made 
social networks at hand through which they could mobilise for the political cause (ibid. 43-44, 
68, 82). Given that Decker’s respondents were mostly young women in their first marriage, 
preoccupied with teaching and other community development activities (Decker 2014: 14), as 
well as intent on maintaining their heshima under the scrutiny of society (ibid. 102, 118, 123), 
it is hardly surprising that they did not (openly) participate in party politics in large numbers. 
Who then, were these ‘other women’, who joined the nationalist cause(s), even sacrificing 
clothing11 to be able to support their party of choice? It is without a doubt inaccurate to suggest 
that Zanzibari women as a group collectively shied away from nationalist politics in the Zama 
za Siasa. Amani Thani, Aisha Amour Zahor and Abdul Sheriff – all interviewed as witnesses 
of the era in Barwani et al. (2003) – concordantly acknowledge the involvement of women in 
electoral politics, particularly during rallies and other political meetings (254, 284, 290-92, 
314), but also in leadership positions, albeit in smaller numbers (256, 314). In the same volume, 
Ludger Wimmelbücker reports that after their defeat in the 1957 elections, the ZNP began to 
purposefully mobilise women, so that in 1962 half of its members were claimed to be female 
(2003: 475, fn. 16; see also Decker 2014: 220, fn. 76). There were prominent and active women 
within the ranks of ASP as well: Bi Zainab Himid, a prominent teacher and former ZNP 
sympathizer, recalls joining ASP’s “Umoja wa [A]Kina Mama” (Union of 
 
10 ‘Ngoma’ can simultaneously delineate a drum, a certain type of music, a kind of dance in which drums play a 
prominent role, or an event at which this type of music is performed. Participation in ngoma-troupes was (and to 
a degree still is) an extremely popular recreational activity for women along the Swahili Coast. (Askew 2002: 355; 
Geiger 1997: x; Lazaro 2017) 
11 Laura Fair has a lot to say about the importance of fashion and cloth(es) to Zanzibari women (1998: 6, 77). For 
instance, the price of cloth was one of the main grievances of lower-class women participating in the 1948 general 
strike (Fair 1994: 374; see also Glassman 2011: 121). This makes the readiness to pawn items of clothing in order 
to participate in political meetings even more remarkable. 
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Women(folk)/Mothers) shortly after 1964. She recounts that at this time, ten to twelve ‘grown’ 
women12 constituted the core of the group, amongst them Fatuma Karume (the first wife of 
ASP chairman and then-president, Abeid Karume) and Bi Mwanaidi Dai, both of whom are 
often mentioned as early female ASP activists (see Annex 2; Barwani & Gerhardt 2012: 148-
151; Issa 2009: 312; YouTube 2017). Women also supported the party of their choice through 
other means, like art or fashion: Moza Ali (Suleiman) composed political poetry throughout the 
Zama za Siasa, which was for instance published in an newspaper affiliated with the ZNP, 
broadcasted on the radio or adapted as songs by taarab13 groups (Askew 2002: 96; Sheikh & 
Adwiraah 1983: 77, 82-88). Other women proudly displayed and communicated their political 
affiliation in public through their attire, particularly through kangas14 imprinted with political 
symbols and inscriptions, like those exhibited in the Museum of the Revolution in Zanzibar 
City: 
All in all, the evidence clearly confirms the active and enthusiastic participation of women in 
the early politics of the Zama za Siasa, often even before they were able to vote15. However, 
 
12 Bi Zainab used the term ‘watu wazima’ here, which can be translated as ‘fully-grown people’ (Knappert & van 
Kessel 2010), simply as ‘adults’ (Lazaro 2017; Mohamed 2011, TUKI 2001), or as ‘completed’ persons (i.e. people 
who have undergone the important life-events: marriage, parenthood, possibly grandparenthood). In this context, 
Bi Zainab – who was of course an adult herself at the time – in my opinion, tries to express both the other women’s 
more advanced age, as well as their status as elders within the organization (see also Arnold Koenings 2018: 156). 
13 taarab: An extremely popular style of music in Zanzibar; developed from the late 19th century onwards, mixing 
musical influences from India, the Arab world and East Africa (Askew 2002 109-110; Fair 2002: 61; Fair 2013: 
18; Topp Fargion 2014: 3, 55). 
14 kanga: A colourfully patterned, two-piece fabric, usually imprinted with a Kiswahili proverb (jina); widespread 
all-over East Africa and popular – also as a means of subtle communication – since at least the 1880s (Beck 2001: 
157-158). 
15 This would also not be the first time that women in Zanzibar acted politically: Fair (1994) details the active part 
women, mostly from Ng’ambo (the ‘African’ quarter of Zanzibar Town), played in the rent strikes of the 1920s, 
and in the general strike of 1948 (119, 127-128, 369, 373-375). Additionally, powerful female leaders are by no 
means unheard of in the history of the Zanzibar archipelago in particular, and along the Swahili coast in general 
(Alpers 1984: 681-682; Topan 2004: 213); with titled female rulers possibly in place in Zanzibar as late as 1886 
(Askew 1999: 81-85).  
Fig. 3: Kanga ‘Furaha ya Mabibi ya Uchaguzi 1961’ 
(Women’s Joy for the 1961 Elections); Museum of the 
Revolution, Zanzibar City (Photograph by the author, 19-
02-2019). 
Fig. 4: Kanga 'Ahsante Pakacha' (Thank you Pakacha). 
The woven basket (pakacha) was a popular symbol for the 
ASP (see Bakari 2001: 178); Museum of the Revolution, 
Zanzibar City (Photograph by the author, 19-02-2019). 
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some women were already practicing self-censorship to avoid inter-family or marital conflicts 
about party politics. Decker cites a woman from Pemba who gave the following insight when 
interviewed by an enfranchisement committee in the 1950s: 
I will reply ‘yes Sir’ to my husband when he orders me to vote for a certain candidate: 
this will please him and keep harmony: but I will vote for my own choice, and as the vote 
is secret my husband will never know! (2014: 142)  
Additionally, the fierce competition and polarization tangible in Zanzibari electoral politics 
from the onset, and the thus existent potential for violence and conflict made women’s 
participation inappropriate in the eyes of some (Decker 2014: 153; see also Geiger 1997: 121) 
and might have deterred certain parts of the female population – like the young teachers in rural 
areas – from engaging with party politics openly.  
Additional to their active participation in politics, women occupied a central role in the 
raging ‘war of words’ between ASP and ZNP nationalists – as symbols of the racialized 
hierarchies and social stratifications inherent to Zanzibari society, and as symbols of ‘the 
nation’ in general. Rumours of ‘the other’s’ sexual deviance and allegedly committed atrocities 
against women were part and parcel of party propaganda on both sides. Controversies, 
particularly about the issue of intermarriage, occupied a central position in the disputes between 
nationalist ideologists. (Glassman 2011: 138-143, 159-160, 170-171, 212) As a result, Decker 
argues that 
[g]ender was fundamental to the construction of racial ideologies in Zanzibar. Popular 
narratives about the intermarriage between Arab men and African women became the 
basis on which Arab nationalists claimed multi-ethnic representation and African 
nationalists argued against Arab domination ([referring to the fact] that Arab men always 
married African women and never the other way around). (2014: 131, my emphasis) 
In the end, it might be reasonable to conclude that to the male politicians of the Zama za Siasa, 
“[w]omen’s actions mattered less than what they represented […], whether as daughters, wives, 
[…], voters, or the nation itself.“ (Decker 2014: 131, my emphasis). It is however equally true 
that some women did create their own spaces of political agency: by discussing politics in their 
taarab-associations and other social clubs, by openly supporting political parties, by 
campaigning and mobilizing new voters, or by silently defying their husbands (or employers), 
by casting their votes for the candidates of their choice.  
 
(2.2) Politics turn violent: Election Riots and Revolution (1961-1964) 
After the second election that women participated in, and as a result of the almost perpetual 
toxic political campaigns full of race-baiting and stereotyping, as well as the vicious circle of 
constant retaliation (social shunning, boycotts and retributive boycotts, evictions, racialized 
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violence), the political tensions of the Zama za Siasa reached a violent climax: riots broke out 
during and after the June 1961 LegCo elections16. 68 men, women and children, mostly of Arab 
decent, died in pogrom-like violence in Unguja, while hundreds of others were injured. There 
was also widespread sexualized violence against Arab women and girls, as well as acts of 
brutality specifically targeted at pregnant women. (Glassman 2011: 141-163; 240-247) These 
events, after one of the first elections that they participated in, and the fact that some of the 
violence was directed explicitly at women (again, as symbols, this time of ‘the other’s’ honour 
and ability to reproduce – in short: his manhood; ibid.: 256-257), as well as their children, will 
have further enforced the cautious attitude of some (Decker 2014: 146). 
In December 1963, after a total of four highly contested elections, Zanzibar attained its 
independence under a ZNP-ZPPP coalition. Only one month later, on the night of January 11, 
1964, the government was violently overthrown and replaced by a coalition of ASP and Umma 
Party, thereafter forming the Revolutionary Council. (Bakari 2001: 1; Glassman 2011: 3) Until 
today, there is no uncontested account of the Zanzibari Revolution, its reasons, course, timeline, 
or participants17 (Cunningham Bissell & Fouéré 2018: 19). It is however likely that frustrations 
like the dismissal of police officers of mainland origin, the eviction of squatters who allegedly 
supported the ASP by ‘Arab’ landowners, and the banning of the Umma Party played a 
motivating role (Brown 2010: 621-622; Glassman 2011: 64, 173-175, 277-278; Kilian 2008: 
108-110; Loimeier 2018: 40-41). Ann Lee Grimstad, who interviewed more than 70 informants 
and considered a wide range of archival sources on the Revolution, claims that there had been 
several groups discussing, and fewer seriously planning an overthrow of the government since 
at least the 1963 elections. There was some collaboration between at least two groups, mainly 
consisting of ASP Youth League members, sacked policemen and day labourers – both 
Zanzibaris and mainland-born men. They jointly launched attacks on Zanzibar Town’s main 
police barracks on the night of January 11. It seems that some Umma Party youth aligned 
themselves with the revolutionaries in the early morning hours of the next day on their own 
account. (Grimstad 2018: 70, 75, 81-87; see also Glassman 2011: 277-278) Bi Aisha Zahor’s 
sister, (K)ubwa Amour Zahor, is claimed to have been the only female revolutionary. As a 
member of the Umma Party (Grimstadt 2018: 100), in her sister’s words, “she took up the gun” 
and participated actively in the revolution (Barwani et al. 2003: 282)18.  
 
16 Partly because ASP-supporters alleged that ‘their’ women had been sexually assaulted while queuing up to vote 
(Glassman 2011: 371, fn. 44). 
17 For an excellent and concise summary, see Loimeier 2018: 39-53. 
18 Grimstadt however claims that Bi (K)ubwa was in Dar es Salaam together with Umma leader Abdulrahman 
Babu on the weekend of the overthrow (2018: 100). Nevertheless, she is for instance pictured in a newspaper 
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The coup itself was over after a few hours, but in the following days and weeks there were 
pogroms, especially against non-elite ‘Arabs’ and prominent supporters of the old regime in 
Unguja (Glassman 2011: 278, 282). Pemba was ‘reached’ by the Revolution belatedly, but with 
a great deal of more systematic, state-sponsored violence that lasted until 1968 (Arnold Koenigs 
2018: 161-165). The total death toll of the Revolution is contested but newer estimates assume 
a number of around 5,000 fatalities (Brown 2010: 622; Kilian 2008: 110; Myers 2000: 434); 
countless Zanzibaris of Arab and Indian origin fled the islands, others were arrested and 
detained in rural camps, and many of them were eventually deported and dispossessed. At the 
end of 1964, Zanzibar’s ‘Arab’ population was decimated by at least 25%. (Bakari 2001: 102-
103; Glassman 2011: 283) 
 
(2.3) Revolutionary Zanzibar and One-Party Rule (1964-1992) 
After an “ideological somersault” from pre-revolutionary rhetoric praising colonial rule for 
ending the oppression of enslaved Africans and “red-baiting” (former) rivals like Umma Party 
leader Babu, the now ruling Revolutionary Council presented itself as socialist (Glassman 2011: 
289). Under the leadership of ASP chairman Abeid Amani Karume there were certain 
progressive welfare measures like land reforms and social housing. At the same time, 
surveillance, repression and regular disappearances and executions of alleged political 
opponents were widespread. (Bakari 2001: 106-107) The controversial union with mainland 
Tanganyika was forged in April 1964, based primarily on pragmatic security considerations on 
both sides, and without any popular input (ibid.: 107-119; Glassman 2011: 289-290; Kilian 
2008: 111 & 121). For the next 16 and 28 years respectively, elections were abandoned, and 
opposition parties were banned (Bakari 2001: 113; Loimeier 2018: 45; Maoulidi 2011: 44). 
The original Revolutionary Council that took power on January 24, 1964 had no female 
members at all (c.f. Loimeier 2018: 45), but it nonetheless clad itself in a language of women’s 
empowerment: schools were made coeducational and women encouraged to take up 
employment outside the household; on the whole, the gendered segregation of the public space 
was to be abandoned (Decker 2014: 5, 147-148; Fair 2002: 72; McGruder 1999: 152). Several 
of my respondents who grew up or came of age in the post-revolutionary era, like Bi Rehema 
and her sister Bi Rukia, as well as Bi Raissa, endorsed this language of women’s advancement 
with their life stories; all three profited from educational and employment opportunities 
 
clipping showing ‘The Revolutionaries of Zanzibar’ (see Zanzibar Yetu 2014) which demonstrates her closeness 
to the inner political circles. 
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accorded to them by the regime19. Two elderly respondents who, respectively, were around 
fifteen and fourteen years old in 1964, Bi Khadija and Bi Salama, had – as was quite common 
in Zanzibar then – finished 8th grade and gotten married soon thereafter. After the revolution 
both received training20 and attained government employment in the police force and the JKU21. 
As an active and loyal member of the UWT (Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania; Tanzanian 
Women’s Union) and the ruling party since joining the ASP Youth League, Bi Khadija travelled 
to Germany, Bulgaria and China for ‘short courses.’ Later, she was offered a women’s special 
seat in the first multiparty House of Representatives. These individual trajectories match Salma 
Maoulidi’s claim that progress in this period centred mainly on the areas of female education 
and employment (2011: 46). 
In contrast to this, several of the Revolutionary Government’s policies made the 
pronouncement of their alleged ‘fight for women’s rights’ appear like hypocritical lip service. 
Laura Fair (2002) indeed calls party policy in the first years of the revolutionary regime 
“misogynist to the extreme” (71). Emblematic for this are the forced marriages of 1970, when 
young women of Arab and Indian origin were coerced to marry older ‘African’ members of the 
Revolutionary Council “[…] to ‘end’ racial discrimination and produce new Zanzibaris” 
(Askew 2006: 27; see also Burgess 2018: 134; Decker 2014: 150; Muhajir & Myers 2018: 209; 
Wilson 2013: 55). My respondent Najima, who traces her family’s roots to both Oman and Iraq, 
mentioned that two of her mother’s sisters were affected by the forced marriage decree; one 
managed to avoid her fate by feigning illness and fleeing the islands from the hospital, the other 
had to go through with the marriage. This was one of the reasons why Najima found it especially 
painful to attend the yearly anniversary celebrations of the Revolution while she was still in 
school. (Informal conversation, December 2018) Her statements also speak to the policy’s long-
lasting traumatic effect on Zanzibari society (cf. Larsen 2018: 258).  
Fair’s urban respondents described a general climate of misogyny, and widespread 
sexualized assaults and rapes during the 1960s and 70s, that made many women afraid to leave 
the house (2002: 72; see also Boswell 2008: 306), while Burgess (2018) outlines the predatory 
 
19 It has to be highlighted however, that all three women came from relatively privileged families and grew up in 
the urban areas of Unguja and Pemba. Other women in their 50s and 40s today, especially those from rural areas, 
like Bi Sauda and the women I interviewed in rural Pemba, seem to not have profited from educational and 
professional opportunities as much.  
20 As a matter of fact, after 1964, the husbands of girls who were still in school had to guarantee the local ASP 
branch in writing that they would not obstruct their wives’ education after marriage (Maoulidi 2011: 46-47). 
21 Jeshi ya Kujenga Uchumi (The Army of the Construction of the Economy) – established in 1977, was modelled 
after the mainland JKT (Jeshi ya Kujenga Taifa - Army of Nationbuilding), and based on the structures of the 
youth labour camps that existed all over the islands at the time. It basically was an institution of national service, 
and at some point, participation was required for all secondary students for a duration of two years. The JKU exists 
until today and is part of Zanzibar’s sovereign security forces. (Burgess 1999: 42; SMZ n.d.; REDET & TEMCO 
2006: 80) 
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practices of Karume himself during this time (134).22 According to Glassman, the forced 
marriages and the further instances of state-condoned sexualized violence can be understood as 
the ‘logical’ continuation of the discourses on intermarriage by ASP and ZNP nationalists that 
I sketched above (2011: 142, 289). The horrors of the past were simply turned around on ‘the 
other’; women, in this context, were conceived of as pawns and symbols in the larger schemes 
of powerful men, while “[…] [their] bodies became objects of revolutionary retribution.” (Fair 
2002: 71; see also Maoulidi 2011: 44) In addition, the imposition of policies of gender-
integration in public spaces and institutions without the input of women themselves often seems 
to have had an adverse effect: men were put into leadership positions while women withdrew 
from spaces in which they felt they no longer had authority or voice. Fair’s portrayal of the 
post-1964 transformation of the formerly almost exclusively female cultural institution of 
taarab-associations into a male-led and government-controlled domain, is an excellent case in 
point (2002: 63-64; 71-72). 
Two years after the forced marriages scandal, Karume was assassinated, and the 
governments of Aboud Jumbe (1972-1984), Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1984-1985), Idris Abdul 
Wakil (1985-1990), and Salmin Amour (1990-1995) followed. In 1977, the ASP merged with 
the mainland Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) to form CCM, cementing one-party 
rule on both sides of the Union – a key moment in the erosion of Zanzibari political autonomy. 
(Bakari 2001: 110-118; Cranenburgh 1996: 536; Nassor & Jose 2014: 251-252; Pallotti 2017: 
551) The party merger also led to the fusion of the ASP Women’s Section with the UWT23, 
which had superseded the TANU Women’s Section in 1962 (Geiger 1982: 49-50). Geiger 
suggests that the UWT was much less political than its predecessor(s), as the organization’s 
focus shifted from women’s political mobilization and consciousness-raising to ‘female 
development’, henceforth concentrating on “cooperatives, household management and 
economic activities […]” (Geiger 1982: 54; see also Geiger 1997: 191, 194). Bi Khadija, who 
was a member at the time of the merger, nevertheless credits successes like legislation 
concerning maternity leave, the establishment of women’s and children’s ministries in both the 
mainland and the Isles, as well as the higher number of women in legislative bodies to the 
lobbying of the UWT. Membership in the organization was – and continues to be – a pre-
 
22 “[…] the president, in his 60s at the time, employed a man known as ‘Foum’ to drive around the capital every 
day in search of women and girls, almost always of Arab or South Asian ancestry. Foum would present these 
unfortunates to Karume at Kibweni palace […]. The total number of those forced to submit to such sexual 
exploitation is impossible to determine. Most submitted out of fear that he might harm them, or people close to 
them […].” (Burgess 2018: 134) 
23 Until then the Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanganyika (Tanganyikan Women’s Union); afterwards retaining the 
abbreviation UWT, but more commonly known as Jumuiya ya Wanawake wa Tanzania (Tanzanian Women’s 
Organization/Association) (see Tenga & Peter 1996: 159). 
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condition for CCM members wishing to enter the Union Parliament and Zanzibari House of 
Representatives through women’s special seats (IRI 2016: 6; TEMCO 1997: 72; Yoon 2008: 
64). 
Due to poor economic performance, the growing curtailment of Zanzibari autonomy, 
problems of political leadership and restrictions or outright violations of civil rights, the 
ASP/CCM-regime entered more than one crisis of legitimacy during the era of one-party rule 
(Bakari 2001: 107-118; 151). The contentious issue of the Union with the mainland was the 
pivotal point in several government crises (Glassman 2011: 292; Kilian 2008: 111-112; Nassor 
& Jose 2014: 248). In 1984, however, a slight (economic) liberalization commenced during the 
short term of office of Ali Hassan Mwinyi; the strong Zanzibari opposition has its roots in this 
time (Bakari 2001: 115, 133, 155-156, 170). 
 
(2.4) The Shift to Multipartyism (1992) 
Within the so-called ‘third wave of democracy’ of the late 1980s and early 1990s, Tanzania, 
like other African countries, gave way to political reforms that eventually led to the re-
introduction of the multiparty system in 1992. The deep and persistent economic crisis since 
the late 1970s and all throughout the 1980s, the consequent “bitter […] pill” (Bratton & van de 
Walle 1992: 420) of Structural Adjustment from 1985 onwards, as well as the regime changes 
taking place in communist Eastern Europe and in several African countries constituted the 
structural and contextual factors that influenced this shift. (Aminzade 2003: 43; Bakari 2001: 
155; Bratton & van de Walle 1992: 422-425, 430; Nyirabu 2002: 102; TEMCO 1997: 12-15) 
Tanzania, however, represents a somewhat ‘odd’ case, as political reforms took place without 
widespread popular pressure, but with explicit and dominant impulses from the political 
establishment with the Baba wa Taifa (Father of the Nation) and long-time Union president 
(1964-1985) Julius K. Nyerere leading the way. In 1991, then-Union president Ali Hassan 
Mwinyi initiated the so-called Nyalali Commission, to consult public opinion on multiparty 
democracy all over the country. Although there was some ambiguity24, the foundation of new 
political parties was legalised one year later. (Bakari 2011: 235; Bratton & van de Walle 1992: 
432; Cranenburgh 1996: 537; Hofmeier 1992: 286) My respondent Bi Rehema recounted these 
developments as follows:  
The Union government made a law in ‘92 that everyone has the right to join a party. 
Which means we were told that ‘multipartyism is coming, let’s go to the march.’ Ehh, 
there was a march to welcome multipartyism, so we welcomed the parties. We were told 
 
24 Given that many respondents seemed to prefer a thorough reform of CCM to a direct introduction of 
multipartyism (Askew 2006: 31-32; Hofmeier 1992: 286). 
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we must go to the march, who does not go to the march will get his or her salary cut. All 
right! So then when we arrived there […] Ali Hassan Mwinyi, [who] was the [Union] 
president at that time, addressed us, he said that everyone has the right to join the party 
he or she wants. Well! (claps) We went, we did [so] and really, multipartyism came.25  
Bi Rehema’s use of passives (‘we were told’), as well as her hint at coercive measures (‘who 
does not go […] will get [their] salary cut’) are meaningful, as they testify quite clearly to the 
top-down mode of Tanzania’s transition. It has been argued that the compliant attitude of CCM 
in this historic moment was a deliberate strategy to take control of and closely guide the 
inconvenient but inevitable reform process in order to stay in power in the long run. By 
controlling the pace and direction of the transition the incumbent party was able to avoid losing 
power to a more mature and better organized opposition at a later point – a calculation that 
seems to add up until today. (Bakari 2001: 154, 162; Bakari & Whitehead 2012: 104; Bratton 
& van de Walle 1992: 421; Brown 2001: 68; Nyirabu 2002: 103; Pallotti 2017: 546; 552-553) 
In Zanzibar, the changes were implemented more reluctantly since CCM-Zanzibar already 
faced a tangible challenge to its power: the political situation in the archipelago had been tense 
throughout the 1980s, and vocal and influential opposition and dissident groups, mostly rallying 
around a reform of the Union structure, had been forming (Bakari 2001: 170; Hofmeier 1991: 
324). The legacy of the revolution as the founding myth of their polity made it hard for CCM-
Zanzibar to even allow the thought of conceding power ‘through a piece of paper’ (Brown 2010: 
628, 630; Nassor & Jose 2014: 252). Nevertheless, in June 1992, Zanzibar’s main opposition 
party26 the Civic United Front (CUF) was formed (Cameron 2002: 314, Hofmeier 1993).  
Female membership in political parties before the first nation-wide elections in Tanzania as 
a whole was low: only 21,63% of the founder members of eight opposition parties at the time 
were women. There were extremely few women in national leadership, as well as amongst the 
national parliamentary candidates (ca. 4% overall). (Mmuya & Chaligha 1994: 50; 200-204; 
Shayo 2005b: 8; TEMCO 1997: 22, 70) In general, the impression that political parties were 
‘men’s clubs’ seemed to be widespread (Shayo 2005a: 26; 2005b: 1). 
 
25 “[..] [S]erikali […] ya muungano, imetunga sheria […] mwaka ‘92, kwamba […] mtu yoyote ana haki ya 
kujiunga katika chama. Maanake tumeambiwa vyama vingi vinakuja, twende kwenye maandamano […]. Ehh, 
kulikuwa na maandamano ya kupokea vyama vyingi, kwa hiyo [....] [t]ulikuwa tumepokea vyama vyingi. 
Tukaambiwa lazima kwenda kwenye maandamano, asiokwenda kwenye maandamano akatwa mshahara. Haya! 
Halafu tena tulipofika kule, Mzee Ali Hassan Mwinyi, wakati ule ndo raisi, akatuhutubia akasema kwamba kila 
mtu ana haki ya kujiunga chama anachotaka […]. Well! (claps) Tukaenda, […] tukafanya na kweli […] vikaja 
vyama vyingi […].” (Interview 1 with Bi Rehema, Unguja, 24-10-2018) 
26 That is, until recently: in mid-March 2019, the leader of the main opposition party CUF, Seif Sharif Hamad and 
most of its Zanzibari members defected from the party and joined ACT (Alliance for Change and Transparency, 
founded in 2014), due to prolonged leadership struggles within CUF since the 2015 campaign and election (ICG 
2019: 8-9; Namkwahe & Kiango 2017). 
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Nonetheless, women like Bi Rehema and Bi Halima joined politics at this time, both 
becoming members of CUF. They respectively claimed to have been motivated by a general 
desire for mabadiliko (change): Bi Halima detailed the aims of CUF that prompted her decision 
to join, as follows: “The aims, especially here in Zanzibar, are to bring change. Change that is 
a good change for the citizens because truly we are very neglected in terms of our lives.”27 Bi 
Rehema told me: “So, I did not have this aim of becoming a politician specifically, to tell you 
the truth. But this wish of wanting to see [that] we have change; we have these troubles of the 
Union; we have troubles with different things.28 Another respondent, Bi Sauda, who declared 
that she voted for CUF in the first two multiparty elections also cited a longing for mabadiliko 
as a reason for casting her ballot for the opposition. Pressed on what kind of change was wanted 
or promised, she answered “A party change, [that] the party of CCM would leave and CUF 
would enter.”29, and explained further that “We were told that our life will be good [by][t]he 
leaders who ran for office. Like the one from CUF, he said that life would change, yes.”30 
Despite referring to some concrete issues like ‘the troubles of the Union’, economic 
conditions, or the human rights situation (as Bi Halima did later in our interview), overall, the 
specific problems that motivated women to vote for the opposition remain largely obscure; just 
as any explicit policies or ideologies that party leaders might have referred to as solutions to 
them. This is hardly surprising, since there were (and are) few ideological or policy-related 
differences between the opposition and ruling party in Zanzibar – beyond a general 
dissatisfaction with the status quo and the desire for change and a ‘good life’ (maisha mazuri) 
(cf. Askew 2006: 31-32; Bakari 2001: 184-185; Cranenburgh 1996: 540, 543; Glassman 2011: 
285, 288; Richey & Ponte 1996: 82). It would however be wrong to dismiss the larger meaning 
of the ‘simple’ wish for a party-change: after twenty-eight years of one-party rule at the onset 
of multipartyism, the pragmatic (and cautious) hope for some sort of change would have already 
constituted a major, if not revolutionary change of policy, in my opinion. 
 
27 “[Malengo] hususan hapa kwetu Zanzibar ni kuleta mabadiliko [...]. [M]abadiliko ambayo [ni] mabadiliko 
mazuri kwa wanachi kwa sababu kweli tuko ovyo sana kimaisha.” (Interview 1 with Bi Halima, Unguja, 13-02-
2019) 
28 “Kwa hiyo, si[ja]kuwa na ile aim hasa ya kuwa mwanasiasa kwa kusema ukweli. Lakini ile hamu ya kutaka 
kuona tuna mabadiliko; tuna kero hizi za muungano; tuna kero za mambo mbalimbali […].” (Interview 1 with Bi 
Rehema, Unguja, 24-10-2018) 
29 “[Mabadiliko ya] kichama […] kitoke chama cha CCM, kiinigie cha CUF.” (Interview 1 with Bi Sauda, Unguja, 
24-10-2018) 
30 “Tuliambiwa maisha yatakuwa mazuri […] [na] [v]iongozi waliokuwa kugombea. Kama huyu wa CUF, alisema 
maisha yatabadilika, ndiyo.” (ibid.) 
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Saida, my research assistant, who disclosed to have voted for CCM in 1995, claimed that, 
on the one hand, it was family and neighbourhood dynamics that made her cast her vote for the 
incumbent: “We were raised by out mother who was a big CCM [supporter] so we follow[ed] 
her [politically]. In other words, I just went with the agitation, 
because I know my mother [supports] CCM and around here 
[people support] CCM.”31 At the time, Saida and her family 
lived close to  Maskani ya Kisonge32, which could rightfully be 
called one of the epi-centres of CCM party culture in Zanzibar: 
up the street from the CCM headquarters, and in front of the 
iconic Michenzani social housing blocks33 it is a popular 
meeting point for members and supporters of the ruling party. 
On the other hand, Saida also cited worries about the prospects 
of multipartyism and the ‘unknown’ that a regime change would 
bring. “[W]e were thinking that multipartyism [i.e. the new 
parties] would bring trouble,”34 she claimed, mirroring a common charge of the time (cf. 
Cameron 2002: 317-318; Richey & Ponte 1996: 82).  
Bi Pili, who is a long-term CCM supporter and a government employee, additionally 
explained to me that “[…] the love for the parties is inside the blood. Inside the soul.”35 I found 
her comment quite insightful as it hinted at a similarly ideology- or policy-detached stance 
amongst supporters of the ruling party. By using the metaphor of blood, and thus eliciting 
associations with family and heredity, it also reiterated Saida’s point about family dynamics 
influencing political choices. Sigrun Marie Moss and Kjetil Tronvoll argue that this tendency 
is quite prevalent in Zanzibar, claiming that “[…] political categories are largely assigned 
through family ties rather than chosen, and when established, the political belonging is 
perceived as static […]” (2015: 84). Incidentally, this holds true for both sides of the political 
 
31 “[…] sisi tunalelewa na mama ambaye alikuwa ni CCM sana, kwa hiyo, na sisi […] tunamfuata [kisiasa]. […] 
“[…] yaani nimeenda kwa ushawishi tu sababu najua mama CCM na huku CCM […]” (Interview 1 with Saida, 
Dar es Salaam, 01-03-2019) 
32 Originally, maskani merely denoted places of male socialization at street corners; since the re-introduction of 
the multiparty system existing maskani in Zanzibar have increasingly become organized along party lines (Bakari 
2001: 179-181; Glassman 2011: 295-296). Sometimes, violence has emanated from maskani toward political 
rivals, as e.g. during the 2001 protests, when members of CCM maskani were involved in brutalities against 
opposition supporters (HRW 2002: 21, 36, 38). The maskani at (Mwembe) Kisonge is one of the most famous 
CCM maskani (Bakari 2001: 180, fn. 51); see Figure 1 for a picture. 
33 Seen as the symbol of the revolution’s achievements (Cunningham Bissell & Fouéré 2018: 2, 14-15), and 
constituting a traditional CCM-stronghold during elections (Cameron 2002: 317). 
34 “[…] tuko tunachukulia kama vyama vyingi kama vinakuja kuleta vurugu […].” (Interview 1 with Saida, Dar 
es Salaam, 01-03-2019) 
35 “[…] vyama upenzi viko ndani ya damu. Ndani ya roho.” (Interview 2 with Bi Pili, Unguja, 14-11-2019) 
Fig. 5: Michenzani social housing 
blocks in Zanzibar City (Photograph 
by the author, 19-02-2019) 
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divide, although it should not be taken as an absolute: there are certainly those who take 
different political sides than parents, siblings, or partners – this is precisely what leads to the 
personalized nature of party conflict after all (cf. e.g. BBC 2015a; The Guardian 2015). Najima 
for instance told me that she supports a different party than her parents and highlighted: “I am 
the first one in my family to be choosing a different party than them. I had my own reasons. 
(chuckles)”36 In my opinion, her emphasis here indicates that this choice is nonetheless 
something out of the norm in the Zanzibari context. 
With the re-introduction of multiparty politics, women in Zanzibar and Tanzania in general 
became very prominently and visibly involved in the electoral processes as political 
campaigners, party supporters, voters and, to a lesser extent, as candidates (Oloka-Onyago & 
Nassali 2003: 65). Several respondents told me that women quite often outnumber male 
participants during election rallies in Zanzibar (cf. e.g. Interview 1 with Bi Farida, Unguja, 31-
10-2018) which is confirmed by election observers (Mosha & Johnson 2004: 100; REDET & 
TEMCO 2006: 45, 64; TEMCO 2011: 130) and video recordings of recent campaigns of both 
CCM and CUF (see e.g. YouTube 2015b, c). The role of women during rallies, albeit dominant 
and visible, is sometimes dismissed as a relegation of women to mere supportive roles (Mosha 
& Johnson 2004: 11; Oloka-Onyago & Nassali 2003: 65), while others bemoan that women’s 
obvious enthusiasm for the political process does not translate into greater representation and 
participation in-between elections (IRI 2016: 17). Another aspect of the criticism of women’s 
overwhelming presence at campaign rallies is a questioning of the authenticity of their motives 
for attending. Saida claimed that there are women who “[…] come, having been persuaded by 
kitenge37 and kanga”38. She further explained: 
So, if someone has never been to shamba39 to visit, on a day like this she40 will already 
get the chance to visit by having the fare payed for her, maybe she has been given a 
thousand shilling for provisions, and free transportation, so she goes! She has been given 
kitenge, t-shirts, and whatnot – [so,] she goes. First, she has already gotten the kitenge, 
secondly, she can go for a trip.41 
 
36 “I am the first one in my family kuwa kuchagua chama tofauti na wao. I had my own reasons.” (Interview 1 
with Najima, Unguja, 11-01-2019) 
37 Kitenge: colourfully imprinted piece of cloth, used for tailoring; of better quality and more expensive than kanga. 
38 “[…] [w]akaja [wa]kashawishiwa kwa kitenge na kanga.” (Interview 1 with Saida, Dar es Salaam, 01-03-2019) 
39 Usually ‘shamba’ translates to the rural areas or someone’s farm (Höftmann & Herms 2010). In Zanzibar, and 
in this context, it may however denote Unguja’s (touristic) beaches, e.g. at Nungwi, Paje, or Jambiani. 
40 Even though I use the generic feminine form here for legibility, I by no means mean to suggest that men might 
not also be ‘pulled’ by such factors. 
41 “Kwa hiyo kama mtu hajawahi kwenda shamba kutembea, siku kama ile anakuwa tayari yeye amepata kwenda 
kutembea kwa kulipiwa nauli, pengine anapewa mpaka shiligi elfu moja ya matumizi, na usafiri wa bure, kwa hiyo 
mtu anakwenda! Amepewa kitenge, amepewa fulana, amepewa nini - anakwenda. Kwanza anakuwa ameshapta 
kitenge, la pili ameweza kutembea.” (Interview 1 with Saida, Dar es Salaam, 01-03-2019) 
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This is a common charge (see e.g. Brown 2001: 96, fn. 16), but due to her general 
disillusionment with party politics42, Saida’s comments should certainly be treated with caution. 
Andrea Brown for example writes that “[m]any women in my survey told me they were 
collecting khangas [sic] but had no intention of voting for the parties passing them out.” (2001: 
96). Overall, political campaigns in Zanzibar and Tanzania have a big entertainment value (cf. 
e.g. TEMCO 2011: 108-10) that without a doubt draws in some women (and men) who might 
not necessarily come for the political message, but for the ‘show’ of it. Other perks include free 
T-shirts, hats and fabrics in party colours, as well as provisions and fares for campaign teams 
and party members (Brown 2001: 72; Kelsall 2007: 526; REDET & TEMCO 2006: 64; 
TEMCO 2011: 109, 119). Nonetheless, the argument that women only come for perks and are 
swayed to vote for one party and not the other, strikes me as quite weak. In my opinion, factors 
like fear, coercion, threats to lose one’s job or social contacts might push people to make an 
‘unauthentic’ political decision (cf. e.g. Roop et al. 2018: 256); ‘freebies’, free trips and 
spectacle are certainly effective, but mostly in bolstering the number of attendees at rallies as a 
show of force. This can be confirmed by the fact that the bussing in of campaigners happens 
especially in areas where support for the respective party has not been high in the past (TEMCO 
1997: 92; REDET & TEMCO 2006: 55).  
Women’s canvassing activities, however, seem to be more universally valued and taken 
seriously: Subira, for instance, claimed that each campaigning team must have women on its 
roll (Notes from Interview 1 with Subira, 25-12-2020). Bi Rehema explained why: 
[I]f there is someone who wants to come campaign in this house. Mister Someone. He 
just sits there. He has said his words, and then he leaves. But if I come in [I will be told]: 
‘Welcome! I am in the kitchen.’ I [will] go into the kitchen. A man cannot go inside the 
kitchen. Women are trusted. Then with the language, we women have a way of speaking 
that perhaps is better for speaking with a stranger. Maybe [you are] in a house that you 
have not come to before, there is no one of your relatives, but you knock, you speak of 
something and you are understood.43  
Bi Halima, who was an organizer of such campaigning teams, told me that they were especially 
useful for reaching those potential female voters who did not come to the campaign meetings 
out of fear, or those who were still undecisive. Door-to-door mobilizing activities were already 
part of female political activists’ repertoire in the 1920s during the organization of the ground 
 
42 Saida shared with me that after entering university and getting married, she started to feel that “[…] there is no 
truth in political matters.” (“[…] hakuna ukweli […] kwenye mambo ya siasa [...]”, Interview 1 with Saida, Dar 
es Salaam, 01-03-2019) 
43 “[K]ama anakuja mtu kucampaign in this house. Mister Someone. He just sit[s] there. Akasema maneno yake, 
kisha, anaondoka. Lakini mimi nikiingia: ‘Karibu! Niko jikoni.’ Naenda mpaka jikoni. Mwanaume hawezi kwenda 
jikoni. […] Women are trusted. […] Halafu na lugha, wanawake […] tuna lugha pengine afadhali zaidi ya 
kuongea na mtu mgeni. Pengine nyumba hujawahikuja, hamna jamaa yako, lakini unapiga hodi, unaongea kitu, 
unafahamika.” (Interview 2 with Bi Rehema, Unguja, 19-11-2018) 
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rent strike in Zanzibar (Fair 1994: 117), as well as of Geiger’s TANU women in Dar es Salaam 
of the 1950s (1997: 59-60; 71). Contemporary critics are however concerned that, again, female 
activists mainly campaign for others (mostly men), and not for themselves (IRI 2016: 24). Bi 
Rehema also raised the point that female campaigning skills were often exploited by male 
politicians44. 
 
(2.5) Electoral Politics since 1995: Constant Crisis 
The first multiparty elections, both for the Union president and parliament, as well as for the 
Zanzibari president and the House of Representatives took place in October 1995 (Bakari 2001: 
224). Just like later elections in 2000 and 2005, the whole process from the registration of 
voters, campaigns, voting and vote counting, up to the announcement of results was marked by 
irregularities, serious flaws and in-transparency. Over- and under-registration of voters, 
constraints on the campaigns of the opposition by state organs, and violence between supporters 
of rival parties, as well as between the opposition and security forces are just a few of the 
symptoms of the permanent political crisis that began in 1995. (Kilian 2008: 100; Moss & 
Tronvoll 2015: 95-96; Nassor & Jose 2014: 248, 254; ICG 2019: 4; Rawlence 2005: 520) 
Election results in 1995 and 2005 were extremely narrow, while the ruling party allegedly 
secured a margin of 34% in 2000 after a controversial partial re-run (Cameron 2001: 284-285; 
Kilian 2008: 114).  
With the amendments allowing for the re-introduction of multiple parties, a quota system for 
female representation was also incorporated in both the Zanzibari Constitution and the Union 
Constitution, initially providing for 15% special seats for women (Askew 2002: 241)45. Bi 
Rehema and Bi Khadija both entered the House of Representatives through these seats for CUF 
and CCM respectively, and neither recounted having actively requested their nomination for 
them: Bi Khadija simply said she was selected by the president, while Bi Rehema was 
approached by party elders who were in need of capable women to fill the positions.  
Special seats continue to be the most common way through which Tanzanian and Zanzibari 
women enter formal politics; the 2016 International Republican Institute (IRI) report estimates 
that from 1985 to 2000, 95% of women entered Tanzania’s two legislatures through some kind 
of special seat arrangement (2016: 4). The reasons for women’s marked underrepresentation 
 
44 cf. Interview 2 with Bi Rehema, Unguja, 19-11-2018: “So their [men’s] chances are low in campaigns. That’s 
why they take advantage of us. Yes. They know [that] women’s agitation [skills are] big. If he manages to go to 
two houses, I can go to two hundred houses.” (“Kwa hiyo chances zao ni fupi kwa campaign. That’s why they take 
advantage of us. Yes. Wanajua wanawake harakati yao kubwa. Yeye kama anamudu kwenda nyumba mbili, miye 
naweza kwenda nyumba mia mbili.”) 
45 A similar quota system had already existed under one-party rule (Kairuki 2013: 17). 
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both as candidates and holders of direct constituency seats can be aptly summarized as the 
‘three Cs’: cash, capacity and conflict (ibid.: 25). First, female aspirants are said to be more 
likely to have inadequate financial resources, which are needed at different steps of the process 
from nomination- and candidacy fees, over campaigning costs, up to possible bribes (Brown 
2001: 72; IRI 2016: 25; Mosha & Johnson 2004: 10, 29, 91; REDET & TEMCO 2006: 45; 
Shayo 2005b: 9; TEMCO 1997: 71). Lacking capacity, in terms of political experience, 
leadership skills, willingness or time on the part of women, is often cited, especially by political 
parties themselves, as a reason for their shortage of female candidates (IRI 2016: 7, 24; Oloka-
Onyago & Nassali 2003: 65; Shayo 2005b: 9; TECMO 1997: 71). A lot of my respondents 
would however strongly refute this claim, like Bi Farida, who placed the fault squarely with the 
male-dominated party leadership: 
[T]he women themselves, they already have the willingness to enter decision-making 
bodies and to participate in politics. Except what we observed during the intervention[s] 
that we did last time in the 2015 elections, is that the political parties themselves, they 
are not ready to support women.46 (see also: Mosha & Johnson 2004: 12) 
Women’s political enthusiasm might in fact be exceptionally strong in Zanzibar, as Raphael 
Ami from the project ‘Women Leaders – Power of Change’47 observed: 
Generally, what is interesting is that when I went to Zanzibar for the first time […] I was 
so surprised because these women were fierce! They were so informed, they were so 
actively engaged, as if they are from a different country. […] it’s like politics is everything 
for them.48 (see also Oloka-Onyago & Nassali 2003: 65) 
The last ‘c’, conflict, signifies the “fierce competition intimidation, hate speech, slander and 
sometimes violence that women candidates encounter” (IRI 2016: 25), which most often 
amounts to verbal abuse by rivals, party colleagues and the media; physical violence and sexual 
harassment have however also been reported (ibid: 11; Mosha & Johnson 2004: 77; Shayo 
2005b: 9; TECMO 1997: 71). Another facet that I would allocate here is the risk that some 
candidates take in terms of their long-term job security, especially if they are employed by the 
government, which has a habit of laying off employees with ‘undesirable’, i.e. oppositional 
‘tendencies’ (Mosha & Johnson 2004: 37; Oloka-Onyago & Nassali 2003: 72).  
 
46 “[…] wanawake wenyewe tayari wanao utayari wa kuingia katika vyombo vya maamuzi na kushiriki katika 
siasa. Isipokuwa tu tulichokiobserve katika intervention ambazo tulifanya last time katika uchaguzi wa 2015, ni 
kwamba hizi political parties zenyewe, they are not ready to support women.” (Interview 1 with Bi Farida, Unguja, 
31-10-2018) 
47 The project, funded by the EU delegation to Tanzania and implemented by Hanns-Seidel Foundation aimed at 
enhancing women’s participation in leadership positions at different levels of decision making in Tanzania; see: 
https://tanzania.hss.de/eu-project/.  
48 His surprise, as he admits himself, partly stemmed from stereotypes, that he, as a mainland (and probably 
Christian) academic harboured: “I never thought they could be that strong. […] [B]ecause of the religion […] my 
expectation was, maybe they are less engaged, but that was absolutely contrary to my expectation.” (Interview 1 
with Raphael Ami, Skype, 06-05-2019) 
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Additional to the ‘three Cs’, many studies refer to structural issues, on the one hand inherent 
to the special seat system, which may lead to the perception on the part of party strategists that 
“since the women have special seats they should not take the spot of a man who can run, and 
presumably be more competitive, for an open competition elected seat” (IRI 2016: 5; see also 
Mosha & Johnson 2004: 94). On the other hand, the winner-takes-all electoral system makes it 
harder for the minority of women who do manage to run to secure themselves a seat (ibid.: 12). 
All in all, most analysts and many of my respondents remain ambiguous about the long-term 
effects of special seat or quota policies. The system has certainly been successful in creating a 
critical mass of female representatives, which undoubtedly led to more gender-sensitive 
legislation. On the other hand, in Zanzibar (as elsewhere) there still remains a lot to be done in 
terms of truly equitable political representation. (Kairuki 2013: 18; Mosha & Johnson 2004: 
107)  
Likewise, structural issues, like the winner-takes-all system, possible gerrymandering and 
the dubious role of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) caused one political crisis after 
another in Zanzibar. Overall, none of the first three elections under the multiparty system 
produced a result that all parties and voters were able to accept. Three peace accords all either 
failed before their implementation, or were only implemented in a flawed and faltering manner. 
(Bakari & Makulilo 2012: 197; Bakari 2011: 232-233; Cameron 2002: 314-325; Kelsall 2007: 
527-528; Killian 2008: 113-114; Moss & Tronvoll 2015: 95-96; Rawlence 2005: 517-520) 
Bakari (2001) argues that the Zanzibari polity was in fact less democratic after 1995 than in the 
last years of one-party rule (251-252). There were widespread politically motivated sackings 
and other repressive measures, especially targeted at Pembans, who were seen as troublemakers 
and opposition supporters across-the-board; as well as a number of sporadic violent incidents 
all over the archipelago, probably perpetrated by militants from both sides of the party divide. 
(Amnesty International 2002: 4; Bakari 2001: 134, 137-140, 258-262; Bakari 2011: 253; HRW 
2002: 7; Oloka-Onyago & Nassali 2003: 72)  
In this hostile climate, Bi Rehema lost her job in a government affiliated institution shortly 
after entering the House of Representatives. Her sister back in Pemba, Bi Rukia, was fired in 
1998, because, as she claimed, she expressed a deviationist opinion on the Union structure 
during the public meetings of the Kisanga Commission49. Both women indicated to me that 
these experiences further politicized and motivated them in their activism: “I was expelled from 
work, I was now at home, so I felt that now I should participate fully in politics, competing for 
 
49 In 1998, the appeal court judge Robert Kisanga was appointed to head a commission to review the Union 
constitution and make recommendations to its enhancement. The issue of the Union’s structure came up 
prominently in the commission’s research and report. (Branson 2015: 3; Oloka-Onyago & Nassali 2003: 14-15) 
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different leadership positions in politics on the side of the opposition,”50 Bi Rukia said. Bi 
Khadija, a member of the ruling party, also (reluctantly) recounted her experiences with social 
discord in this period: 
In the past, when multipartyism started, people didn’t know about these many parties 
[and how to behave]. Like the things [that] the opposition [did]: they put faeces inside 
the well. The members of the opposition destroy[ed] the water pipes so we wouldn’t get 
water. They did these things. In the past. But now they don’t do that. But the ruling party 
did not dare to do this. Because we are the people of the government.51  
Bi Khadija conveniently blocks out the state-led repressive measures enforced against the 
opposition and its followers from her narrative. It is however without a doubt true, that this 
period was frightening for supporters of the incumbent as well; especially in Pemba physical 
attacks against property and people connected to CCM were quite common (Bakari 2001: 258, 
262). 
Eventually, the tensions and animosity between the political camps found their sad climax 
in 2001: on January 26 and 27, between 30 and 70 men and women were killed in several 
Pemban towns and in Zanzibar City by security forces during CUF-organised protest marches 
against the official election results; hundreds more were injured and arrested. Women were 
sexually assaulted and raped – especially during house raids and while in police custody. As a 
result of the violence, around 2,000 people sought refuge in Kenya and Somalia. (Amnesty 
International 2002; Oloka-Onyago & Nassali 2003: 66; HRW 2002) Bi Halima, who 
participated in a protest in Zanzibar City and was subsequently arrested told me: “We were 
brought to the jail. And don’t believe that you just go there, [that] you are brought like a bride! 
You are beaten up!”52 By contrasting treatment accorded to brides – the ‘icon of femininity’ in 
coastal culture (Fuglesang 1994: 141) – with the actual practices of the police, Bi Halima’s 
statement highlights that violence against women as women, in her opinion, should be assessed 
as an especially grave breach of moral standards by the security forces.  
Sometime during this period of turmoil, another one of my respondents, Subira, entered party 
politics. Looking for work as a recent university-graduate, she described being constantly 
confronted with questions like ‘Which side [are] you on?’ or ‘Whose child are you?’ 53. Her 
 
50 “Nikatolewa kazini, nikawa sasa niko nyumbani kwa hiyo nikaona nishirikisha sasa kikamilifu katika siasa kwa 
kugombea nafasi mbalimbali za uongozi katika sisasa kwa upande wa upinzani.” (Interview 1 with Bi Rukia, 
Pemba, 26-11-2018) 
51 “Zamani vilivyoanza vyama vyingi watu walikuwa. [...] hawajui vyama vyingi. Kama vitu vya upinzani: wanatia 
vinyesi kwenye [...] kisima. [...] Wapinzani wanabomoa bomba wa majij, tusipate. Walikuwa wanafanya hivyo. 
Hapo zamani. Lakini sasa hawafanyi. […] Lakini chama kinachotawala hakijathubutu kufanya hivi. Kwa sababu 
sisi ni watu wa serikali.” (Interview 2 with Bi Khadija, Unguja, 13-11-2018) 
52 “Tukachukuliwa jela. […] Na usifikiri kuwa unakwenda tu, unapelekwa kama Bi Arusi! Unapigwa juu.” 
(Interview 1 with Bi Halima, Unguja, 13-02-2019) 
53 ‘Wewe upande gani?’, ‘[Wewe ni] mtoto wa nani?’ (Notes from Interview 1 with Subira, Unguja, 25-12-2018) 
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experiences are indicative of the pervasive influence of party politics in the realm of 
employment in Zanzibar then and now54, as well as the degree to which political alignment is 
common knowledge – a simple question about one’s family background could reveal one’s 
political ‘side’. Subira, growing increasingly frustrated, searched for a forum in which she could 
express and address her grievances. She eventually joined the CHADEMA party55, where she 
holds a local leadership position today.  
With the presidency of Amani Karume (2000-2010), the archipelago saw was a slight 
mitigation of the political tensions, especially because CUF for the first time recognized a CCM 
presidency. However, when the opposition withdrew from renewed peace negotiations in 
March 2008, the relations between the parties worsened again, and with the onset of voter 
registration in July 2009 societal frictions rose to an unprecedented level. Social and economic 
boycotts, arson attacks and bomb blasts became an almost daily fare. (Bakari 2011: 262; Brown 
2010: 625-628; Cameron 2002: 313; Moss 2016: 320; Moss & Tronvoll 2015: 95-97, 106 fn. 
58; Minde et al. 2018: 165) Due to this cycle of escalating violence, CUF leader Seif Sharif 
Hamad, and CCM president Amani Karume met for talks in November 2009: their momentous 
‘hand-shake-agreement’ was followed by the so-called maridhiano (reconciliation)-process. As 
a result, the Zanzibar Constitution was amended to allow for the formation of a Government of 
National Unity (GNU) after the forthcoming elections. In July 2010, a referendum confirmed 
these amendments with a 66.4% majority56. The elections three months later were calm and 
peaceful, and although electoral margins were again extremely close (1%), opposition leader 
Hamad accepted the result, and thereafter became First Vice President. (Minde et al. 2018: 166; 
Hirschler & Hofmeier 2011)  
In the first two years of the following legislative period the spirit of harmony between the 
parties that had begun to develop in early 2010 continued, and an atmosphere of collaboration 
and critical democracy prevailed in the HoR (Roop et al. 2018: 260). Scholars, politicians and 
the general population welcomed these developments with enthusiasm and social relationships 
in the archipelago improved significantly (Bakari & Makulilo 2012: 212-213; Hirschler & 
 
54 With the government continuing to be the largest formal employer, this is of course highly relevant for most 
graduates (cf. SMZ 2019: 7). 
55 CHADEMA (Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo – Party for Democracy and Progress) has not yet been able 
to secure a meaningful proportion of votes in Zanzibar. On the mainland, however, where Subira studied, 
CHADEMA began making strides in 2007 as a vocal opposition party, especially in connection to a series of 
corruption scandals in the Kikwete administration. In the 2010 General Election, it surpassed CUF as the biggest 
opposition party in the Union parliament. (Hirschler & Hofmeier 2008, 2011 & 2012) Subira told me that she 
joined CHADEMA and not CUF or CCM because she saw bigger chances of fast advancement as a woman there 
(Notes from Interview 1 with Subira, Unguja, 25-12-2018). 
56 The same constitutional amendment also raised the percentage of special women’s seats awarded in the Zanzibari 
HoR to 40% (Roop et al. 2018: 261). 
30 
 
Hofmeier 2012; Nassor & Jose 2014; Minde et al. 2018: 166, 169) – although the arrangement 
was, according to Roop et al., far from perfect or even fair (2018: 255, 258). Additionally, 
within CCM leadership and its party base in Unguja, substantial scepticism about the GNU 
remained (ibid: 255, 259-260; Minde et al. 2018: 169, 174). 
From late 2011 onwards, when the issue of the Union and its structure – and thereby the 
question of greater autonomy for Zanzibar – came to be part of a national debate in the context 
of the constitutional review launched by Union president Kikwete, the atmosphere changed, 
and the spirit of Maridhiano and the GNU began to ail. CUF and some reformist CCM carders 
advocated for a re-structuring of the Union towards a three-government-system, while CCM 
hardliners accused them of the ultimately aiming to break up the arrangement altogether. The 
divisive 2015 electoral campaigns and the dramatic events following the October elections can 
be understood both as the deathblow to the Maridhiano-spirit and the Government of National 
Unity, as well as a re-assertion of control by CCM hardliners in Zanzibar. (Minde et al. 2018: 
164-175; ICG 2019: 5) Tangibly disenchanted, Bi Rehema summed up the ‘history’ of the GNU 
like this: “I feel a lot of resignation at seeing that the GNU was a story like smoke. It was just 
a story like smoke, it passed by, [and] it was [already] over.” 57  
The subsequent elections in 2015, although calm and appraised as the most transparent and 
free since 1995 by observers, were annulled in a dramatic move by the chairman of the ZEC; 
ostensibly as it became clear that the opposition had made significant gains in Unguja (until 
then a CCM stronghold) and Seif Shariff Hamad had declared himself and his party the winners 
of the elections. After failed closed-door talks, an election re-run was held in March 2016, 
which was boycotted by the opposition. These developments effectively put Zanzibar back 
under one-party rule, as all but four seats in the Zanzibari House of Representatives were filled 
by CCM-members. CUF refused to recognize the president and his government, and as a result, 
at least half of the Zanzibari electorate is effectively excluded from political participation and 
representation today. (Hirschler & Hofmeier 2017; Minde et al. 2018: 176-177, 181; Roop et 
al. 2018: 264; Pallotti 2017: 557) Bi Rukia captured how this affected the previously improved 
social relations in the archipelago:  
In the time from 2010 until 2015 there was no discrimination like, ‘who is this one’, 
‘which party does he/she support’. We did our work together. We walked together, 
neighbours, relatives, all were good together. No problem. But just after the Government 
of National Unity ran into troubles in 2015, you started again like it was before: ‘So-and-
 
57 “Lakini mimi […] nasikia unyonge sana kuona kwamba [GNU] imekuwa ni hadithi kama moshi. Imekuwa ni 
hadithi kama moshi tu, imepita, imeisha.” (Interview 1 with Bi Rehema, Unguja, 24-10-2018) 
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so is not my fellow.’ ‘I do not want to work with so-and-so.’ ‘I do not visit so-and-so’. So, 
these are the politics that we have right now. Of hate.58 
In addition, democratic and civil space in Zanzibar and Tanzania has shrunk progressively since 
2015 (Defend Defenders 2018: 10; ICG 2019: 6; Hirschler & Hofmeier 2018: 388). As we have 
seen above, democratic processes have never been flawless, but since John Magufuli became 
Union president, things have taken a pronounced turn for the worse: opposition party members 
and government critics are harassed, imprisoned, and have become victims of assault and even 
murder. Independent newspapers have been closed or suspended, and journalists are persecuted 
and have disappeared. Civil society organizations and independent researchers are intimidated. 
(Article 19 2018; Defend Defenders 2018: 14, 21-24, 26; Hirschler & Hofmeier 2018: 388, 391; 
ICG 2019: 6-7; Ulimwengu 2017) Often, violent incidents have taken place in an unexplained 
and mysterious manner which further adds to the general atmosphere of fear and insecurity in 
the population59 (Defend Defenders 2018: 23; Hirschler & Hofmeier 2018: 392; ICG 2019: 6-
7). At the same time, Tanzania’s economy is faltering, with the president’s unpredictable policy 
shifts scaring off both local and international investors in the private sector (Hirschler & 
Hofmeier 2018 & 2019; ICG 2019: 7-8). In June 2016, all opposition rallies and protests were 
suspended until at least 2020. Further measures by the police suggested that internal party 
meetings could also fall under this ordinance, which has left the opposition in an extremely 
precarious state – pushed out of the public sphere and at risk for government intervention even 
during internal gatherings (Hirschler & Hofmeier 2017; ICG 2019: 6, 8). Bi Halima told me 
that scheduled meetings of CUF party leaders with the Zanzibar Youth Wing had been 
prevented by the authorities the day we met for our interview. In general, the undemocratic 
developments on the mainland were observed with great worry, and their impact was acutely 
felt in the islands by my oppositional respondents: “We are being crushed. That man 
[Magufuli] just [upon] entering [into office], he blocked everything.”60 (Bi Halima, Unguja, 
13-02-2019).  
 
58 “[Wakati wa 2010 mpaka 2015] […] ilikuwa hakuna ubaguzi wa kuwa huyu ni nani, huyu ni chama gani […]. 
Tuko tunafanya kazi kwa pamoja. Tunatembea pamoja, majirani, ndugu, wote tuko vizuri kwa pamoja. Hakuna 
tatizo. Lakini mara tu baada ya ile serikali ya umoja wa kitaifa kuingia dosari 2015 pale ukaanza tena […] [kama 
ilivyokuwa] kabla: ‘Huyu fulani siyo mwenzangu’, ‘Huyu fulani sitaki kufanya naye kazi.’ ‘Huyu fulani 
simtembelei.’[…] Kwa hivyo hizi ndo siasa zizopo sasa hivi. Za chuki. (Interview 1 with Bi Rukia, Pemba, 26-11-
2018) 
59 A good example would be the mysterious kidnapping of billionaire Mo Dewji in October 2018 (BBC 2018). I 
spent the weekend after his disappearance in Dar es Salaam and the city was abuzz with rumours and conspiracy 
theories, from allegations that Dewji had orchestrated his kidnapping himself, to claims that president Magufuli 
had personally ordered it (Informal conversations, Dar es Salaam, 12- to 14-10-2018). Bi Rehema referred to the 
incident in one of our interviews when talking about the risks of political involvement in present-day Tanzania. 
(Interview 1 with Bi Rehema, Unguja, 24-10-2018) 
60 “Tumebanwa sana. […] Huyu bwana [Magufuli] kuingia tu, akablock kila kitu.” (Interview 1 with Bi Halima, 
Unguja, 13-02-2019) 
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The Zanzibari House of Representatives further added its own set of restrictive laws, for 
instance reversing the reform of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) that, as part of past 
reconciliation agreements, was intended to make the electoral process more transparent and 
fair. Due to the 2015 crisis and the subsequent developments there seems to be only very limited 
space for inter-party dialogue. (ICG 2019: 10) The leadership crisis in CUF and the mass-
defection of most of its Zanzibar faction to ACT-Wazalendo in March 2019 further contributed 
to instability and uncertainty, especially because there is the possibility that the incumbents will 
try to use new party registration laws to obstruct the opposition’s activities as the next elections 
in 2020 draw closer (ibid. 8-9). There is a growing sense of precariousness and concern relating 
to the coming elections (see e.g. Mwananchi 2019: 15; Salim 2019b: 17), which Bi Rehema 
expressed as well: 
But now, the style that the mkuu61 is going with is not good and may God grant that we 
might just be patient. That we should not become like other places, they would already 
have war by now. But the truth is that he is moving [us] towards that there either is no 
election in 2020, or if there is, I am asking myself of what kind it will be. Really, I am 
asking myself how it will be in 2020.62 
 
(2.6) Conclusion: “It is like a bomb that is ready to blast.”  
Since the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in 1992, the political climate in Zanzibar 
seems to be marked by similarly intensive and chronic conflicts as during the first Zama za 
Siasa, generating deep divisions which, in such a small geographical space, almost inevitably 
have an adverse effect on social relationships (cf. Glassman 2011: 285). Bakari (2011: 242) and 
Minde et al. (2018: 163) agree that, despite some periods of relative calm, the political crisis in 
Zanzibar has been a constant since at least 1995.  
On the level of the political parties, division and conflict are caused by a deep mistrust and 
hostility between the two camps (Bakari 2011: 223-224). The incumbent CCM lacks the 
willingness to surrender its power and grip on state resources (Minde et al. 2018: 165), while 
the opposition does not believe that the current electoral system will be able to ever deliver a 
fair result (Bakari 2011: 232-233; Roop et al. 2018: 248). A huge bone of contention is the 
question of the nature and future of the Union with the mainland (Minde et al. 2018: 167)63. 
 
61 ‘Mkuu’ can, amongst others, mean leader, or elder (Knappert & van Kessel 2010). Here, Bi Rehema is referring 
to President Magufuli. Just like Bi Halima, and many other people that I met during my stay in Zanzibar and Dar 
es Salaam, she avoided mentioning his name directly.  
62 “Lakini sasa hivi style ambayo anakwenda nayo mkuu siyo nzuri na Mungu ajaliwe tuwe wastahamilivu hivi. 
Tusiwe kama sehemu nyingine, tayari wangekuwa wana vita saa hizi. Lakini ukweli ni kwamba anapelekea kwaba 
aidha hakuna uchaguzi 2020 au kama upo […] najiuliza itakuwa wa aina gani. […] [Kweli] nakuwa najiuliza 
inakuwaje 2020.” (Interview 1 with Bi Rehema, 24-10-2018)    
63 It is notable that even in CCM-Zanzibar, a critical mass favours more Zanzibari sovereignty (Hirschler & 
Hofmeier 2006; Glassman 2011: 294; ICG 2019: 3). Nevertheless, CCM party leaders know that ultimately, their 
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Additionally, political rivals are not understood as such, but are frequently portrayed and treated 
as ‘the enemy’64 (Hirschler & Hofmeier 2010). 
For ordinary Zanzibaris, the party conflict translates into everyday life as a disparate access 
to ‘life chances’, i.e. the relative ease or difficulty to seize employment, business licenses, loans, 
scholarships, passports, and other government services. The incumbent party, in its 
entanglement with the state, acts as a major gatekeeper here, distributing rewards and sanctions 
at discretion. (Bakari 2001: 149-150; Bakari 2011: 251; Nassor & Jose 2014: 253) The 
extremely close electoral margins and the fact that regional dynamics play a role in the political 
conflict as well, indicate that there is significant polarization in Zanzibari society (Roop et al. 
2018: 248). All of the few respondents that were prepared to answer my questions to this end, 
could tell me about a friend or neighbour that they no longer interacted with, or a relative that 
caused a rift in their family due to his or her political attitude.  
 Within the political discourse, memories of violence and experiences of discrimination and 
exclusion from the distant and more recent past that I have narrated in this chapter, are actively 
commemorated and frequently referred to (Cameron 2004: 109; Kilian 2008: 114; Moss & 
Tronvoll 2015: 97). Bi Kauthir, who personally has been a victim of politicized intimidation, 
characterized the situation as follows: in 
general, she said, Zanzibaris are tolerant and 
patient (wavumilivu) but ‘they have pain in their 
hearts – it is like a bomb that is ready to blast. 
For now, they are enduring, but if something 
happens it can [all blow up]’65. She vividly 
pointed to the fact that political resentment and 
grievances in Zanzibar sit deep, just under the 
surface of the peaceful and calm ‘island paradise’ and have never been sustainably reconciled. 
The 2010 maridhiano-process constituted a hope in this regard, but it seems to have failed in 
the long run (cf. Arnold Koenings 2018: 178; Minde et al. 2018; Rajab 2018: 348, 350; Roop 
et al. 2018). 
 
continued rule depends on their mainland counterparts and the security forces they command (Bakari 2001: 262; 
Cameron 2009: 155; Roop et al. 2018: 248). The fact that there are significant doubts whether the political and 
constitutional structure of the Union could even accommodate an opposition government in Zanzibar complicates 
matters further (Brown 2010: 628-629; Rawlence 2005: 522). 
64 This was also expressed by Subira who said, ‘If you are an opposition member, you are the enemy, you don’t 
have rights’ (‘Ukiwa mpinzani, wewe ndo ni adui, […] huna haki’; Notes from Interview 2 with Subira, Unguja, 
29-01-2019) 
65‘Wana maumivu ndani ya moyo – ni kama bomb ambaye ni tayari kublast. […] kwa sasa wamevumilia lakini 
ikitokea kitu inaweza kublast.’ (Notes from Interview 1 with Bi Kauthir, Unguja, 02-02-2019) 
Fig. 6: Political cartoon commenting on the 2020 
elections (ICG & Gado 2019; cropped by the author)  
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The political context in Zanzibar is thus overall characterized by a great deal of fragility and 
uncertainty. Union-President Magufuli’s encroachment on political and civil rights in the 
mainland has emboldened Zanzibari hardliners to act in increasingly authoritative ways. A 
growing number of disenchanted and often unemployed youth might be ready to voice their 
frustrations in violent ways (ICG 2019: 11). Others, having experienced several phases of 
seeming reconciliation and hope being superseded by phases of escalation and tension, are quite 
frankly tired of the political ‘games’ (Cunningham Bissell & Fouéré 2018: 3; Keshodkar 2013: 
68). It is further unclear what the recent split of Zanzibar’s opposition will mean for the political 
conflicts in the islands, as well as for the nationwide elections in 2020 (ICG 2019:8-9; 
Karashani 2019; Ulimwengu 2019). 
Zanzibar and Zanzibaris continue to be polarized, and today, like in the past, the close, 
intimate and, personal interactions between followers of the incumbent and the opposition 
parties often lead to especially severe feelings of resentment (Glassman 2011: 108; 284-285). 
In such a context, elections and other political processes cannot but function as a catalyst, that 
brings political ills, grievances and frustrations to the surface over and over again (Bakari 2001: 
1; Moss & Tronvoll 2015: 91). These processes obviously affect both men and women, but, as 
I will argue, women develop specific outlooks, attitudes and strategies within this context of 
uncertainty.  
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(3) ‘Birthing’ a Theoretical Framework 
My research question calls for several concepts and theories to be more closely examined in 
order to set the data of this thesis into a comprehensive framework for analysis and 
interpretation. First, as I considered the field and data from a feminist standpoint, I discuss the 
dynamic relationship between feminist thought and motherhood, and establish motherhood as 
institution and resource, and mothering as practice. I especially focus on Sara Ruddick’s (1989) 
notion of maternal thinking here. Uncertainty, as the overarching context of maternal practice 
and maternal thinking in Zanzibar is established, while Vigh’s (2009, 2010, 2015) concept of 
social navigation – so far most notably deployed in studies of (male) youth (cf. Christiansen et 
al. 2006: 13, 22; Cooper & Pratten 2015: 9; Di Nunzio 2015; Thorsen 2006; Vigh 2006 & 2010; 
Waage 2006) – is introduced and extended by integrating it with the relationality of maternal 
thinking. I argue that ‘maternal navigation’ as a concept can take into account the practices of 
people who not only strategize to ‘get by’ and ‘get on’ as individuals, but who navigate 
uncertainty on behalf of and through others as mothers. 
 
(3.1) Feminism and Motherhood: A Turbulent Relationship 
“[…] the contemporary capitalist industrialized societies in which white feminists are located 
are structured to disregard motherhood, […] [as a result] many feminist have bought into the 
idea that to progress (whatever that means), women must discount, minimize, nay eschew 
motherhood in their lives. (Oyèwùmí 2016: 214) 
When I began noticing patterns in Zanzibari women’s narratives, referring to their role as 
mothers and the influence this had on their (political) behaviour, I was initially faced with 
doubts whether a focus on women as mothers would be appropriate within a feminist-oriented 
research project: Would I not run the risk of reducing women back on their biology, which has 
long been one of the central premises of gender-based discrimination that feminism strives to 
overcome? Was ‘women-as-mothers’ not an outdated and reactionary category? Would such a 
focus even be applicable to the totality of my data, given that at least two of my respondents 
weren’t biological mothers? 
My initial apprehension was undoubtedly fed by a subliminal awareness of the categorical 
rejection of biological motherhood by some radical white Western feminists as summarized and 
criticized by the Nigerian feminist scholar Oyèrònké Oyèwùmí above. Such extreme views 
however only represent a fraction of feminist thought on maternity, mothers, and mothering, 
which is much more diverse and multifaceted than the quote above makes it seem: additional 
to being the subject of an expanding field of feminist inquiry, much of the mainstream feminist 
political agenda in the past and present actually centres on ‘maternal issues,’ for instance 
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through campaigns for safe abortion, maternity leave, or through promoting the compatibility 
of family and career (Arendell 2000: 1192; Kinser 2010a: 395-396; Ruddick 1989: 236). 
 Still, the relationship between (Western) feminism and motherhood has been a dynamic 
one; as intimate, as it has been conflicted (Coulter 2010a: 572; Kinser 2010a: 396). It emerged 
from the maternal feminism of first wave feminists, suffragettes and peace activists (Coulter 
2010b: 707; Marotta 2010: 992), to, indeed, a repudiation of motherhood by early second wave 
feminists, who saw biological reproduction as the root of women’s oppression (Tong 1989: 74-
76; Roth-Johnson 2010: 352). Yet, theorizing did not stop dead here, and scholars like Adrienne 
Rich, Nancy Chodorow and Sara Ruddick initiated a feminist reclaiming and rethinking of 
maternity in the late 1970s and 1980s. Today, motherhood studies constitute a separate field of 
inquiry, with their own research association66, journals67, and conferences. (Green 2010b: 831-
832; Glenn 1994: 22-23; Jeremiah 2006: 22-23)  
African feminist thinkers have had (and are having) similarly intensive debates on the issue 
of motherhood, especially about its relationship with an ‘authentically’ African feminist 
outlook. Most of these thinkers agree that, in general, the concepts developed for feminist 
analysis in the West by white, middle-class theorists and activists are – to say the least – 
inadequate to describe and examine African realities. Based on this criticism, a number of 
writers have drafted up indigenous feminist models, intended to speak from and to an African 
perspective and location. (Nkealah 2016: 62) One of these models is what Catherine Obianuju 
Achonolu (1995) termed ‘motherism’; an alternative to Western feminism, focussing on the 
centrality of motherhood in the experiences of African women and highlighting the nurturing, 
life-giving and -sustaining role of rural women (Bakare-Yusuf 2003: 7; Ebunoluwa 2009: 231; 
Nkealah 2016: 62). Others, like Oyèwùmí, emphasize the powerful position and centrality 
accorded to mothers as the givers of life in the philosophies of different African societies, which 
was offset negatively with the onset of colonialism and the spread of Abrahamic religions 
(2016: 2, 7; see also Tyler 2013: 221). Most of the authors of the ‘motherist strand’ subscribe 
to what Bibi Bakare-Yusuf has termed the ‘dual-sex role system theory’ (2003: 5) – questioning 
the inherency of the hierarchization of gender relations in African societies, and arguing that 
before colonialism African societies were organized by complementary and parallel structures 
of power for women and men (ibid. 3). In these approaches, motherhood represents the central 
 
66 The Motherhood Initiative for Research and Community Involvement (MIRCI), see: 
https://motherhoodinitiative.org/.  
67 e.g. the Journal of the Motherhood Initiative for Research and Community Involvement (until 2009: Journal of 
the Association for Research on Mothering; see: https://jarm.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/jarm/index), or the 
Journal of Mother Studies (https://jourms.wordpress.com/).    
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column of women’s identity and “the symbolic core of a powerful female subject position” 
(ibid. 4).  
Proponents of a more radical African feminism have strongly criticized this often 
romanticising, uncritical celebration of maternity (see ibid. 5; Nekeleah 2016: 64; McFadden 
& Twasiima 2018: 3, 12, 14). Desiree Lewis writes that 
[c]elebrating purely symbolic roles for women, or affirming gendered roles of service and 
nurturing, Achonolu [with her idea of ‘motherism] ultimately reinforced gender 
stereotypes. […] The assumption that identities and life strategies that are historically 
determined, profoundly oppressive and coercively policed [like motherhood] can provide 
the only basis for an alternative to western feminism is disturbing. (2001: 6, my emphasis) 
Others, like Fatou Sow in her recent keynote lecture at the 2019 European Conference of 
African Studies in Edinburgh, denounce the celebration of African women’s power as mothers 
as tokenistic, and warn that motherhood often develops into a trap (YouTube 2019b; see also 
McFadden 1997). 
 
(3.1.1) Motherhood and Mothering 
In my opinion, both of the general approaches to maternity by African feminists remain 
somewhat incomplete, as they focus mainly on its ideologies and symbolisms; their subject 
matter is thus the institution of motherhood, and not mothering as a lived experience. This 
differentiation is one of the central conceptual distinctions of motherhood studies; established 
in the Western tradition by Adrienne Rich in her ground-breaking work Of Woman Born (1976). 
With the concept of motherhood as an institution, Rich meant to denote the socially constructed 
ideals of motherhood and the culturally specific image of ‘the good mother’. These often work 
to the detriment of women and may contribute to their oppression under patriarchy in a 
significant way, as mothers struggle to meet an impossible standard. (Coulter 2010a: 571-572; 
O’Reilly 2010: vii-viii; Green 2010a: 347 & 2010c: 839; Kinser 2010a: 396) Motherhood as an 
institution for instance finds expression in the dominant image of the “superstrong Black 
mother” (Collins 1991: 116), preeminent in African American communities, as well as in many 
parts of Africa: the suffering and self-sacrifice of mothers is revered but also normalized in a 
way that leaves little space to address the structural issues that make both necessary, as well as 
judging harshly those mothers who ‘fail’ at accomplishing the ideal. (Akujobi 2014: 374, 379; 
Collins 1991: 116-117; hooks 1990: 45)  
On the other hand, the immense symbolic and metaphoric value attached to motherhood as 
an institution might certainly be tapped into as a resource in the quest for various forms of 
public power and legitimacy. Different authors claim that motherhood can be employed as a 
political strategy to frame demands, imbuing them with legitimacy and wider resonance (Alidou 
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2013: 39, 101; Kron 2016: 580, 589, Marotta 2010: 991; Peteet 2002: 140-141,145). 
Motherhood as institution can also be effectively mobilized to gain support without appearing 
threatening (Chuchryk 1989: 131-132; Tibbetts 1994: 38; Weinbaum 1999: 96).  
Historically, motherhood has been a potent force in political activism on the African 
continent: Iris Berger describes how different women’s movements from all over Africa made 
recourse to their maternal roles to lay claim to political power, as well as using it as a source of 
solidarity in the struggle against colonial rule (2016: 66-88). In fact, the female TANU 
nationalists mentioned in the previous chapter made prominent references to natality (and 
thereby to motherhood) to strengthen and legitimize their claims to public leadership and 
activism during pre-independence mobilization: “‘We have given birth to these men [the party 
leaders]. Women are the power in this world. We are the ones who give birth to the world. I am 
telling you that we have to join the party first,’” their leader Bibi Titi Mohammed for instance 
argued, when addressing potential female party members in the 1950s (Geiger 1997: 58).  
This other side of the institution of motherhood – what I would term ‘motherhood as 
(political) resource’ – is certainly what African motherists refer to when they argue that the 
institution of motherhood can be a site of power and leadership (Oyèwùmí 2016: 216). Other 
writers however caution about the wider implications of the usage of motherhood in this way: 
Peteet for instance argues that political claims to motherhood may be empowering and effective 
in the short run, but not transformative in the long term, as activism remains within the rigid 
framework of conservative gender norms (Peteet 2002: 135, 139). Others warn in a similar vein 
that making demands on the basis of motherhood often serves to reinforce stereotypical and 
essentialist images of women, relegating them even further to the margins of formal politics 
(Moravec 2010: 21-24; Glenn 1994: 23-24). In this context, it is important to note that many of 
the African ‘motherist’ activists of the anti-colonial struggles were faced with a reactionary 
backlash after independence – as for instance was the case for the mentioned TANU activists  
in post-independence Tanzania who were called on to “[…] abandon leadership roles and 
rebuild the community by retreating into subordinate roles relative to men”  (Mikell 1997: 24; 
see also: Geiger 1997: 191-194). 
In contrast to motherhood as institution, the term ‘mothering’, denotes the concrete practices 
and lived experiences of individuals doing mothering work (O’Reilly 2010: viii; Arendell 2000: 
1196-1197). Although individual mothers may at times succeed in resisting the oppressive 
tendencies of institutional motherhood, most scholars acknowledge that mothering experiences 
are usually heavily affected by its norms and expectations (Green 2010c: 839; O’Reilly 2010: 
viii). Many academics thus highlight the deep ambivalence and dialectical tension inherent to 
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individual and collective experiences of mothering, especially regarding power (Arendell 2000: 
1196-1197; Ruddick 1989: 34-36, 68, 109; Saliba 2002: 8).  
I think that a recognition of this ambivalence, both in relation to the institution of motherhood 
and the experience of mothering, could harmonize the two strands of African feminist thinking 
on maternity that I introduced above – both hold some truth: motherhood can be empowering 
and oppressive at the same time, with women possessing the agency to “resist, rework or 
acquiesce” (Bakare-Yusuf 2003: 8) its normativity, or draw on it as a resource in their quests 
for power and control. Individual experiences of mothering are similarly ambiguous: 
experienced as a trap by some, and as “[…] enabling, enobling, and inclusive” (Oyèwùmí 2016: 
220) by others – or by the same individual mother at different points of her ‘career’, or at 
different times in her day of work (cf. Arendell 2000: 1196). The social, ideological, and 
political context of mothering, as Bakare-Yusuf reminds us, always needs to be considered in 
order to be able to take account of this ambivalence adequately (2003: 5). The same author also 
argues that the embodied potential to bear children is something that all women68 share. Even 
if this potential is never realised or is impaired, it still retains an enormous influence on most 
women’s experiences and relationships. (ibid. 8) This reassures me that a careful, context-
sensitive and critical consideration of women as mothers is by no means out-dated or 
reactionary but actually signifies taking seriously women’s (embodied) experiences in their 
complex entirety. My focus on mothering as experience and the concepts I choose to analyse it 
with, additionally deconstruct images of motherhood resting upon some sort of ‘biological 
essence’, as, for instance, a ‘natural’ motherly instinct allegedly activated by gestation and birth.  
As to my last ‘doubtful question’ – is it permissible to focus on mothering and motherhood 
as an analytical lens if not all of my respondents are, in fact, mothers? In many societies, notions 
of motherhood and womanhood are intimately interwoven, and ‘appropriate femininity’ is often 
firmly tied to the institution of motherhood (Kinser 2010a: 396; see also: Arendell 2000: 1192; 
Glenn 1994: 3; Peteet 2002: 136; Ruddick 1989: 41). Certainly this is the case in Zanzibar, 
where women are understood to only reach full status as adults when they become (preferably 
married) mothers (Beckmann 2015a: 199-120 & 2015b: 61; Fuglesang 1994: 256; Keefe 2016: 
123-125; Kielmann 1998: 141). Women and girls practice mothering in a diverse range of 
relationship constellations from a young age onwards (see e.g. Poblete 2007: 156-158) and are 
 
68 Bakare-Yusuf’s argument of course applies only to cis-women and is exclusionary of transwomen who do not 
possess this ‘natural’ potential but wish to be included in the category of ‘women’. One could however argue that 
even a transwoman’s experience would be shaped significantly by this potential or, more specifically, the lack of 
it, which might make her ‘less of a woman’ in the eyes of some.  
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– as I experienced first-hand – perceived and addressed as (at least prospective) mothers by 
society69. It could thus be expected that most Zanzibari women have internalized cultural and 
religious images of motherhood and proper mothering, and make sense of their experiences as 
women in the islands by referring to these notions – even those women who are not mothers 
(yet). It should however not be swept aside that this firm ideological connection between 
motherhood, femininity and full adult status of course carries strong exclusionary tendencies; 
for sure for women who might choose to stay childless, and even for those for whom 
childlessness is not a choice (see Akujobi 2014: 375). Additionally, we always need to remain 
aware of the fact, that women who are mothers, and who consider their mothering activities as 
an important part of their daily work and identity, still retain other identities and pursue other 
activities that are similarly relevant to an understanding of the complexity of their experiences 
(cf. Glenn 1994: 16). 
 
(3.1.2) Maternal Thinking  
One of the most important works of motherhood studies that addresses mothering primarily as 
practice and lived experience is Sara Ruddick’s 1989 monograph Maternal Thinking. Towards 
a Politics of Peace, in which she establishes a framework for describing and analysing a style 
of thought that develops as mothers engage in the work of mothering (cf. Adams 2010: 726; 
Keller 2010: 834, O’Reilly 2009: 295-296, Green 2010b: 831). Ruddick’s main argument builds 
upon practicalist assumptions about truth: Practicalists presume that distinctive ways of 
knowing evolve out of practices or work – defined as (organised) activities distinguished by 
specific aims and consequent demands. Practitioners who want to achieve these aims develop 
strategies, attitudes, capacities, and virtues in their pursuit and make sense of their actions 
within a framework of socially developed concepts and values. These strategies, attitudes, 
capacities, virtues, concepts and values then constitute a consciousness or truth, connected to 
the specific practice in question. Ruddick applies this model to mothering as work and argues 
that the demands and goals of maternal practice likewise lead to a unique kind of consciousness: 
maternal thinking. (Ruddick 1989: 9-16) By highlighting that mothering is a consciously and 
voluntarily practiced intellectual activity, Ruddick counters essentialist ideas of a ‘natural’ 
maternal instinct (cf. Kinser 2010b: 405, Adams 2010: 727; Glenn 1994: 4-5, O’Reilly 2009: 
296). 
 
69 The polite address for any woman of an approximate childbearing-age in Zanzibar is ‘mama’, which I was 
approached as often as well. With the mean age of women both at first marriage and at first birth around 23 years 
(SMZ 2019: 9), aged 25 years at the time of fieldwork I should have had at least one child by local standards. 
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Ruddick claims that the practice of mothering is shaped and constituted by three demands: 
(1) preserving life, (2) fostering growth, and (3) ensuring social acceptability (Ruddick 1989: 
17). Maternal thinking evolves as mothers think about, develop and make sense of strategies to 
fulfil these maternal demands or aims – strategies of protection, nurturance and training in 
general terms – and try to balance them out amongst each other (ibid. 24). Ruddick believes 
that these three demands, as well as the three types of strategies are universal, while concrete 
practices and thinking vary greatly in different localities, cultures, classes, and religions (ibid. 
52). The most generalizable of the three demands is preservation, since, as Ruddick argues “[i]n 
all societies, children need protective care, though the causes and types of [perceived] fragility 
and the means of protection vary widely” (ibid. 18). Specific strategies of preservation may 
include ‘scrutinizing’ – looking out for dangers before they appear (ibid. 71-72) – or ‘holding’, 
“[…] a way of seeing with an eye toward maintaining the minimal harmony, material resources, 
and skills necessary for sustaining a child in safety” (ibid. 79). A basic attitude of distrust or 
wariness of the actions and strategies of others (especially those in positions of power) as related 
to children’s needs, is also part of mothers’ efforts to ensure preservation. (ibid. 118, 177) 
Fostering growth, in Ruddick’s opinion is more culturally specific, and of course, other people 
than mothers typically aim to fulfil this demand, like e.g. teachers. To mothers, however, falls 
the primary task of upholding the conditions in which growth is possible, for example by 
creating a safe home environment. (ibid. 19-20, 87) Lastly, a mother’s social group demands 
that she trains her children in ways that are acceptable to them, ultimately making her offspring 
successful adults that will contribute to the continuance of the group in question (ibid. 17, 104, 
170). A mother is eventually defined by Ruddick as “[…] someone who responds to the three 
main demands of [maternal practice]” (ibid. 51) and invests a large part of his or her working 
life and time into this response (ibid. 40). Separating birthing work from mothering work, she 
is able to perceive the category of ‘mother’ as principally gender-neutral, although she 
highlights that historically and to a large degree until today, most mothers have been women 
(ibid. 40-41).  
Of course, maternal demands and goals are merely ideals that are striven for, and Ruddick 
herself emphasizes over and over again, that actual maternal practice in this striving is usually 
far from perfect or easy (ibid. 162-163), especially if there are material or environmental 
constraints that obstruct mothers in their work (Frazer & Hutchings 2013: 117; Schalge 2010: 
258). Evelyn Nakano Glenn (1994: 18), in the same line, reminds her readers that, in order to 
fulfil the goals of preservation, fostering growth and ensuring acceptability, mothers are in need 
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of resources that may be more or less difficult to obtain, depending on the context of mothering 
and the social positions of mothers themselves (see also Arendell 2000: 1199).  
Another important and, initially, implicit aspect of Ruddick’s work on mothering is the 
principle or relationality, i.e. the fact of its characterization and constitution by ever-evolving 
networks of relationships. Motherhood and mothering are thus shaped by an understanding of 
the deep and fundamental dependency of the mother-child(ren) unit on the support of others: 
being unsupported, i.e. unconnected, exposes mothers to a much higher degree of vulnerability, 
and causes difficulty in accessing the resources needed for fulfilling maternal demands. 
(Ruddick 1989: 131, 211 & 2009: 306; see also Arendell 2000: 1192; Butler 2016: 19; Jeremiah 
2006: 24, 26)  
Most criticism of Ruddick’s work has been concerning her broad claims pertaining to the 
universal validity of the outlined maternal goals, especially coming from feminists of colour, 
who bemoan the exclusion of their voices and experiences in mainstream (read: white, middle-
class) feminism in general, and within the theories of mothering in particular, which tend to 
minimize or ignore the influences of race and class on experiences and practices as mothers and 
women (Andrade 1990: 92; Collins 1991: 5, 7, 116 & 1994: 48; Glenn 1994: 3; Jenkins 1998: 
202-203, 205, 208). This assessment is highly relevant to me, since African writers – as touched 
upon above – have played a significant part in the critique of the feminist project in this regard. 
It is notable that even those authors who set out to endorse Ruddick’s theses by ‘rethinking’ 
(Keller 2010) or ‘revisiting’ (Frazer & Hutchings 2013) her work, acknowledge the 
ethnocentric and classists bias in her writing. As Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings note, 
Ruddick, by no means, carried out the empirical work that could have strengthened her 
universalist claims (2013: 117); although it needs to be remembered that hers was a “[…] 
philosophical and political project, rather than an anthropological or sociological one.” (Cohn 
2013: 48). Nonetheless, Ruddick is certainly guilty of making a general rule of what is mostly 
her own experience of mothering (Keller 2010: 836). 
Jean Keller argues that much of the contention about Ruddick’s work stems from the general 
tension between universalization and particularism in the social sciences. She proposes a 
‘modified universalism’ as a way out of this dilemma; recognizing on the one hand, that some 
broad and general categorizations are needed in order to make sense of specific, context-bound 
realities of mothering, and to be able to compare them in a meaningful way. (2010: 843-844) 
On the other hand, these categories need to be understood “[…] as provisional and subject to 
change, as new voices contribute to our understanding of mothering” (ibid. 844). Terry 
Arendell, in a similar line, argues that even though we must consider the heterogeneity and 
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diversity of mothering practices, experiences and contexts, an extreme focus on what makes 
mothers different without examining broader commonalities bears the danger of constructing 
“[…] ’an Other who is an exotic alien, a breed apart.’” (2000: 120; citing Bordo 1990: 140; see 
also Moore 2009: 209). Overall, Keller emphasises that only a thorough engagement with the 
specific local variations of abstracted maternal aims can truly enrich a feminist understanding 
of maternal practices and thought (2010: 846). This demand is mirrored by most of the more 
current feminist texts on mothering, urging scholars to abandon ‘pure’ universalism in favour 
of considering diversity and multiplicity, as well as foregrounding the social location of mothers 
and the implications of social, political, and economic contexts in their mothering experiences 
(Abbey & O’Reilly 1998: 14-16, 24-25; Collins 1994: 45, 62; Glenn 1994: 3-4, 26; Jenkins 
1998: 210). 
As the purpose of this thesis is to examine the particular mothering practices of women in a 
particular local context, quite far removed from what Ruddick had in mind when she wrote 
Maternal Thinking, the ethnocentrism critique remains relevant to me. I however tend to agree 
with Keller, that a complete dismissal of Ruddick in favour of extreme particularism is not 
conducive of meaningful scholarship either (Keller 2010: 843). The basic tenets of her theory 
of maternal practice and thinking are extremely helpful in conceptualizing Zanzibari mothers 
as skilled agents who actively negotiate and balance the needs, aspirations, and pressures of 
their environment, as well as of others and themselves, developing strategies, capacities and 
virtues in the process. By adopting Ruddick’s theses as an analytical lens, I can avoid the pitfall 
of reducing women back on ‘biology’ or interpreting their actions as based on some sort of 
innate ‘maternal instinct’. Overall, I see my work as an attempt to move on from Ruddick’s 
general classification of maternal goals, towards a modified, ‘Kellerian’ conceptualization of 
these categories as provisional and necessarily subject to critical examination through the 
empirical data I co-created with respondents. 
Just as the literature on motherhood, Ruddick and other authors focusing on mothering as 
experience give impulses in the direction of its political potential, especially as a resource for 
peace politics in Ruddick’s case. She argues that the fact that all aspects of maternal practice 
are seriously hampered in times and places of conflict and war, creates a potential for 
antimilitarist and nonviolent maternal politics of peace (Ruddick 1989: 148, 220; see also 
Afshar 2004a: 4; Foster 2010: 242-243). The term potential is important here, as Ruddick 
highlights that often, mothers have supported military endeavours (1989: 12, 136; see also: 
Afshar 2004b: 43; Pankhurst 2004: 13-14). The issue that needs to be overcome in order to 
actualize this potential, in Ruddick’s opinion, is the equally strong potential for chauvinism 
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based e.g. on ethnicity, religion or class, and racism that dwells within maternal thinking, often 
aimed at fulfilling maternal demands for particular children only, sometimes to the deliberate 
or unintentional detriment of other – or ‘othered’ – children (1989: 57, 174-175, 177; see also 
Mukta 2000: 166-168; 174-175; Weinbaum 1999: 87, 90-91). Consequently, for the potential 
of maternal thinking in terms of peace building and nonviolence to be ‘activated’, a conscious 
decision to extend care and attentive love to children and people outside of one’s own group is 
needed (Ruddick 1989: 136-137). Ruddick suggests feminism with its ideology of female 
solidarity as a stimulating force (ibid. 239-241), while Patricia Hill Collins argues that practices 
like ‘other-mothering’70 could help extend the ethics of care and provide a foundation for 
political activism in the wider community (1991: 127, 122).  
Additional to Ruddick’s considerations, other authors have claimed that the experience of 
mothering may engender specific political subjectivities, possibly giving rise to ‘maternal’ 
political demands: Alexandra Tibbetts for instance writes that mothering experiences may guide 
the choice and prioritization of political issues by female activists, as well as shape how they 
address these, especially if circumstances or policies impinge on their abilities to care for their 
families properly (1994: 38, 45). For certain ‘motherist’ movements of the past century, 
especially in South America, it was the experiences of governments’ attacks on the domestic 
sphere, e.g. through ‘disappearances’ of family members, that pushed women to engage in 
public political work (Chuchryk 1989: 140). Stefanie Kron claims that, in fact, under such 
circumstances “[…] motherhood may become a radical and political subjectivity” (2016: 580), 
even though it is commonly seen as an apolitical subject position (ibid: 581). Tibbetts however 
cautions, that mothering as experience should not be seen as the exclusive source of female 
activists’ political consciousness and argumentation schemes: “[…] the motivating force of 
women’s political action,” in her opinion, “is not limited to the ‘care ethic’” (ibid. 45). 
 
(3.2) The Context of Mothering in Zanzibar: Uncertainty, (Mis)Trust and 
Vulnerability 
As I do choose to take seriously the demand for a sensitivity to context made by so many 
motherhood scholars and feminists, the question arises, what context, or what parts of the 
overall context in Zanzibar should I turn my attention to? Which aspects of this context had and 
 
70 Othermothering is a term principally developed by black feminist scholars, meant to describe the practices of 
people mothering children who are not their own biological offspring, sometimes in organized women-centred 
networks. Experiences as othermothers have, according to Collins, been the basis for social and political activism, 
especially on behalf of the African American community in the US. (Collins 1991: 119, 127; Wilson Cooper 2020: 
956) 
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have the largest bearing on the mothering practices of the women in my sample? How can this 
context be adequately defined and conceptualized? I argue that in Zanzibar this can be 
appropriately captured by the term uncertainty, which many of my respondents experienced 
and explained to me through a deep sense of their (gendered) vulnerabilities.  
 
(3.2.1) “A World of Uncertainty”  
Uncertainty has been one of the preeminent images used to describe the experience of ordinary 
people in  contemporary Africa against the background of ‘the crisis’, characterized by years of 
economic decline, political instability, and overall dramatic changes since the beginning of the 
1990s (Cooper & Pratten 2015: 1; Mbembe & Roitman 1995: 324; Haram & Yamba 2009: 11-
12). Henrik Vigh describes a “world of uncertainty” (2009: 422) as an environment that is in 
constant motion, shaped by multiple forces at once, in which change is perceived as “an 
uncontrollable sequence of events” (ibid.: 421; my emphasis) and planning for positive futures 
is extremely challenging (ibid.: 419-423). 
This image of uncertainty seems quite fitting as a backdrop to everyday life in Zanzibar – 
like other places in Africa, the islands have gone through major transformations in the recent 
two decades: the liberalization and privatization of the socialist economy under the provisions 
of the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1990s, which lead to the monetarization of 
formerly state-funded social services like health, education or water supply, and an increase of 
corruption, inflation and consumer prices; the re-introduction of the multiparty democratic 
system, causing upheavals and violence in the islands; as well as a surge of tourism and 
immigration from mainland East Africa. (Askew 2006: 29-31; Beckmann 2015b: 76-77; 
Keshodkar 2013: 56-58; Larsen 2009: 18-20) Most of these changes went ahead without 
popular input, and a sense of a personal inability to influence societal shifts and ruptures seems 
to be widespread: 
From the late fifties until now, the lives of most Zanzibari women and men have been 
influenced by dramatic socio-political changes in which most of them had no say at all. 
In this context the unpredictability of life has truly been experienced by Zanzibari men 
and women. (Larsen 1995: 57; my emphasis)  
Larsen refers to some of the historic developments examined in the previous chapter, for 
instance the violent regime change in 1964, the Union with the Tanganyika the same year, as 
well as the liberalization policies of the early 1990s, but this awareness of limited personal 
control over the environment in which they live, is still shared by many Zanzibaris today (see 
Beckmann 2015b: 76; Demovic 2007: 100; Larsen 2013: 73,76, 84). Although there are 
certainly differences in how individuals experienced and experience these economic and 
46 
 
societal shifts – depending for example on their class, ethnic background, or gender (Keshodkar 
2013: 58; see also: Haram & Yamba 2009: 13) – a sense of demise seems to be widely shared, 
which “[has led] led to a profound sense of uncertainty both about individuals’ and families’ 
prospects, and about the continuity of Zanzibari society as a whole […]” (Beckmann 2015b: 
76-77). This generalized sense of decline was also mirrored during some of my interviews and 
informal conversations, as my respondents bemoaned the current ‘hali duni’ (poor (living) 
conditions) and spoke nostalgically about the past, especially in terms of the services the state 
used to provide: 
In the past, when we were little, education was free, we did not pay, [and] you [could] 
study until university. We didn’t pay for water. Do you see? Therefore, life went well. But 
now you have to pay for everything; the state of life is difficult; the salaries of the workers 
are low, those who didn’t work, let’s say they are doing business, that’s difficult. You can 
sit in your store maybe for three days, [and] you don’t sell anything. 71 (Bi Rukia, Pemba) 
As Nadine Beckmann argues, the sense of uncertainty that develops in face of this decline 
decidedly influences the futures that people imagine for themselves, their families, and their 
society (see above). Susan R. Whyte and Godfrey E. Siu confirm this in their definition of 
uncertainty as “[…] the inability to predict the conditions on which you are dependent.” (2015: 
29). In Zanzibar, this incapability manifests itself further in the estimations given by 
respondents when they were asked about the anticipated development of the economic situation 
in the country in the coming twelve months in the most recent Afrobarometer Survey: 33,6% of 
interviewees presumed that the situation would either become ‘worse’ or ‘much worse’, while 
a staggering 27,5% reported that they didn’t know what the future held in this respect 
(Afrobarometer 2016/2018). Additionally, a majority of Zanzibaris assessed their government’s 
strategies in managing different indicators of economic stability and future development as 
overall poor72. 
In summary, a great part of the population in Zanzibar feels that recent years have brought 
significant decline in several areas of their lives, that positive futures for themselves and their 
dependants are not necessarily a given, and that unfavourable economic fluctuations are almost 
inevitable. At the same time, people do not feel that they can do much to control or influence 
the abstract forces that impinge upon their lives and livelihoods. It is hence reasonable to argue 
 
71 “Zamani sisi tulipokuwa wadogo, elimu ilikuwa ni bure, hatulipi, unasoma mpaka university. Maji tulikuwa 
hatulipi. Umeshaona? Kwa hivyo, maisha yalikuwa yanakwenda vizuri […] lakini sasa hivi, kila kitu ulipe; halafu 
hali ya kimaisha ni ngumu; mishahara ya wafanyakazi ni dogo; waliokuwa hawafanyi kazi, tuseme anafanya 
biashara, ni ngumu. Unaweza ukakaa na duka lako pengine siku tatu, huuzi kitu.” (Interview 1 with Bi Rukia, 26-
11-2018, Pemba) 
72 For instance, those who chose the options ‘very badly’ or ‘fairly badly’ to the question “How well or badly 
would you say the current government is handling the following matters […]?” amounted to 69,88% for 
‘addressing the needs of youth’, 77,8% for ‘creating jobs’ and 87,4% for ‘keeping prices stable’. (Afrobarometer 
2016/2018)  
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that the majority of Zanzibaris live in and with a situation of prolonged uncertainty73. Further 
relevant for this thesis is the fact that the economic decline and retrenchment of public services 
seems to have hit women and children especially hard: Schalge (2002) for instance claims that, 
while “[…] Tanzania’s economic crises of the 1970s and 80s forced women to take greater 
responsibilities for the maintenance of their families” (211), men were perceived to be quick to 
abandon their obligations in this respect (ibid. 2, 273; see also Schalge 2004: 152-153). Other 
authors confirm this pattern, which is sometimes referred to as the ‘feminization of poverty’ 
(e.g. Arendell 2000: 1200; Mikell 1997: 1, 27; Obbo 1995: 177). 
 
(3.2.2) Uncertainty as Lived Experience: Contingency and (Mis)Trust 
What does living in such circumstances signify for people in their everyday lives? This is a 
question that the contributors to the volume Ethnographies of Uncertainty in Africa (2015) 
address: the editors, Elizabeth Cooper and David Pratten, define uncertainty as “[…] the lived 
experience of a pervasive sense of vulnerability, anxiety, hope and possibility […]” (2015: 1) 
and suggest shifting the scholarly focus away from the macro level of ‘the crisis’ per se – i.e. 
explaining its causes or predicting its future trajectories – towards the microlevel: to exploring 
how uncertainty as an experience affects people in their everyday lives. The authors highlight 
the fact that uncertainty shapes “ways of knowing and being” (ibid.) and, firstly, is entwined 
with social relations and secondly, guides people’s navigation of short-and long term temporal 
horizons, their “[…] ‘get[ting] by’ in the here and now, [and their] […] ‘get[ting] on’ in the 
future” (ibid. 12, my emphasis; see also 2).  
While discussing the former aspect or relationality, Cooper and Pratten refer to the work of 
Caroline Bledsoe on fertility and reproduction in rural Gambia (Cooper & Pratten 2015: 4): 
Bledose uses the term contingency to describe a notion of physical and social proximity, 
implying that social agents are always susceptive to the impact of actions of others – in a 
negative and positive sense (Bledsoe 2002: 20, 25). Cooper and Pratten incorporate contingency 
into their conception of the relational element of uncertainty, which is also fundamentally 
double-edged: “[…] while certainty and security are sought by investment in social relations, 
so those proximate, intimate social relations provide no guarantee and may produce further 
uncertainties” (2015: 4). The possibility that an investment into social relationships could ‘go 
either way’, is certainly nothing novel for Zanzibari women. A good example would be the 
 
73 I use the term ‘uncertainty’ for the situation here, and choose to not distinguish between uncertainty as a state 
of mind and insecurity as the social context in which it develops, as for instance suggested by Susan Reynolds 
Whyte (2009: 213-214; see also Whyte & Siu 2015: 19). In my opinion, the term ‘insecurity’ can elicit unhelpful 
associations with situations of armed conflict or criminality, that do not fit my context.  
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pessimistic attitudes many Zanzibari women hold about the longevity of marriages: Erin Stiles 
claims that a majority of her respondents “[…] regarded divorce as unavoidable and said that 
they expected to be divorced at some point and perhaps without their knowledge.”74 (2005: 586; 
see also Keefe 2016: 119, 125; McGruder 1999: 26). Bi Pili, who was married for the fourth 
time when I met her, explained:  
My first husband left me with a six-month old child, but I did not get any assistance from 
his family75. I stayed with the child, me and my parents. So, I took care of everything at 
our place, I help[ed] myself [with some] business [here and there]. I raised my children 
myself, alone. And this is our norm here in Zanzibar. [There are] few men who care for 
their marriages, [who] care for their children. But on my side, I had a lot of bad luck in 
marriage.76 (Bi Pili, Unguja) 
Left with a small infant to care for, Bi Pili made the experience that the connections created 
through marriage did not guarantee her much in terms of concrete support, and that the attempt 
at forging relationships to secure herself in the future, left her more vulnerable than before, with 
additional dependants to tend to. 
Whyte and Siu (2015) describe different strategies and behaviours that people in situations 
of uncertainty and heightened contingency adapt; for instance, an attitude of ‘civility’ or 
tentativeness, in which open confrontations are avoided in order to maintain relationships on 
which individuals and groups are dependent, or might become dependent in the future (28-29). 
This is an attitude that should be fairly familiar to maternal practitioners who ‘hold’ onto 
relationships in order to preserve favourable conditions for preservation and nurturing growth 
of their children (see above).  
Cooper and Pratten point out that the development of trust in the face of such myriad 
(inter)dependencies and contingencies, as well as in the context of uncertainty is elusive (2015: 
4-5): trust, following Niklas Luhmann, can be defined as a means by which social actors reduce 
complexity and uncertainty concerning future events. By making positive assumptions about 
others’ behaviour and accepting the risk of vulnerability to their actions, people are able to 
reduce the number of possible futures they need to take into account when making decisions. 
(Kenworthy et al. 2016: 1044; Lahno 2011: 675; Lewis & Weigert 1985: 968, 971; Morgner 
 
74 This is possible due to the fact that, according to Islamic tenets, men are able to divorce their wives through 
repudiation without their consent, presence, or even knowledge (Stiles 2005: 582). 
75 During the same interview Bi Pili shared with me that she was around 19 at the time, alone in Dar es Salaam. 
She said her first husband just “[…] disappeared, [and] until today it is not known where he is” (“[…] akatoweka, 
mpaka leo hajulikani alipo.”) (Interview 1 with Bi Pili, 22-10-2018, Unguja) 
76 “[…] [M]ume wangu wa kwanza […] ndo aliniacha na mtoto wa miezi sita lakini sikuwa na huduma zozote 
kutoka katika familia yake. Na mtoto […] nabaki na yeye, miye na wazee wangu. Kwa hiyo kila kitu kilikuwa 
nashugulikia kwetu na mimi mwenyewe najisaidia biashara biashara. […][W]atoto [wangu] nalea mwenyewe, 
peke yangu. […] Na hii ni ndo kawaida yetu Zanzibar. […] Wanaume wachache ambao wanajali ndoa zao, 
wanajali […] watoto wao. Lakini kwa upande wangu mimi, nilipata bahati mbaya sana. [...] kwenye ndoa.” (ibid.) 
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2018: 234-235) In contexts in which uncertainty surpasses these ‘normal’ levels, trust-building 
becomes more difficult, which is confirmed by Beckmann for present-day Zanzibar:  
[…] [T]rust is hard to establish and in some respects has become a drawback: where 
success in life has become connected to savvy and ruthlessness, trusting others has 
acquired a whiff of gullibility and backwardness. This is especially the case when dealing 
with the institutions and agents of power, be they connected to the state or the powers of 
the market. (2015b: 77) 
The lack of trust into those in positions of power, and, further, those connected to ‘politics’ can 
be conceptualized as a shortage of ‘system trust’, i.e. of trust based on the perception of the 
stability and reliability of the bureaucracy and other social, political and legal institutions 
(Lewis & Weigert 1985: 973; Morgner 2018: 235). System trust is especially low in Zanzibar 
where “[p]eople have learned from experience that […] socially distant forces are unreliable 
and have little faith in their workings,” (Beckmann 2015b: 77), or even take the point of view 
that “[…] ordinary people […] [are] not respected and thus, […] [have] no legal rights” (Larsen 
2013: 81). (Inter)personal trust in socially close actors is given preference (Beckmann 2015b: 
77), although, as pointed out above, there are also clear risks involved in this. 
Mistrust and a wariness of the unpredictability of life (and people) exist on different levels 
and in different contexts in Zanzibar: in relation to the political system political parties and 
political elites and within personal relationships and the family. I argue that it is politics (siasa) 
that frequently exacerbate these tendencies on a more personal level. Greg Cameron, describing 
the consequences of the re-introduction of the multiparty system in rural Pemba, put this very 
aptly, claiming that “[s]uddenly, politics, not the vagaries of nature itself or a bumbling one-
party state could undermine survival strategies for households” (2004: 112; my emphasis). 
Unsurprisingly, most of the Zanzibaris whom I talked to understood siasa as something 
inherently negative (see also Cunningham Bissell & Fouéré 2015: 18; Fair 1994: 5 & 2001: 55), 
and often as one of two things: as mambo ya vyama (party matters), i.e. the adversarial 
relationship between the ruling party and the opposition which – as I described in the previous 
chapter – has, amongst others, led to violence, politically motivated sackings and employment 
discrimination. My respondents claimed that politics victimizes people77, leads to social 
 
77 e.g.: ‘Here in Zanzibar, many people are victims of politics. They get into difficulties/they get stuck.’ (‘Hapa 
Zanzibar watu wengi ni victims ya siasa. Wamekwama’, Notes from Interview 1 with Bi Kauthir, Unguja, 08-02-
2019) 
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discord78 and associated it with ‘hate’79 and ‘trouble’80. A second group of informants 
considered politics as ‘kazi bure’ (empty/fruitless work), something that happens in the distance 
but has little to no benefits, but possible drawbacks for ordinary people: ‘Politics are just talk, 
the benefits don’t arrive.’81. They described it as ‘meaningless’82 or as a ‘waste of time’83. In 
Zanzibar, party politics frequently figure in everyday life as a negative force – for instance, 
even in people’s perceptions of the health care system: 
[…] [P]oor quality of care, lack of drugs, harsh treatment by health-care providers are 
closely associated with the hospital as an extension of the ruling party. The mistrust of 
government health facilities goes as far as accusing health staff of deliberately mistreating 
patients and killing infants during birth […]. (Beckmann 2015b: 71) 
On the level of personal relationships, the state of political affairs not only frequently dictates 
which social relationships people cultivate by attending weddings, funerals or through visiting 
(see Bakari 2011: 262; Moss 2017: 177-179), but marriages – anyways perceived as highly 
unstable – have ended because of politics84. The volatility of the political situation, the recent 
decline of democratic values, and the structural violence exercised by an unpredictable 
bureaucratic state towards those perceived as ‘anti-government’, e.g. by obstructing access to 
‘life chances’ further exacerbate uncertainty, tentativeness, and mistrust in Zanzibari society 
today.  
 
(3.2.3) Gendered Vulnerability 
These experiences of uncertainty, and the lack of system – and, to a degree, - interpersonal trust, 
leaves many women (and men) feeling vulnerable. In fact, a “sense of vulnerability”, as Cooper 
and Pratten write, is a significant factor in the lived experience of uncertainty (2015: 1). 
Semantically, vulnerability is closely connected to ‘exposure’ (Butler 2016: 14) which 
 
78 Bi Hasnaa said,‘Politics are a problem, they hold people back from going far.’ (‘Siasa ni tatizo, inawanyima 
watu kwenda mbali.) According to her, there is no true development in her village, since people do not work 
together due to politics. (Fieldnotes 27-11-2018) 
79 e.g.: “You know here, especially in Zanzibar, there are politics of hate.” (“Unajua, huku kwetu, hasa Zanzibar 
kuna siasa za chuki.”, Interview 1 with Bi Rukia, Pemba, 26-11-2018) 
80 e.g.: “[This organization is a] safe place. We don’t want to talk about politics. [We don’t want] to put anybody 
in trouble. We are just there to talk about our own issues.” (Interview 1 with Najima, Unguja, 19-01-2019) 
81 Bi Zahra: ‘Siasa ni […] kuzungumza tu, faida hazifiki.’ (Fieldnotes 27-11-2018) 
82 e.g.: “I saw that there is no meaning in politics because there is no change at all that results from it.” (“Nikaona 
[siasa] haina maana, kwa sababu […] hakuna mabadiliko yoyote yanayotokea.”, Interview 1 with Bi Sauda, 
Unguja, 24-10-2018) 
83 e.g. “2015 came, I was there, but I saw the political process in the same way. I felt like I am just wasting my 
time.” (“Imekuja hii 2015, nipo, lakini […] ni vile vile jinsi nilivyokuwa nikiona zile harakati za siasa […] 
[N]ilikuwa nahisi[…] kwamba napoteza muda [tu] [...]”, Interview 1 with Saida, Dar es Salaam, 01-03-2019) 
84 In the wake of the ‘election drama’ of 2015, it was reported that several Zanzibari women were divorced or 
abandoned by their husbands due to the way they had voted (BBC 2015a; IRI 2016: 15; The Guardian 2015; see 
Hanak 1996: 33-34 for a similar case in 1995). 
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resonates well with how some of my respondents conceptualized their own or others’ 
vulnerability in connection to multiparty politics: 
So, still, in African multiparty politics there are very big challenges. And, at time you can 
even say, [they are] worse than those of the one-party system. Because in the one-party 
system you were not known, just there in the shadows, you [were] hiding. You just go [on 
with your life]. But now, when you entered the multiparty [era] you became exposed. ‘Ah, 
really, this one is not our fellow.’85 (Bi Rehema, Unguja) 
‘Exposure’ could result from being a party member, and publicly engaging in party work, but 
also simply from being seen going to a campaign meeting or heard uttering criticism of the 
incumbent government; in Zanzibar, these dynamics most commonly affect members and 
supporters of the opposition. 
Julie Drolet defines vulnerability as “[…] the compounded effect of the exposure and 
susceptibility of people […] to the impact of the hazard, as well as their capacity to anticipate, 
cope, and recover […]” which depends significantly on people’s access to power and resources, 
and, correspondingly, on aspects like ethnicity, class or gender (2015: 478; see also Neumayer 
& Plümper 2017: 551-552). This definition originates in the framework of studies of 
environmental and human-induced ‘disasters’, but I would contend that it fits for the Zanzibari 
political context as well – female party supporters calculate the impact of their personal 
exposure to the hazards of government and social sanctions, while taking into account their 
need of resources in order to fulfil present or future (maternal) demands, their relative access to 
power, and how this access could be negatively influenced by government authorities. 
In general, mothers as social actors are, a priori, intimately familiar with experiences of 
uncertainty and vulnerability, even in contexts that are relatively stable and secure (cf. Arendell 
2000: 1197; Oyěwùmí 2016: 216; Ruddick 1989: 209). For those women who are biological 
mothers, mothering starts with the uncertainty of pregnancy and childbirth, which is intimately 
connected to gendered and social conceptions of vulnerability (Beckmann 2015b). In many 
African contexts, a large portion of this vulnerability is understood as emerging socially: 
pregnant and birthing women, as well as the prospective child, are perceived as being highly 
vulnerable to those close to them who, for instance, bear grudges, and to social discord in 
general (Bledsoe 2002: 22; for Tanzania and Zanzibar specifically, see Allen 2002: 11; Haws 
2009: 37, 44, 50-52, 64; Kielmann 1998: 142). After birth, the perception of the vulnerability 
of an ‘other’ – the child – is one of the major elements that sets in motion the processes of 
 
85 “Kwa hiyo, bado siasa za mulitparty kwa Afrika [kuna] changamoto kubwa sana. Na wakati mwingine unaweza 
ukakusema mbaya kuliko ile ya one party system. Kwa sababu [….] [kwenye] one party system unakuwa 
hujulikani, humo tu kwenye mamvuli, unajificha. Unakwenda tu. Lakini sasa ukiingia kwenye multiparty unakuwa 
umekuwa exposed. ‘Ah, kumbe huyu si mwenzetu.‘“ (Interview 1 with Bi Rehema, Unguja, 24-10-2018) 
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maternal thinking: Ruddick asserts that mothers perceive the fundamental vulnerability of a 
child and then choose86 to respond with care to work towards its preservation (Ruddick 1989: 
18-19, see also Cohn 2013: 51-52).  
Counting ‘women and children’ as part of ‘especially vulnerable groups’ is commonplace in 
security and NGO rhetoric and has been critically examined by different feminists: 
vulnerability, they argue, is an intensely gendered concept, and has often been associated with 
femininity, passivity, weakness, lack of control and victimhood within Western discourse. It is 
also frequently assigned to a distant ‘other’. (Butler et al. 2016: 1; Cohn 2013: 53) Thinking 
about my respondents and my data, I recognize that Butler et al. were right to hold that there is 
“[…] something both risky and true in claiming that women and other social groups are 
especially vulnerable.” (2016: 2). My respondents expressed the truism of women’s 
vulnerability to me countless times: 
You know in any country, if there is disorder or chaos, women are very much afraid […] 
because they will be the victims […], they and their children.87 (Joyce, Unguja) 
Women know that they will be ‘victim number one’, together with their children.88 (Bi 
Kauthir, Unguja) 
Despite these claims, I contend that it would be wrong and over-simplified to imagine Zanzibari 
women solely as passive victims; they develop active strategies to counteract their own 
exposure and vulnerability as I will show in Chapters 5 and 6 by using the concept of maternal 
navigation. 
 
(3.3) Social Navigation - Maternal Navigation 
In exploring how people deal with uncertainty, as well as out of positions of vulnerability or 
powerlessness, different authors have strongly emphasized the need to depart from notions that 
portray those in such situation as without agency (e.g. Butler et al. 2016: 2; Copper & Pratten 
2015: 2-3; Haram & Yamba 2009: 14-15). Mbembe and Nuttall (2004), referring to those living 
with ‘the crisis’ in Africa, demand not only that we need to find concepts that can take account 
of the complexity of the situation itself, but also a language “[…] to describe people’s relentless 
determination to negotiate conditions of turbulence and to introduce order and predictability 
into their lives.” (349). This is also reflected in the writings of those hoping to advance 
 
86 The element of choice is important here, as Ruddick highlights that this choice, by no means, is natural, or, in 
other words ‘a motherly instinct’ (1989: 18). In this sense, all mothers are adoptive (ibid. 218). 
87 “[...] unajua nchi yoyote ilinapokuwa na machafuko wanawake wanakuwa wanaogopa sana […] kwa sababu 
wao ndo watakuwa wahanga […], wao na watoto” (Interview 1 with Joyce, Unguja, 21-02-2019) 
88 ‘Wanawake wanajua kwamba watakuwa victim namba moja pamoja na watoto wao.’ (Notes from Interview 1 
with Bi Kauthir, Unguja, 08-02-2019) 
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motherhood studies as a field of inquiry, calling for a stronger focus on maternal agency (Glenn 
1994: 26). 
The concept of ‘navigation’ is currently ‘en vogue’ to try to take account of the practices of 
people in situations of prolonged uncertainty. Henrik Vigh, whose work is central in this 
respect, has however criticised that ‘navigation’ in many studies remains undefined and 
inexplicit. He suggests using the term ‘social navigation’ as a perspective on practices at the 
intersection of individual agency, social forces and change, i.e. practices that take place within 
the unfolding and constantly changing environment of uncertainty. (2009: 419-420) In his 
words, “[t]he concept […] highlights motion within motion; it is the act of moving in an 
environment that is wavering and unsettled.” (ibid. 420). Immediately upon reading how Vigh 
traces back the word ‘navigation’ to directing a boat at sea (ibid. 420, 429-430), I remembered 
something that Bi Rehema had said to me about the current political situation in Zanzibar:  
Once I talked to my leaders [in the party], we were talking about the state of affairs, [and] 
I told them ‘We are at a point in time which is like we are in the Nungwi Channel. We are 
coming from these waters, going into those, [and] there are maelstroms. It is like this. 
Only when that channel might calm down, we will receive [i.e. we will know] which 
direction to go.89  
The Nungwi Channel (sometimes also: Pemba Channel) constitutes a strong metaphor in the 
Zanzibari context. It is the body of water that separates the two main islands of the archipelago, 
Pemba and Unguja, from each other, and, according to Nadine Arnold Koenings, it represents 
a ‘deep divide’, both in a symbolic and geographical sense. The channel is marked by rough 
seas and strong currents, and several ferries travelling between the islands have capsized and 
sank, costing the lives of many. (2018: 151) When I left Unguja to go to Pemba in November 
2018, I witnessed the roughness of the seas myself as the huge ferry continuously swayed from 
right to left as we were crossing the waters of the channel (Fieldnotes 21-11-2018). Bi Rehema 
thus drew an extremely vivid picture of different social and political forces and dangers acting 
upon Zanzibar as a polity, with the very real possibility of fatal consequences and significant 
loss of innocent lives. Only if the situation calms down, she argued, a clear view to the horizon 
of the future would be possible, while the current situation continued to warrant tentative 
navigation to prevent (another) catastrophe.   
Vigh develops two components of social navigation that relate to “[…] both the socially 
immediate and the socially imagined” which are however not to be considered as separated 
 
89 “Mimi niliwahi kuzungumza na viongozi wangu wakati fulani, […] tunazungumzia hali, […] nikawaambia kama 
‘Tuko katika kipindi ambacho [ni] kama […] tuko mkondo wa Nungwi vile. Tunatoka maji haya, kwenda haya 
hapa, pana msokotano. Ndiyo huu. […] Mpaka huu mkondo utulie, ndo tutapata direction hasa ya kwenda.” 
(Interview 1 with Bi Rehema, 24-10-2018, Unguja) 
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endeavours but need to be thought together (2009: 425-426; his emphasis). In the first instance 
people focus on ‘getting by’ in the here and now, all the while experiencing and anticipating 
the movement of their environment. Secondly, social navigation also includes figuring out and 
adjusting strategies and tactics for ‘getting on’, i.e. gaining life chances, social worth and 
recognition in the future they imagine for themselves. For both components of navigation, the 
establishment of contacts and networks is vital. (ibid: 420-422) 
What is termed ‘dubriagem’ in the Portuguese-creole of Vigh’s respondents in Bissau (2009: 
423-424), or ‘se débrouiller’ in Cameroon (Waage 2006: 61-62), i.e. the “[…] tactical practice 
of navigating social forces and events” (Vigh 2009: 424), in my opinion, finds a close match in 
the Kiswahili verb ‘kuhangaika’: many of my respondents used this term when describing 
activities necessary to ‘getting by’ and ‘getting on’ in current times. The verb has, as many 
Kiswahili terms, a myriad of meanings and thus offers a wide range of interpretations. I argue 
that what comes closest to a translation in this context would be ‘to roam about and struggle’. 
In the context of mothering, the word applies both to ‘getting by’ as a family, in terms of 
fulfilling basic household needs, as well as to activities aimed at creating future possibilities. 
For the women I interviewed, the focus here was often on securing a positive future for their 
children, for instance by facilitating their education. I will further discuss the meaning and 
relevance of maternal kuhangaika-activities in Chapters 5 and 6. For now, let it suffice to say, 
that social navigation has a local equivalent in the Zanzibari context, and that the women and 
mothers I interviewed frequently used the term to describe their own activities.  
Another important point that Vigh (2009) makes is that the practice of social navigation is 
always linked to an actor’s social location, and the perception of one’s own power to influence 
social forces. In other words,  “[…] we all navigate, but the necessity of having to move in 
relation to the movement of social forces depends on the speed and volatility of change as well 
as the level of exposure or shelter that our given social positions and ‘capital’ grants us […]” 
(430). This speaks very well to both the relative (in)ability to influence social forces as 
experienced by Zanzibaris, as well as to the different levels of vulnerability or exposure 
experienced by different people in different positions on the continuum of power (ibid. 430-
431). 
When exploring Vigh’s ideas about the practice of social navigation with Sara Ruddick’s 
philosophy still fresh in mind, I was surprised how well some of their ideas spoke to each other: 
Vigh’s hyper-attentiveness – the “[…] uncompromising awareness of socio-political 
movements in order to anticipate oncoming problems and assess possibilities of action” (2009: 
422) that people in Bissau displayed, sounded a lot like Ruddick’s maternal tactic of 
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scrutinizing. Michael Jackson’s concept of ‘manoeuvring’ (1998: 18-19) that Vigh partly builds 
his conceptualization of social navigation on (see Vigh 2009: 424) – the constant striving for 
balance and control in human practice (Jackson 1998: 18-19) – reminded me of ‘holding’. If 
we develop these similarities further and look at Vigh’s work from a practicalist point of view, 
social navigation could arguably be understood as a practice, giving rise to ‘navigational’ 
reasoning; it is, as he claims “[…] simultaneously an act of analysing possibilities within a 
social environment, drawing trajectories through it [i.e. thinking] and actualising these in 
practice.” (Vigh 2010: 150). Despite these overlaps, Vigh’s view of social navigation, as 
precisely not a “mechanical practice toward a goal, but a practice that is tied up in a range of 
power configurations” (432-433), on first glance, seems to clash with Ruddick’s practicalism. 
At a second glance, this perspective might actually be the remedy for the weaknesses in 
Ruddick’s argument in relation to her ethnocentrism and context-blindness. Considering 
maternal practice while carefully minding the power relations it is tied up in, would enable us 
to uncover the differences in mothering practices of women situated in different spaces 
constituted by the intersecting dimensions of class and race, that her critics so rightly point 
towards. 
As I have suggested at the end of the last sub-chapter, it is not surprising that the practices 
of mothers and people living with prolonged uncertainty in general, tend to be similar: Arendell 
has argued that the fundamentally ambivalent character of mothering is intensified by the fact 
that the long-term outcomes of mothers’ work are always uncertain (2000: 1197); Oyěwùmí 
claims that mothers “must constantly project into the future for the benefit of their children” 
(2016: 216), while Ruddick writes that “[…] to give birth is to commit oneself to the protecting 
the unprotectable and nurturing the unpredictable.” (1989: 209; my emphasis). Mothers, we 
could thus say, are always navigating, even in political and economic environments that are not 
‘uncertain’ in the sense of Vigh, Cooper, Pratten, Mbembe and others: in their daily work, 
mothers everywhere mediate the specific social, cultural and economic conditions they are 
contingent on, so as to gain the most favourable results in achieving their maternal goals (cf. 
Maher 2010: 835). They strive to introduce certainty into the uncertainty of preserving, 
nurturing and training a being with its own subjectivity and free will (Ruddick 1989: 73). Large 
parts of a mother’s work are future-oriented and involve a similar simultaneous focus on ‘the 
immediate’ and ‘the imagined’, (Cohn 2013: 55) as Vigh describes for youth in Bissau (2010: 
150 & 2015: 122). Consequently, I think that it would be extremely beneficial to integrate the 
notions of maternal thinking and social navigation with each other, establishing a new concept 
of ‘maternal navigation’ that not only enables me to analyse and interpret women’s practices as 
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mothers in the context of prolonged uncertainty in the thesis at hand, but would also open up 
possible pathways for social navigation to be applied to more diverse contexts by others: So 
far, Vigh and other authors, have most commonly used the concept to study the endeavours of 
(male) youth and their struggles – often to transcend their current status of ‘waithood’ and enter 
adulthood in times of economic crisis and generalized uncertainty (Cooper & Pratten 2015: 9-
11; Vigh 2010: 147-148). Although these analyses are insightful, the narratives that are woven 
here can at times read like highly individualized ‘every man for himself’-stories. Relationality 
and contingency are only considered as part of the strategies of individual young men trying to 
‘get on’ and ‘get by’ for their own benefit. This is where notions of maternal practice and 
thinking could enrich the idea of social navigation: Mothers not only navigate uncertainty for 
themselves, but also for their dependents, ensuring their survival and positive futures. Other 
than the protagonists in Vigh’s studies, they are not trying to reach adulthood, but attempting 
to fulfil the demands of maternal work – an activity that emphatically marks their status as 
adults. Maternal navigation, as I would define it, includes navigation practices through and for 
other people, whom mothers are connected to by way of relations of care. These practices take 
place in an environment that is not only in motion through the natural growth and development 
of their children, and changing policies affecting mothers and their families, but also due to a 
general climate of uncertainty. Maternal navigation is thus the lens under which I will consider 
the strategies, investments, connections, mothers in Zanzibar take and make, in order to reach 
maternal aims in a context of political and economic uncertainty. 
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(4) “Being a stranger, you cannot know what is going on” - Challenges of 
Epistemology and Methodology 
In my second interview with one of my key informants, Bi Rehema, I ask her cautiously 
about conflicts in Zanzibari society and sketch the difficulties I had had so far in getting 
clear answers about them in conversations. “You know Hannah,” Bi Rehema answers, 
“you only have come here a very short time [ago]. Being a stranger, you cannot know 
what is going on, because you just came, and you see people how they are.”90  
In my opinion, this exchange is an excellent starting point for contemplating basic questions of 
epistemology, ontology and positionality, about my own outsider-position and its limitations, 
and about the silences looming large in Zanzibari society, which have lead some authors to 
claim that “[…] in Zanzibar […] things are never only what they appear, or what they are said 
to be.” (Larsen 2015: 234). From Bi Rehema’s statements, the transition to questions about the 
epistemological foundations of knowledge, i.e.,  
- its nature (What can I, as an outsider-researcher know? What do Zanzibaris classify as 
‘truth’/knowledge?),  
- its sources (How can I best obtain knowledge in the context at hand? How can I access 
knowledge or the ‘truth’ about ‘what is [really] going on’?)  
- and its validity (What are the limits of knowledge? How does my position and 
background limit what I can know? How do time and other constraints influence data? 
How do outside influences, like the political context of uncertainty, limit my access to 
knowledge?),  
is not too far-reaching (cf. Schnegg 2015: 21). It is these questions that I will discuss and attempt 
to answer in the course of this chapter. By bringing transparency to, and reflecting on the 
processes of knowledge production, its context and agents, as well as the complex relationships 
between these elements, I hope to add a reflective element and further validity and reliability to 
the selections and interpretations made within the thesis at hand (cf. Alvesson & Sköldberg 
2009: 9; Cho & Trent 2006: 327; Schnegg 2015: 46).  
In terms of the epistemological orientation of my work, I do not claim to be able to present 
‘Truth’, but much rather attempt to give a glimpse into what my respondents conceived as their 
truth(s), and to present and analyse the ways in which they tried to make sense of their realities 
for me. In agreement with this line of thinking, I did not assume that I would go to the field to 
 
90“Unajua Hannah wewe bado umekuja muda mfupi sana. [...] Kuwa mtu mgeni kweli huwezi kujua what is going 
on, kwa sababu wewe umekuja tu umeona watu kama walivyo.” (Interview 2 with Bi Rehema, Unguja, 19-11-
2018) 
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‘collect’ data (i.e. ‘truth’), but instead sought to co-create meaning with my respondents; 
meaning which additionally passed through several layers of selection and interpretation 
(dominantly of course, my own). Thus, what is (re)presented here can only be partial and 
fragmentary. (cf. Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 269, 294) Nonetheless I would hope that by 
representing some empirical examples of women’s practices of maternal navigation in Zanzibar 
in this thesis, I created opportunities for understanding and further investigation (cf. ibid. 9).  
 
(4.1) The Process of Knowledge Production 
(4.1.1) Fieldwork 
Fieldwork for this thesis was conducted in the Zanzibar archipelago from September 2018 until 
March 2019 with approval of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (SMZ). For the most 
part of my stay I was based in the historic downtown of Zanzibar City (Stone Town), on Unguja, 
which is why a majority of my respondents hail from the urban area of this island (56%). In 
November 2018, I travelled to Pemba for nine days and stayed with a local host family91. This 
provided me with valuable data from informal conversations and participant observation at their 
house, and the opportunity to carry out interviews in two urban districts and one rural area there. 
One interview was additionally conducted with my Zanzibari research assistant in Dar es 
Salaam, and another upon my return to the Netherlands via Skype. 
Generally speaking, I approached ‘the field’ with an open-ended and flexible attitude. I had 
determined my interest and a preliminary research question in my research proposal, but 
remained open to adjustments according to the inputs and impulses by respondents, thereby 
following a ‘Geertzian’ research design (“[…] the fieldworker must go to the field with a 
number of questions, adapt them, and leave the field with different questions.”; Schnegg 2015: 
34). I would call my approach pragmatic and explorative; in some respects resembling the 
guiding principles of grounded theory (cf. Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 55-56) and inductive 
ethnography (ibid. 86). This proved to be the right approach, as my research question changed 
significantly in the field and after my return to the Netherlands. 
As a student of multidisciplinary programmes in both Bachelor and Master, I have access to 
several academic and disciplinary ‘identities’ from which I can select in different contexts. It is 
thus no wonder that my research and this thesis are a product of a pragmatic and somehow 
opportunistic application of theories and methods from a wider repertoire (see also Quinn 2005: 
6-7). As mentioned in the introduction, I was however strongly committed to conducting 
research from a feminist standpoint, wanting to understand political uncertainty and tension 
 
91 In order to maintain the family’s anonymity, I refrain from naming the exact area of my stay. 
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based on my respondents’ (gendered) experiences (cf. Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 238-239). 
With this focus on experience and the rejection of heavily imposing my own categories and 
notions of what I deemed ‘important’ prior to the field stay, I adopted qualitative research 
methods aimed at gaining free narratives (ibid.: 7).  
Methods and Sample: My main research methods were semi-structured interviews, often with 
a life-history orientation, of which I conducted twenty-eight92, (participant) observation and 
informal conversations. My aim for the interviews was to obtain narratives of personal 
experiences, conceding respondents extensive narrative privileges, i.e. as much control as 
possible over the conversation, its course and focus (Quinn 2005: 8-9). By trial-and-error I 
figured out that the best practice would be to ask an open question about the respondent’s life 
at the beginning of the interview and then make recourse to some of the issues raised during the 
narrative at a later point. In this context, the period of collaboration with my research assistant 
Saida was very helpful. I observed that she asked questions in a verbose manner, giving lengthy 
examples and explanations; the answers she then obtained were much more detailed than the 
ones I received. As a consequence, I scraped some of the rather compartmentalizing life-history 
questions I had devised (e.g. asking separately about childhood, youth, and adult life), and 
instead began most interviews with an almost overfraught, but open question that resonated 
better with respondents93. If I already had some knowledge about an interlocutor (e.g. that she 
was involved with a particular political party) I usually prepared a few more pre-formulated, 
but open questions.   
Overall, the co-operation with Saida as my research assistant at the beginning of fieldwork 
proved extremely advantageous: having conducted research in the archipelago herself, she was 
able to advise me on different issues, such as gaining research permission from local authorities, 
or approaching contentious issues in a delicate manner. Due to budget restraints on my, and 
limited time on her side, we only worked together for the very first weeks of fieldwork. Saida 
did not act as a translator, as my level of Kiswahili was sufficient to ask questions and 
understand the gist of what was being said during interviews on my own, but – knowing my 
research interest – she probed some respondents herself on certain topics and reformulated 
questions that they did not understand. After our collaboration ended I conducted an interview 
 
92 My 29th interview, which was conducted upon my return to the Netherlands via Skype, is excluded here, and my 
interlocutor is not included in Table 1 which details my sample. This is for the simple reason, that with him being 
the project manager for an EU-project for female empowerment in leadership positions, this interview was the 
only ‘true’ expert interview, and his perspective as a male non-Zanzibari, was interesting as background 
information, but not as relevant to my main argument.  
93 Nieleze kuhusu maisha yako/‘hadithi‘ ya maisha yako (kama utoto, elimu, ndoa, kazi, n.k.). Vipi umefikia 
ambapo upo sasa hivi maishani? (Please explain me about your life/the ‘story’ of life (like your childhood, 
education, marriage, work etc.). How did you ‘arrive at’ where you are right now in life?) 
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with her – as proposed by Temple and Edwards (2002: 6) for translators in cross-language 
research: I figured that the examination of her values, personal opinions and insights on the 
issues I was interested in would be extremely fruitful. Since Saida thus became an informant, I 
gave her a pseudonym and included her in my sample below. 
Originally, I approached some of my interviews as separate ‘expert interviews.’ Ultimately, 
I however decided to discard the artificial boundary between interviews with ‘members of the 
local population’ and ‘experts’ because on the one hand, the female ‘expert’ shared a lot of her 
personal experience as a woman in Zanzibar, while, on the other, a number of interviewees 
from the ‘local population’ group were ‘experts’ in their own right, for example due to their 
considerable experience as professional politicians. I thus integrated all of my female 
respondents into one sample. Additionally, I use the contents of a number of informal 
conversations I had with two women, whom I never formally interviewed, in this thesis. Their 
details are added to the table below in brackets.  
Table 1: Sample Details  
Current residence Party affiliation94 Occupations included Motherhood status 
Pemba rural: 6 
Pemba urban: 3 [+ 1] 
 
Unguja rural: 1 
Unguja urban: 13 [+1] 
 
CCM: 4 
CUF: 3 [+1] 
CHADEMA: 1 
apolitical (self-reported): 8 
unknown/unsure: 7 [+1] 
teacher, librarian, 
journalist, private tutor, 
tailoress, farmer, sheha, 
civil servant, police 
officer, mama wa 
watoto/wa nyumbani95, 
small-scale 
entrepreneur, politician, 
NGO employee, etc. 
mothers: 19 [+2] 
childless: 2  
unknown: 2 
Total: 23 [+2] women; 28 formal interviews and numerous informal conversations 
I recruited respondents for formal interviews by way of networking with different people: I, for 
instance, met my five first participants through Saida, more through the personal networks of 
the women thus sampled, and others through friends and acquaintances in the archipelago. I 
 
94 This strictly applies to the time of my research. As already mentioned, a large part of the Zanzibari CUF 
membership defected to ACT-Wazalendo in March 2019. I reckon that at least three of my CUF-respondents did 
follow their party leaders to ACT. The affiliation of one CCM supporter was inferred due to her position in local 
government, which would have been almost impossible to access if she was not a party-member; the others clearly 
communicated their support for the incumbent. Those in the ‘apolitical’-category told me directly that they did not 
have any party or were not interested in politics. It could be however the case that some of them did support a 
certain political grouping but did not feel comfortable sharing this with me. The ‘unknown’ category includes 
informants whose statements were too elusive to infer a party following, those who said they supported one but 
didn’t want to share which one, and one respondent who said that she ‘hate[d] politics’ but obtained a CCM-
membership card to avoid negative sanctions in her work (Fieldnotes, 31-01-2019).  
95 This is the term respondents employed, so I choose to use it as well. It translates roughly to ‘mother of children’ 
or ‘mother of the house’. A hasty equation of this term with the Western ‘housewife and mother’ or ‘stay-at home 
mum’ is inadequate in my opinion. In the local context, being a mama wa watoto includes a wide range of activities, 
like care- and housework but often also the running of (sometimes several) small businesses from home, and, 
especially in rural areas, horticultural and agricultural activities (see e.g. Demovic 2007: 114-115, 128). In general, 
it is to be noted that most of my respondents pursued numerous economic activities, even though they might self-
identify ‘only’ as a mama wa nyumbani.   
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noticed quickly that a facilitated contact to new respondents, i.e. snowball sampling through a 
friend or relative that I had already interviewed, often provided an important foundation of basic 
trust. I also felt that respondents recruited in such a way were slightly more inclined to meet 
with me, as a direct refusal, in their view, would not have only offended me, but would have 
probably caused the facilitator in question to lose face. This element of social pressure of course 
raised ethical concerns about the voluntariness of participation and made me feel uneasy at 
times, especially when I presumed that a person might be taking a risk by talking to me (e.g. 
employees of the government). In these instances, I tried to be particularly cautious when 
approaching sensitive or politicized topics and made sure that respondents understood that they 
could ask me to omit certain information in my transcripts and thesis. In other cases, when I 
sensed a reluctance to speak with me (e.g. numerous postponed appointments), I did not push 
for a meeting, since I felt that Zanzibaris themselves were much better able to assess the 
potential risks of participating in my project than myself, and probably had good reasons for 
evading me96.  
Most of my interviews were recorded on a tape recorder, after obtaining permission by the 
respondent in question. Although taping can be an obstacle to candour, I agree with Quinn 
(2005), who claims that there are also clear advantages when researchers are able to use 
recorders: the ability to hold a conversation in a more natural way (looking at one’s interlocutor 
and not at a note pad), and the possibility to listen more attentively and react more immediately. 
Additionally, for a close analysis of discourse and narrative, a detailed record at one’s disposal 
is vital (Quinn 2005: 18-20), especially, I would add, if the interview is not conducted in one’s 
first language. Nine of my interviews were however only recorded in notes, according to the 
preference of the participants in question97. Three interviews in rural Pemba merged into an 
impromptu group discussion: the four of us sat together outside one of the respondents’ house 
and after hearing the individual life histories, the women started relating to each other’s 
statements in a more general discussion. 
I had originally aimed at creating a diverse sample of respondents – in terms of their place 
of residence, political activity, class background, educational level, etc.– which I did not fully 
achieve. I, for instance, failed to recruit a meaningful number of respondents from rural Unguja 
(see table 1). This was partly due to the fact that in rural areas sampling would have had to be 
facilitated through local authorities like shehas. My experience in Pemba, which I will describe 
 
96 I rarely heard a clear ‘no’ though, which highlights to me that there were clear cultural inhibitions towards direct 
refusal. Sensibility to subtle ways of communication was thus paramount.  
97 Quotes from these interviews (and informal discussions) are obviously not fully verbatim but paraphrased as 
closely as possible. Throughout the thesis, I mark them with single quotation marks (‘…’).   
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in further detail below, showed that this would mean – as Saida put it: ‘You will only get people 
from one [i.e. the ruling party’s] side.’98 – as well as a high probability for socially and 
politically desirable answers. There also is a bias for higher educated and professional women 
in my sample, which had to do with differing levels of willingness and confidence to embark 
on certain topics.  
Observations and the contents of informal interactions in my everyday life, which included 
semi-regular ‘drop-ins’ with two key informants in urban Zanzibar, participation in celebrations 
(like weddings), but also mundane everyday activities like going to the market, participating in 
an all-female fitness group, or travelling around the islands, were recorded in a field diary. It 
however proved difficult to spontaneously strike up informal conversations about politics and 
political conflict with women in the everyday context (in contrast to male acquaintances), so 
the bulk of my empirical data was co-constructed in formal interviews. 
Validity and Ethics: In the field, I tried to ensure validity on the one hand through occasional 
member checks, e.g. raising some unclear issues from previous interviews with the respondents 
that I had the chance to talk to more than once, and reflecting on some of my preliminary 
interpretations together with them (cf. Cho & Trent 2006: 322). I also confronted respondents 
with compelling points that other informants had made (while safeguarding anonymity of 
course), to retain their interpretations and reactions. Data triangulation was carried out by 
consulting a wide range of secondary literature, statistics, observations, and through discussions 
with acquaintances and friends in the field that were not directly involved in the research 
project. Such techniques were the context in which I was able to carve out the centrality of 
motherhood and mothering for female identity in Zanzibar, as well as for women’s attitudes 
towards political uncertainty. After noticing this pattern during transcription, I, on the one hand, 
confronted respondents directly with my interpretations, and, on the other hand, also waited to 
see if motherhood would come up if I asked similar questions in ensuing new interviews (e.g. 
Do you think that women are more peaceful than men? Why?). I additionally went back to the 
transcripts of previous interviews to explore how motherhood and mothering figured in them.   
As it quite quickly became clear to me that there were real worries from the side of many 
respondents that a disclosure of their participation in the research or the content of our 
interviews could become known to the government, employers, neighbours and others, and lead 
to negative consequences for themselves and their families, questions of anonymity and 
informed consent came to be of primary ethical importance. Guided by the central ‘do no harm’- 
principle of research, and following Wood’s guidelines for research in (post-)conflict areas, I 
 
98 ‘Utapata watu wa upande moja tu.’ (Informal conversation with Saida, October 2018) 
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focused on three key points in this regard: full informed consent, protection of sensitive data in 
the field, and the avoidance of harm caused by publication (2006: 179). Before interviews, I 
made sure to obtain full informed consent through a combination of written and oral informing 
practices99. I also offered to share the transcript or notes of the interview with participants for 
editing, which only one respondent requested. I decided against seeking signatures on consent 
forms as I felt strongly that for most respondents this would have been off-putting in the current 
political context and would have further eroded openness and willingness for participation (see 
Crow et al. 2006: 90). I also preferred to avoid producing a written link to my project through 
filled out forms with personal information (cf. Wood 2006: 380). 
The question if consent was ‘fully’ informed was one that troubled me at times: my original 
research question focused strongly on political conflict and polarization. I however believed 
that this wording would deter people, especially non-politicians and those connected to the 
ruling party from participating. I thus found myself in the dilemma of not wanting to disclose 
‘too much’ and scare possible participants off, and revealing ‘too little’, and unethically 
misleading my interlocutors about my motives. As a middle course, I took great care to 
approach questions about sensitive topics in a step-by step manner, remaining attentive to signs 
of discomfort on the part of respondents. If they let me know, verbally or non-verbally, that 
they did not want to talk about certain issues, I usually abandoned the topic at hand and did not 
probe further. Additionally, by using the keywords ‘siasa’ (politics) and ‘mahusiano ya kijamii’ 
(community relations) prominently, both in my information document and in oral procedures 
before the interview, I hoped to communicate a ‘code’ that people would be able to read, and 
thus could make an informed choice about their participation. The fact that my research permit 
with exactly these key words in the title (Women, Politics and Community Relations in 
Zanzibar) was initially revoked by the authorities, speaks to the fact that these are charged terms 
in Zanzibar. 
Respondent’s data were protected in the field by keeping personal information separate from 
transcripts, interview recordings or notes which I stored on a password-protected hard drive 
that remained locked away in my room at all times, and was put in my hand luggage whenever 
I travelled. Sound files from interviews were transferred to this hard drive as soon as I reached 
home after a meeting. The biggest portion of my field diary was composed in German which 
would make it unintelligible to most people in Tanzania. Additionally, at first, I inconsistently 
shortened the first names of people to initials in the notes; later I blacked all of them out 
 
99 See Annex 3 for the English version of the document I handed out to respondents before our first meeting or 
which’s main messages I covered verbally with them before the interview started and the tape recorder was turned 
on (if applicable). I am indebted to Sigrun Marie Moss for sharing her own document with me as a template. 
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consistently. I chose to use pseudonyms for all respondents throughout the thesis and I took 
care to also leave out or anonymize personal information that would – especially due to the 
‘singularity’ of certain women100 – make them identifiable in any way. The promise of 
anonymization helped to raise the willingness to respond to certain questions, and to participate 
in general. 
In written and oral information procedures I made clear, that I was not be able to monetarily 
compensate any of my respondents. Like many field workers in the post-reflexive-turn-age, I 
did recognize it as one of my responsibilities to achieve a degree of reciprocity for taking up 
participants’ time, unearthing distressing memories or bringing about fear of government 
reprisals for their participation (Eckl 2008: 383; Johansson 2015: 56). Concerns about 
becoming the caricature of “[…] the ambitious social scientist making off with tribal lore and 
giving nothing in return […]” (Clifford 1986: 9) were constantly at the back of my mind; on 
many of the interview recordings I can be heard apologizing for ‘stealing people’s time’. I was 
able to overcome some of my qualms by bringing small gifts (snacks, self-made sweets, etc.) 
to some interviews, and by inviting participants from Unguja to a dinner party before I left. 
Some of my informants (especially those with an opposition leaning) displayed a degree of 
‘narrative urgency’‘– the need and desire for others to know one’s story, or the pleasure to 
finally be able to define and defend one’s identity (Quinn 2005: 12; Wood 2006: 377) – and 
were happy to know that the narratives about their struggles would be disseminated outside of 
the archipelago; they were however not in the majority by a long stretch.  
I am planning to share this thesis privately with a number of respondents but – due to the 
current political climate in Tanzania in general and Zanzibar in particular, which will probably 
deteriorate further with the 2020 elections – an immediate sharing with the community as a 
whole does not seem prudent for now. Hence, I will have to live with the insight, that my 
research project, as those of many others (cf. Johansson 2015: 55-56, 58; Wood 2006: 382), 
will remain a deeply uneven exchange.  
Data Analysis: Interviews were transcribed, partly in the field, partly upon return to the 
Netherlands, and for the most part left in the original Kiswahili. Some sections which I deemed 
interesting for further analysis and possible quoting were transcribed verbatim, while other 
sections were summarized in quick notes, recording the gist of what was being said. I also made 
 
100 I.e., for instance, being the only female holder of a certain position or job.  
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note of certain ‘surrounding’ circumstances of the interview on top of some of the transcripts, 
mostly as soon as possible after the interview101. 
The transcripts and other data recorded in the field diary were then intensively reviewed, 
probing for recurring images, keywords or metaphors, and loosely coded according to my 
research question and the envisioned structure of this thesis. Emergent themes were also 
considered and incorporated into said structure. Overall, I looked at the narratives both on the 
level of ‘plain content’ (as a ‘factual’ account of respondents’ life experiences, views and 
values), while also trying to tease out patterns that pointed to “[…] the covert underlying 
presuppositions that organize the worlds in which speakers live” (Hill 2005: 157; see also 
Luttrell 2005: 249-250). 
 
(4.1.2) De-constructing the ‘Story of Success’ 
If I report it like this, my ‘fieldwork story’ sounds very straightforward – like a carefully 
planned and impeccably executed, effortless endeavour. I would argue that any researcher with 
experience in fieldwork would probably call such a narrative into question. At the same time, 
it is not at all uncommon to present fieldwork in this way. (cf. Thomson et al. 2013: 5; Lecocq 
2002: 274) Why then, do researchers choose to tell such polished ‘stories of success’? I think 
that, on the one hand – and this is the reason why the above compiled description is not invalid 
– readers need a more or less concise overview about methodology and fieldwork for practical 
reasons of accessibility and comprehensibility. On the other hand, I believe that telling success-
stories produces authority: it shows that we were ‘in control’ of our respective fields (cf. Lecocq 
2002: 274, 281; Berckmoes 2013: 125). Especially as a master student, anyways struggling with 
the legitimacy of my own ‘authoritative voice’, to construct such a story (and letting it be the 
only story) is extremely tempting. Admitting that I was not ‘in control’ of ‘the field’ would 
seem like an undue risk to take in terms of my credibility.  
However, I decided to take this risk and admit that the account I presented above is of course 
‘true’, but only partially; it leaves out the massive doubts, reorientations, challenges and 
difficulties that my time in Zanzibar presented me with – the “pains of fieldwork” as Baz 
Lecocq (2002: 275) calls them. I think that these ‘pains’ are not only worthwhile pondering 
upon as part of a personal ‘debriefing’ but need to be discussed in order to understand how, and 
in what context data were co-created. Such transparency demonstrates the enormous impact 
that respondents and other external agents or forces can have on any research process. Hereby, 
 
101 This could e.g. be basic information as the place of the interview, and who else was present, but also occurrences 
before or during the interview that I deemed relevant or interesting, e.g. Bi Halima’s consistent lowering of her 
voice whenever someone passed in front of her window during our interview. 
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I do by no means wish to present a collection of anecdotal evidence of ‘how hard I had it,’ but 
divulge information that can serve as an answer to some of the epistemological questions posed 
at the outset of this chapter. (cf. Leegwater 2015: 35)  
Looking back, I can see that the most difficult moments of my research were those in which 
I felt that I was losing control. Even though I was aware of the sensibilities of politics in the 
archipelago before I left the Netherlands, the intensity with which this impacted my experiences 
and my research was unexpected. The dynamics of relinquishing control over my research 
already started after re-writing my proposal and subduing most of its critical language in order 
to receive my research permit, which I initially succeeded in after a record time of only two 
weeks. This was certainly too good to be true, as became clear during a visit to the Second Vice 
President’s Office102, which holds the final say in all matters of research: That day, I wanted to 
request required reference letters for my visa and to the district authorities throughout the 
islands. When the approached employee looked at my documents, he lost control over his facial 
expression for a second – I reckon in utter disbelief at the topic that had been approved. After 
long hours of waiting in uncertainty, a younger officer finally informed me that my research 
permit had been retracted, without being able to tell me the exact reasons or point me to the 
concrete ‘problems’ in my forms that he mentioned. I barely made it out of the building and 
broke down crying outside, under the puzzled gazes of passers-by. (Fieldnotes, 08-10-2018) 
Embarrassing as I found this breakdown later on – I am sure, the men in the office noticed me 
fighting back tears of anger while I was still inside – it was a formative experience of my stay, 
as well as a glimpse into some of the non-transparent and arbitrary workings of government 
power in Zanzibar and the hostile attitude towards independent research in present-day 
Tanzania in general103. After intense negotiations at the office, I was later allowed to go ahead 
with my project – on the conditions of submitting a catalogue of interview questions, providing 
a detailed plan of my whereabouts until March, a circumscription of the districts I would be 
able to visit and committing to regular reports. The hardly veiled threat that employees would 
come ‘check on me’ during interviews angered and frightened me at the same time. (Fieldnotes, 
09-10-2018)  
 
102 The position of second vice president, and the office were created with the 2010 amendments to the Zanzibar 
constitution providing for the GNU: according to the constitutional amendments, the first vice president has to be 
of the opposition party, while the second is from the majority party. While the 1st VP does not have a clearly 
defined mandate, the 2nd VP has extensive powers, and was at the time of my fieldwork CCM-hardliner Seif Ali 
Iddi. (Minde et al. 2018: 180) 
103 An example for this was the (now retracted) statistics law, whereby it would have been a crime to publicize 
data contradicting government statistics. In 2018, the passport of the head of TWAWEZA, an NGO that has carried 
out surveys in Tanzania for years, was confiscated, which was connected by many to the publication of polls 
suggesting a decrease in support for president Magufuli. (Eyssen 2019; ICG 2019: 7; Nyeko 2019; Said, K. 2018) 
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Additional to the extensive powers the central government wields over researchers by way 
of the Second Vice President’s Office, further control is exercised through the local government 
and administrative system which reaches down until the neighbourhood and ward level, with 
the so-called shehas acting as the face of the CCM-regime here. All shehas and their superiors, 
the Regional and District Commissioners, are appointed by the government and most are 
staunch supporters of the ruling party (Minde et al. 2018: 168; Roop et al. 2018: 254). Shehas 
are especially powerful vis-à-vis ordinary citizens as they are to write letters approving almost 
any civil procedure, like applying for a passport or an ID. They also control enrolment in the 
voter register, which has resulted in many a controversy over the years (Roop et al. 2018: 252). 
A notion of surveillance as also falling into their area of responsibility was expressed to me by 
Bi Hawa, a sheha in Pemba: “In short, anything that enters the shehia (ward) the sheha has to 
know [about].”104  
The government wants researchers to work with and through commissioners and shehas 
when recruiting respondents, and interactions with local government officials can become 
another site of struggle between researchers and local authorities: First of all, district 
commissioners are able to influence significantly where in their district research is conducted, 
as they can pick and choose for which shehias (wards) they will provide the needed introduction 
letters. Secondly, shehas are able to exercise tight control over whom the researcher is allowed 
to talk to and what is told to him or her, as my experience in a village in northern Pemba shows:  
I arrive in the village in the morning, after I called and announced my visit the evening 
before. I meet the sheha who is busy with the ‘zoezi ya kitambulisho’105. He is quite curt 
and immediately asks for my documents. He calls someone on his mobile phone, and I 
can understand snippets of his conversation: ‘The one that I told you about yesterday is 
here. She really has a letter.’ He goes on to read the beginning of the letter that the district 
commissioner wrote for me. ‘Who signed? … The district commissioner himself. … So, 
should we allow it?’ The sheha makes a copy of my letter, tells me to wait for his assistant 
and returns to his endeavour. After a while, the assistant arrives, and I explain the reasons 
for my visit. He leads me straight to a specific house, but the occupant is not there. 
 
104“[K]wa kifupi sheha, lolote ambalo linaingia [katika shehia], lazima alijue.” (Interview 1 with Bi Hawa, 
Pemba, 28-11-2018) 
105 ‘The ID exercise:’ Zanzibaris used this term to describe the registration process for the new Zanzibar ID, needed 
for instance to register as a voter, receive a business license or open a bank account. Talk about this left a mark on 
my whole stay in Pemba: on the ferry other passengers asked me jokingly if I was also going back ‘home’ to get 
my ID, like them; my host mother went to the relevant offices on several days during my stay, initially 
unsuccessfully. The first step in the process involved obtaining a letter from the local sheha, and again there were 
charges that ‘certain people’ were prevented from obtaining the correct documents. (Fieldnotes, 22-11, 23-11 & 
27-11-2018; see also: Daily News 2018; Salim 2018: 16 & 2019b: 17) 
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Without further ado, he compels two female neighbours who happen to be in the vicinity 
to talk to me. The elder woman, Bi Zahra, is palpably reluctant, while the younger one, 
Hamida, is nervous and taciturn. The man stands facing us as we talk, and interrupts often. 
Hamida vehemently negates any interest in politics (‘sina chama’ – I don’t have a party). 
At a certain point, while I talk to Bi Zahra, the sheha’s assistant leaves to get some 
breakfast and during this time the woman he originally had wanted me to talk to, Bi 
Hasnaa, arrives. She listens in and then joins our conversation. I begin to ask her some 
questions, and – encouraged by the man’s absence – also dare to inquire about more 
sensitive topics, like the degree of political conflict in the village. She is open and critical, 
and then asks me – almost conspiratorially – if I know with whom I came and what that 
means. I have the impression that all of us feel a bit paranoid, and constantly peep at the 
corner of the house to see if the sheha’s assistant comes back. When he does, the 
conversation dies down and Bi Hasnaa invites him and me to come in for tea. While we 
are inside, she asks the man to whom else in the village he will take me and suggests some 
names. He dismisses all of her suggestions insistently: he will not bring me to ‘those 
people’. Bi Hasnaa and I exchange a furtive glance; she raises her eyebrow, as if to say: 
‘See, what did I tell you?’. The sheha’s assistant takes me to several other houses all over 
the village, but it is clear that he consciously picks and chooses which ones. He stands 
next to me while I talk to the women, and some seem extremely intimidated. When asked, 
they consistently tell me that they have no interest in politics at all, also no knowledge 
about it and anyways, ‘politics do not reach the village’ (‘siasa haifiki mpaka kijijini’)… 
Around midday I decide that I have had enough. I have to leave my name in the sheha’s 
visitor book before I take the daladala (minibus) back home. (Fieldnotes, 27-11-2018) 
To me, this experience further demonstrated the Zanzibari government’s desire to control the 
kinds of knowledge that researchers can access while in the archipelago. It also showed me that 
the government’s local agents are acutely aware of the members of their community ‘loyal’ and 
‘disloyal’ to the ruling party106, and as unwanted ‘research assistants’ their simple presence is 
enough to enforce silence about certain topics.  
Additional to controlling access to respondents, the authorities would clearly like to seize 
some of the data gathered by researchers for their own purposes: additional to requiring me to 
write reports for them, I was called repeatedly by an employee of the 2nd VP’s office. During 
one call – upon hearing that I was working on interview transcripts – the officer demanded to 
 
106 Also testified to by the role during the 2001 crisis in Pemba, when they helped security forces by pointing out 
‘opposition houses.’ (HRW 2002: 10) 
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come to my house to view them, which I firmly declined. He later suggested to me, that things 
could go ‘more smoothly’, if I were to work together with the authorities ‘more closely’ 
(Fieldnotes 16-01-2019). 
I do by no means intend to suggest that it is in principle inappropriate or even uncommon 
for some kind of governmental oversight of scientific studies to exist; for instance, reviewing 
whether ethical standards are abided by. It is however quite revealing, how much control the 
Zanzibari regime would like to, and can, in fact, exert over research, e.g. through the measures 
I described above. I often sensed that local authorities and members of the ruling party were 
somewhat fed up with foreigners coming to pry beyond the surface of the image of the idyllic 
and peaceful island paradise they would like to present to the outside world (see e.g. Mtumwa 
2019; Said, S. 2018)107.  
Overall, my interactions with Zanzibari government authorities and their local agents made 
it obvious that I would have to be on my guard when presenting my research interests to others, 
in order to not risk the whole endeavour, and – more importantly –  to not endanger participants; 
I became increasingly wary of any unnecessary contact with the authorities. My experiences 
greatly influenced my research as they gave rise to – at times – intense feelings of anxiety, 
mistrust and animosity, especially in relation to the government and the ruling party (cf. 
Leegwater 2015: 42). Certain parts of my research project planned in my proposal, like visits 
to the Zanzibari House of Representatives or more intensive sampling in rural areas, could not 
be carried out due to the adverse attitude of state organs, and my own desire to avoid them and 
their interference108. The constant cautioning of people around me about the sensitivities of my 
research topic made me hesitant and restrained in asking certain questions or probing deeper 
with respondents at times. I struggled with the control that the authorities tried to enforce on me 
and my project, and at the same time, struggled to control my own fears, anxieties and other 
negative emotions that my experiences evoked. Reflecting on these events from a spatial and 
temporary distance brings home the point that total control or ‘mastery’ (Lecocq 2002: 274) of 
one’s field is at any rate an illusion, if not totally misguided. Additionally, I realize that pushing 
negative experiences, failings, dead ends, and the attached emotions aside because they are 
 
107 I, for example, gathered this impression during my visit to a District Commissioner’s office in Pemba: After I 
carefully (and vaguely) explained my research interest, he let out a deep sigh and condescendingly asked ‘Why 
politics?’ (‘Mbona siasa?’). He then went on to carefully hand-pick the shehias I would be allowed to visit. 
(Fieldnotes, 22-11-2018). 
108 My avoidance was reinforced by the fact that the young male officer responsible for my ‘case’ behaved in 
increasingly inappropriate ways towards me; questioning me about my relationship status, calling me outside of 
office hours, asking to be invited to my home for dinner, taking me to separate, empty rooms to talk, etc., which 
made me deeply uncomfortable. See Kloß (2017: esp. 405) & Johansson (2015: esp. 56-59) on the issue of 
sexualized harassment in fieldwork, especially regarding ‘big men’ or ‘gatekeepers’.  
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supposedly ‘unscientific’, leads to missing out on chances for deeper reflection and discovery, 
as the following sections demonstrate. 
 
(4.2) The Context of Knowledge Production: Morally, Socially and Politically 
Motivated Silences, Denials and Evasions  
The context in which knowledge is produced is one of the elements that needs to be examined 
more closely in any reflective research framework (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 269). In this 
section, I focus on the silences, denials and evasions that I was confronted with during my stay 
in Zanzibar, which substantially shaped the process of data co-creation. At first, such instances 
of self-censorship greatly frustrated me, which again relates to struggles for control: in the 
context of uncertainty that prevailed in Zanzibar during the time of my research, I had little 
control over the extent to which respondents felt they could invest trust in me and be open and 
honest. It also speaks to informant’s own desires to control what could be addressed during 
interviews (Löfving 2005: 89). 
 
(4.2.1) The Stakes of Truth-Telling in Zanzibar 
In general, it can be argued that many Zanzibaris have a rather tentative attitude towards 
‘knowledge’ or ‘truth’. Kjersti Larsen writes that in the archipelago “[…] people are 
continuously preoccupied with the idea that everybody is always hiding something and nobody 
will ever disclose what she or he actually thinks or feels” (1995: 34). This idea that what people 
say, do or display is not necessarily ‘true’ is also expressed in the epigraph at the beginning of 
this chapter: Bi Rehema questioned my ability to know ‘reality’, as I could only see people 
‘how they are’, i.e. ‘how they present themselves’; the implication being that there is much 
more to people than what they will be able and willing to show to an outsider like me.  
I was confronted with silences, denials and evasions in almost all of my interviews. As I 
described in the introduction, I had planned to gather personal narratives about the impact of 
electoral conflict on ordinary life in Zanzibar, to find out how individual women experienced 
and possibly mitigated political tensions in inter-election times. This ambition was frustrated 
over and over again, as respondents typically became evasive or silent altogether whenever I 
asked for more concrete examples of conflict from their own lives:  
Hannah: I have heard a lot that politics and also the conflict between the parties enter 
into the everyday life of people. Would you agree and if you agree can you give me an 
example from your life? Maybe how this conflict has- 
Saida: How it has influenced you? Maybe in the family.  
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Bi Rehema: (chuckles uncomfortably) You know there are other things that I wouldn’t 
like to be recorded, for what reason? These are things that I don’t like (pauses) to be open 
[about].109  
Others promised to give me a concrete example, but then talked in general and frustratingly 
familiar terms about social sanctions: “‘So-and-so is not my fellow.’ ‘I do not want to work with 
so-and-so.’ ‘I do not visit so-and-so’”110. Still others denied any conflict or tension in Zanzibari 
society at the time of the research (“The situation is calm and peaceful! At this time, there is 
absolutely nothing. Everyone has calmed down their soul.”111). It was extremely rare for 
someone to tell me about conflicts in their personal networks of family, friends or neighbours 
in clear and straightforward terms112.  
The general restraint towards disclosing personal matters, conflict and negative emotions is 
something that many authors working on the Swahili Coast have noted (cf. Demovic 2007: 63; 
260-261; Fuglesang 1994: 25; Hirsch 1998: 8, 39-40; Larsen 1995: 31; McGruder 1999: 50; 
Stiles 2005: 583; Thompson 2019: 684). Beckmann (2015b) captures this well by stating that 
“[i]ssues of secrecy and mistrust characterize life in Zanzibar. Secrecy is a central value in 
Zanzibari society, and private, domestic matters must always be kept secret […].” (78). This 
mindset is also reflected in a number of popular Swahili proverbs, warning people about being 
‘chatty’, as for instance “The one who talks much, is usually thanked by few” (“Asemaye sana, 
hushukuriwa na wachache”; Kalugila 1997: 8; see also: ibid. 5, 20; Farsi (1958) 1973: 28, 43, 
47). In Zanzibar, there are thus distinct moral-cultural sanctions against revealing one’s own 
and other’s private matters, as well as against gossiping and slandering – especially within the 
family (McGruder 1999: 50). This moral standard might apply particularly strongly to women 
who, according to Angela Demovic (2007: 99), are less likely to voice criticism or grievances 
in public. Transgressing the ideal of secrecy can lead to severe reputational damage, shame and 
might even have socio-economic consequences (McMahon 2015: 30; Thompson 2019: 692). 
Susan Hirsch (1998) already pointed out the ‘awkward fit’ that this ideology can have with 
researchers’ interests in ‘inner’ affairs and workings of society (1998: 14).  
 
109 Hannah: “Nimesikia sana kwamba […] siasa na pia ugomvi […] baina ya vyama zinaingia sana katika maisha 
ya kila siku […] ya watu. […] Ungekubali na kama unakubali unaweza kunipa kama mfano ya maisha yako. Labda 
[u]le ugomvi [u]meku-“ - Saida: “Imekuathiri vipi? […] Katika familia labda. […]” – Rehema: “Unajua kuna 
vitu vyingine kuwa sipendi lakini virecordiwe, kwa sababu gani? Ni vitu ambavyo sipendi […] [to] be open.” 
(Interview 1 with Bi Rehema, Unguja, 24-10-2018) 
110“’Huyu fulani siyo mwenzangu’, ‘Huyu fulani sitaki kufanya naye kazi.’ ‘Huyu fulani simtembelei.’ […].” 
(Interview 1 with Bi Rukia, Pemba, 26-11-2018) 
111 “Hali iko shwari! [...] sasa hivi hakuna chochote. Kila mtu […] katulia roho yake.” (Interview 2 with Bi Pili, 
Unguja, 14-11-2018) 
112 Even if I knew people longer this did not change significantly, although I would expect this could have been 
the case if I would have stayed with a Zanzibari host family, and for a longer period of time.   
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Silences, denials and evasions, can also be viable (though rather unsustainable) strategies to 
maintain social stability within polarized societies (Vinckel 2015: 80; Eastmond 2010: 8-9). 
The silences of my respondents in connection to (past and present) interpersonal conflicts 
associated with party politics can thus likewise be understood as a coping mechanism, that 
might be particularly necessary in such a small and close-knit place like Zanzibar. Larsen – 
when writing about the reluctance of elderly Zanzibaris to speak about their memories of the 
1964 revolution – links the individual desire to forget and keep silent to “[…] the notion that 
‘speaking of memories’ would prevent a wished-for reconstruction of social harmony and 
propitiation of the past.” (2018: 254). I think that the same holds true for ‘speaking of memories’ 
of violence, social strife and injustice in more recent times, especially if these affected the 
private domain of family. These attitudes clearly relate to notions like ‘civility’ or the maternal 
strategy of ‘holding’ that I explored in the previous chapter. Pressing for answers to certain 
questions in a context of polarization, can quickly become an ethical issue as well: by insisting 
on replies, e.g. to questions of personal identity or political following, researchers could re-
highlight differences and divisions that have been supplanted for the moment, acting in contrary 
to the ‘do no harm’ imperative of ethical research (cf. Moss 2017: 174). 
A third structural constraint in the Zanzibari context causing silences, evasion and denials is 
the exacerbated context of (political) uncertainty: in a climate where journalists are practicing 
self-censorship out of fear (cf. Quintal 2018), and even private posts on social media or in 
WhatsApp groups can land citizens in prison (Hirschler & Hofmeier 2018: 393; Ismail 2016), 
it is not surprising that few ordinary people were willing to speak bluntly or critically about 
current politics with me. The stakes of being ‘politically exposed’ are extremely high, as Saida 
poignantly emphasized to me:  
So, if for example that information [that I gave you in the interview] comes up and goes 
to any other place that ‘so-and-so said’, it will be that they [the government] will see that 
you talked about something that is not based on their side. So even if you are educated, 
you may not be given a [job] posting. There are things like that. So, once you have 
exposed your [political] interest straightforwardly, they will see ‘Ah, really, he/she is not 
together with us.’ So that then you are shocked [that] you suffer difficulty you and your 
family because people know ‘Doesn’t so and-so come from a certain family?’113  
 
 
113“Kwa hiyo information […] mfano zikikuja, zikienda sehemu nyingine yoyote kwamba ‘anasema fulani’, ikiwa 
wanaona umezungumza kitu ambacho hakikubase upande wao. Kwa hiyo hata kama una elimu unaweza ukawa 
usipewe posting […] Kuna mambo kama hayo. […] Kwa hiyo once umeexpose zile interest zako moja kwa moja 
[...] [wataona] ‘Ah kumbe, hayuko pamoja na sisi.’ […] ili basi unaweza ukashtukia unapata ugumu - wewe 
pamoja na ile familia yako kwa sababu watu wanajua ‘Fulani si anatoka kwenye familia fulani?’ […].” (Interview 
with Saida, Dar es Salaam, 01-03-2019) 
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Saida made clear that the stakes for candour and ‘exposure’ in Zanzibar are extremely high and 
may (importantly) extend to one’s wider family, in a way of ‘guilt by association’. In their 
silences and self-censorship, people were thus communicating important information about the 
current political context in Zanzibar, and about the protective functions these strategies fulfilled 
to me; as Vinckel (2015) asserts: “[…] if we are to understand the meaning of silence, we have 
to look at ‘the structural constraints that are behind the silence and the functions that it 
performs’114 […]” (85; see also Fuji 2010). Time and time again, instances of self-censorship 
reminded me of my responsibility to keep data safe and anonymized. On other occasions I used 
silences as access points, like when I asked Bi Rehema about them as cited at the beginning of 
the chapter. Respondents’ answers in these instances added greatly to my insights. Lastly, such 
discussions helped me to reflect on my position in the field, and my own share in causing 
silences or ‘noise’. In this regard, Lee Ann Fuji argues:  
As many scholars have pointed out, not only are researchers studying their informants, 
their informants, in turn, are studying them back – to figure out who the researcher is and 
whether the researcher is a source of potential threat […]. How informants identify 
researchers can determine the amount or level of access the researcher can gain. (2010: 
233)  
This is what I will reflect on in the next section. 
 
(4.3) “If a mzungu comes…” - The Agent(s) of Knowledge Production 
The last interview of my research in Tanzania was conducted with my research assistant Saida. 
As I was about to finish my stay and embark upon the task of writing up this thesis, our last 
meeting not only constituted the unique opportunity to examine her personal opinions and 
insights as a Zanzibari academic on the issues that I was interested in, but also gave me the 
opportunity to reflect on the challenges and emergent questions of my fieldwork with her, in 
particular those related to the silences, denials and evasions discussed in the previous section. 
After I inquired why she thought that many of the women I tried to talk to were extremely 
reluctant to be interviewed or to answer my questions, especially if I mentioned ‘siasa’ 
(politics), she pointed out that,  
[p]eople have a mental orientation that if a mzungu (white person) comes, […] she will 
maybe want the information about CUF [and] what they have done more. And maybe she 
will bring the information [over] here/there [and] after bringing the information, it will 
come back [as] ‘Ah so-and-so said, so-and-so said’.115 
 
114 Translating and citing Pollack and Heinich (1986: 12). 
115 “Watu pia wana mental orientation ya kwamba akija mzungu, […] atakuwa anataka habari za labda CUF 
wamefanya nini zaidi. Na pengine atapeleka information huku, baada ya kupeleka information zikirudi ‘ah fulani 
alisema, fulani alisema’ […].” (Interview with Saida, Dar es Salaam, 01-03-2019)  
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Saida’s comments aimed precisely at what Fuji argues above – informants are often studying 
and interpreting researchers ‘back’: figuring out whether they are trustworthy, what their 
ulterior motives might be, and, as Saida highlighted, what kind of stories or information they 
are interested in (see also Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 287). It should however be noted, that 
even though this notion of ‘studying back’ can easily convey the impression of a more equalised 
research encounter taking place on eye-level between researcher and ‘researched’, we should 
not misconstrue the fact that my informants’ studying- and classifying-me emerged from a very 
different subject position than my studying-them. Saida made this acutely clear within the 
second part of the quote above: despite my promises to the contrary, my position as a socially 
distant foreigner made it hard for others to invest trust in me; they had no way of knowing if I 
would not share sensitive data ‘[over] here/there’ and adjusted their testimony accordingly. Her 
statement underscored the relative position of risk and vulnerability that any of my (potential) 
informants occupied and spoke from, and the ethical responsibilities and dilemmas that thus 
emerged; as a researcher I was always bound to be an ‘exposer’ to a certain degree (c.f. Hirsch 
1998: 40). Therefore, in order to understand knowledge production for this thesis fully, I 
consider it vital to reflect on how intersecting aspects of my subject position, like  race, gender, 
age and family status, influenced data co-construction, as respondents and others interested in 
control over my endeavour assed my trustworthiness, ulterior motives and ‘true’ intentions.  
According to Na’mah Razon and Karen Ross, in research settings characterized by tensions 
and polarity, it is vital for researchers to be perceived as allies by respondents, as this 
significantly influences the kinds of knowledge they are able to access. The authors connect 
this ability to be recognized as an ally to a researcher’s identity: informants (and others with 
influence on the research process) consciously and unconsciously interpret aspects of it, and 
place researchers on a continuum between a ‘close’ or ‘distant’ position accordingly. They 
highlight how ‘alliance-building’ in interview situations can already start with so-called ‘micro 
choices’, like the language the interview is conducted in, or the kind of questions, comments or 
reactions a researcher communicates or silences. All these choices contribute to a respondent’s 
assumptions about the relative ‘closeness’ of their counterpart. (Razon & Ross 2012: 495-496, 
501) Although the two authors do not make this connection explicitly, ‘building alliances’ of 
course also relates to trust and trust-building. Bernd Lahno (2011) for example notes that a 
‘trustee’ usually needs to be perceived as someone who can ultimately be held accountable for 
acts, as well as someone abiding to similar aims and norms as oneself (675). Satisfying these 
‘credentials’ as a foreign researcher who will eventually leave the place of his or her fieldwork, 
is of course difficult.  
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Razon and Ross point out, that informants may play an active role in processes of identity-
construction (and alliance- or trust-building), by confronting researchers directly with their 
assumptions about them, or asking questions aimed at prompting the researcher to position her- 
or himself (ibid. 497, 499-500). In most of my own researcher encounters, this ‘testing’ of my 
alliance went on quite subtly: especially in interviews with women that had a clear political 
positioning, the frequent use of phrases like ‘Umeshaona?’ (Have you already understood?) or 
‘Unajua, ...’ (You know…) was striking to me116. Sure, partly this is to be attributed to the fact 
that respondents (sometimes with good reason) may have doubted my command of Kiswahili, 
or it simply being a part of ‘automated’ speech patterns. However, the aggregation of such 
check-backs in certain interview contexts led me to also interpret them as a testing of my 
alliance; I argue that what respondents were really asking was: ‘do you agree?’ (see also Temple 
& Edwards 2002: 8). The only respondent that tried to prompt me to explicitly position myself 
politically was Leila: when I visited her at home for the first time, she caught me quite off-
guard by asking very straightforwardly which ‘side’ I was on. Now it was my turn to become 
evasive, and I wriggled myself out of the situation by suggesting that it would not be my place 
to have a side, since I wasn’t a Zanzibari. (Fieldnotes 06-01-2019) I think that it is reasonable 
to assume that most of my respondents asked themselves this question before, during and after 
out interactions; trying to classify me as ‘close’ or ‘distant,’ ‘trustworthy’ or ‘suspicious’, as 
‘ally’ or ‘adversary’. Different intersecting dimensions of my identity influenced this process: 
My gender guaranteed me an easier access and acceptance in women’s spaces, my interest in 
talking to women was not deemed inappropriate or suspicious, and it was often the helpful basis 
for assumptions about shared gendered knowledge and solidarity. Issues that were thought of 
as ‘female problems’ – marriage, divorce, or concerns about children and motherhood, but also 
more delicate issues like sexualised harassment – were more readily communicated to me, even 
though they were quite intimate. As a fellow woman I was expected to understand and 
sympathize. Additional to my gender, my age and childless status at times de-constructed the 
hierarchy of research relationships, especially when I started to use motherhood as an access 
point to other, more obviously ‘political’ discussions. A great many of my informants could 
have easily been my mother themselves, which made it easier to be classed as a non-threatening 
junior eager to learn about the subtleties of life as a prospective wife and mother. Often, this 
greatly enhanced sharing, as well as ‘closeness’. 
 
116 E.g. during my short interview with the Bi Hawa, the sheha in Pemba, she asked me ‘…umeshanifaham?’ 
(…have you already understood me?) seven times in only a little over 11 minutes. Additionally, most of these 
times, it sounded like she was making an affirmative statement, rather than asking a question. (Interview 1 with 
Bi Hawa, Pemba, 28-11-2019) 
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Another important attribute of my identity in the field – which both Saida and Bi Rehema, 
singled out as relevant to the process of knowledge production – were my race and nationality: 
both voiced their doubts whether I, as a white European (mzungu) and temporary visitor to the 
islands (mgeni), would ever be able to fully access and comprehend the type of knowledge I 
was interested in – due to my obvious distance to the context at hand, as well as to the fact that 
respondents would probably attach significant weight to these elements in their interpretation 
of me. Certainly, this played into many of my encounters in the field that were characterized by 
silences or evasions. Sometimes however, as I already mentioned, and as Saida also emphasized 
in the quote above, these aspects actually encouraged sharing, especially for those respondents 
affiliated with the opposition. To them, my being a white European marked an ideological 
‘closeness’; an assumed sympathetic stance towards their struggles, as well as a possible access 
to a receptive outside audience117.  This assessment was of course mirrored in the judgement of 
my positionality by respondents close to the ruling party or by the government agents I 
encountered. I sometimes noticed what I perceived of as a certain defensiveness in their replies; 
like when CCM-loyalist Bi Khadija stressed that “[..] at this time there is no conflict. Ah-ah 
[no]. Every person is supporting his or her party. There are many parties here in Zanzibar, a 
great deal of them.”118, to my inquiry about political tensions in the islands. I interpreted 
reactions like these, as reflective of the wariness of both the Zanzibari and Tanzanian 
governments towards what they regard as ‘Western interference’ into internal political matters 
(Throup 2016; Hirschler & Hofmeier 2019; see also fn. 107). Without a doubt, I was at times 
identified as belonging to this group of ‘biased Western meddlers’ by respondents, and certainly 
by government authorities. Finally, to those politically ‘unexposed’ women my identity might 
have represented a danger to be ‘exposed’, since talking to me would have invited 
interpretations about their political leanings. This might have been the reason why many 
remained evasive, both if interviews took place, or in avoiding to be interviewed in the first 
place. 
Finally, ‘closeness’ was consciously produced through language use: I conducted the vast 
majority of my field encounters – including interviews, informal conversations and 
administrative matters – in Kiswahili. Overall, I dare say, my experience would have been 
radically different without my language skills. They, for instance, enabled me to approach a 
 
117 Although Bi Halima for instance also criticised that such outsiders, like election observers, or representatives 
of foreign missions, leave and publish their reports, but do not end up taking an active stand for those they saw 
wronged in elections or conflicts. (Interview 1 with Bi Halima, Unguja, 13-02-2019) See Fuglesang (1994: 25) on 
scepticism towards foreign researchers in Lamu.  
118 “[…] katika kipindi hichi […] hakuna umgomvi. Ah-ah. Kila mtu anatetea chama chake. Kuna vyama vyingi 
chungu nzima hapa Zanzibar.” (Interview 2 with Bi Khadija, Unguja, 13-11-2018) 
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diverse sample of women and I was able to understand parts of conversations that were not 
directly aimed at me – but most importantly, they allowed my respondents to express 
themselves in a language that they felt comfortable speaking in, and their statements were not 
mediated through a translator, whose ‘ally-status’ would have also needed to be assessed. Still, 
conducting lengthy interviews in Kiswahili, some replete with linguistic variations unknown to 
me, and listening, writing and understanding simultaneously proved to be a challenge. I have 
no doubt that many of the intricacies of my respondents’ statements were (and continue to be) 
lost on me, and that I missed multiple opportunities at gaining deeper insights because I simply 
did not grasp the full meaning of a certain comment in time. These obvious deficiencies are 
aggravated by the fact that Kiswahili is a language riddled with word play, polysemy, and 
hidden meanings – a characteristic that is also consciously employed at times (Askew 2003: 
619; Fuglesang 1994: 26; Stiles & Thompson 2015: 24; Topan 2004: 218).  
Further, understanding a word, sentence, or the gist of a narrative is a far way off from 
understanding the underlying intentions of a person in sharing something, their choices to 
remain silent about other topics, or fully comprehending the experiences of the person uttering 
it. The fact that I had the same gender as all of my respondents, that I chose to dress in ways 
similar to them119, and spoke and understood their first language, should not mislead me into 
thinking that I could ever fully understand or share their experiences of being-in-the-world as 
Zanzibari women and mothers. Importantly – as Saida’s comment above also highlights – I 
spoke and acted from a position of relative privilege in relation to my respondents: the 
vulnerabilities that shaped their testimony did never fully apply to me (cf. Thomson et. al 2013: 
3, 8). Yes, the government exerted pressure on me and could have put an end to my research 
endeavour, but I always knew that I would leave the islands eventually. My long-term career 
or my family’s access to government services were never on the line. Thus, my  
‘knowledge’ of my respondents’ experiences remained and will always remain ‘partial’ 
(Mullings 1999: 337; see also Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 1; Schnegg 2015: 29, 41; Thomson 
et al. 2013: 1). 
On a related note, not being a mother myself, the knowledge and practices I try to analyse 
and interpret within this thesis are, as of yet, merely theory to me (although, as I argued above, 
this was helpful at times). Should I ever have children myself, I, in contrast to many women in 
Zanzibar, do not anticipate that I will have to struggle economically in order to facilitate their 
survival and education, or assume that I will, at some point, be left to fend for myself and my 
 
119 Throughout my stay, I adapted to local ways of female dress by covering my head and hair with a loose scarf 
or turban and wearing floor-length and shoulder-covering clothes; also to set myself apart from the many other 
Western foreigners in the archipelago. 
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dependants by a partner without any monetary support. Similarly, although childbirth is surely 
a scary and vulnerable experience for women everywhere120, I do not presume that it will be 
like ‘bingo’121. 
It thus becomes clear that there are certain pitfalls and clear limitations to consider as one 
engages in ‘alliance-’ or ‘trust’-building’ as a field researcher. Another flipside of such 
practices, namely the desire to preserve ‘closeness’ or trust established through conscious 
micro-choices, significantly impacted my process of data co-creation at times: frequently, when 
I looked at the list of questions that I came to an interview with, I felt like a terrible researcher, 
noticing all the questions that I had skipped fearing they could alienate my interlocutor. I 
routinely agreed with my respondents on everything, scared that a critical comment, or insistent 
probing would not only elicit denials or evasions, but also end the research relationship, or at 
least call into question my status as an ‘ally’. This was emotionally straining at times, as I found 
myself affirming statements that would have elicited at least a respectful challenging in other 
circumstances (see also Begley 2013: 77)122. I also began to watch very closely what I said or 
shared about my research in public and became increasingly concerned about the respondents 
of ‘one side’ knowing that I spoke to those ‘of the other side,’ as well as about my visibility 
(‘exposure’) when I entered the houses of opposition party members (see e.g. Fieldnotes 11-12-
2018). Witnessing my own ‘silencing’ was deeply distressing to me; it made me doubt whether 
I really could ‘access’ the quality data I needed. Nonetheless, as frustrating it was to observe 
my own self-censorship; and as troubling it was at times, to constantly be on my guard, these 
experiences – as different authors have very aptly stated – constitute the proverbial ‘tip of the 
iceberg’ in comparison to what many of my respondents felt every day (Bouka 2013: 120; 
Leegwater 2015: 49-50; Thomson et al. 2013: 6)123. In the end, they helped me to make a better 
sense of the context of my research, and encouraged me to accept women’s silences: many of 
them kept quiet, not because they had nothing to say, but because there were too many reasons 
to say nothing. 
 
120 See e.g. recent reports about widespread occurrences of abuse and mistreatment of women during childbirth 
(e.g. Gimson 2018; Hill 2020, WHO 2019). 
121 “‘Giving birth is like bingo’, a young woman from my neighbourhood in Zanzibar Town told me. ‘You have a 
fifty-fifty chance of survival.’” (Beckmann 2015b: 59) 
122 This parallels my reactions to the inappropriate behaviour by the employee of the 2nd VP’s office; just like 
Johansson, “[…] I hesitated to respond from within my own ethnocentric conceptions of gender relations and 
definitions of ‘harassment’. I doubted myself. Was I reading the context right? Was my experience of this 
encounter […] really legitimate? Immobilised by navel-gazing, I responded to […] sexual advances by politely 
smiling, sweetly declining, joking or mildly chastising, not wanting to cause offence. Such responses, in the murky 
landscape of cultural translation, might have been misread as uncertainty rather than the clear ‘no’ that I 
instinctively wanted to voice.” (2015: 58-59; see also Kloß 2017: 402) 
123 According to Afrobarometer, 81,24% of respondents in Zanzibar claimed to be careful about what they said 
about politics ‘often’ to ‘always’ (Afrobarometer 2016/2018). 
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(4.4) Conclusive Remarks 
In the end, my research experience in Zanzibar was a process that was never entirely controlled 
by me – respondents, government officials, and even my own subconscious and emotions, 
played a role in shaping and directing it. It was a learning experience, and looking back on my 
six months in Zanzibar, I can see the methodological shortcomings, and the many “stones left 
unturned” (cf. Berckmoes 2013: 128). The question whether it was all worth it – possibly having 
endangered some research participants, or having stirred up disturbing memories with others – 
for the self-serving purpose of this thesis and my degree, remains as unsettling to me as it does 
to many others (see e.g. Begley 2013: 81). In the end, I can only hope that my respondents will 
find themselves adequately represented in the version of ‘truth’ that I present here. In this 
chapter I hope to have clarified, that there were many different factors and dimensions that 
shaped the process of knowledge production for this thesis; influencing, and enhancing each 
other, or cancelling each other out, both on my side as ‘the researcher’ and on the side of my 
respondents as ‘the researched’.  
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(5) ‘Every woman must also be a mother.’ – Womanhood, Motherhood and 
Mothering in Zanzibar 
I first meet Subira, a single mother and political activist, in a restaurant in Zanzibar Town 
in December 2018. Over the past few weeks, I noticed that in informal talks and 
interviews, women from all different kinds of backgrounds prominently invoked their 
motherhood when talking about their lives and positions in society, as well as their 
navigation of the (political) context of uncertainty in the archipelago. Bi Rehema, for 
example, a mother of three and a former CUF-politician, highlighted her identity as a 
mother at the very beginning of our interview, even before discussing her many political 
activities and successes. Bi Rukia did the same. When asked to tell me about their lives, 
my informants often not only described their own activities, but also recounted where 
their children stood in life: their current educational levels, their jobs, or marital status. 
Subira is the first of my informants that I ask directly about the importance of motherhood 
for the experience of women in Zanzibar. ‘Ah yes.’ she tells me enthusiastically, 
‘Motherhood is everything for the woman. Every woman must also be a mother.’ 124   
Subira’s highly affirmative response confirmed my perception of the close interlinkage of 
motherhood and womanhood in Zanzibar and led me to further develop ideas about the 
influence of motherhood as institution and resource, as well as of mothering as practice, on 
women’s navigation of (political) uncertainty in Zanzibar. Given that, as I demonstrate below, 
maternity along the Swahili Coast is often only mentioned in passing in the scientific literature, 
I first present a relatively detailed account of the interlinkage of motherhood and womanhood, 
as well as mothering practices in this chapter, before I move on to its connections and linkages 
to the political sphere.   
 
(5.1) Considering the Literature: Maternity as an Afterthought? 
In the growing body of literature on gender, gender relations, sexuality and women along the 
Swahili Coast and in Zanzibar, topics like marriage and weddings, as well as divorce, female 
initiation and sexual instruction, sex segregation, and spirit possession have been approached 
by a range of different scholars, mostly female anthropologist (see Caplan 1976; Fuglesang 
1994; Hanak 1996; Hirsch 1998; Keefe 2016; Larsen 1995; Stiles 2005; Stiles & Thompson 
(eds) 2015; Strobel 1979; Thompson 2011). Motherhood, its intimate connection with attaining 
 
124 ‘Ah ndiyo, umama ndo kila kitu kwa mwanamke. Kila mwanamke lazima ni mama.’ (Notes from Interview 1 
with Subira, Unguja, 25-12-2018) 
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full status as a woman, the position of mothers in society, as well as specific maternal practices, 
however, are often merely mentioned in passing:  
Marriage and childbearing are a woman’s primary accomplishments and status markers 
in this community […] (Keefe 2016: 125; my emphasis.)  
[…] to marry and to have children is the aim of both women and men and the main 
concern of their families and relatives. (Larsen 2015: 222; my emphasis.) 
Both in the literature and the local context, therefore, marriage and motherhood typically seem 
to be thought together, albeit, especially in academic works, the primary focus is rather on the 
former than the latter; making motherhood and mothering afterthoughts of sorts to the elaborate 
ceremonies of Swahili weddings, sexual initiation and sexual instruction. This omission is 
surprising to me; on the one hand, since their roles as mothers seemed to be so very important 
to many of my female informants, and on the other hand, because marriage and sexuality within 
marriage can in a very basic sense be thought of as principally aiming for the realization of 
mother- or parenthood within a morally sanctioned space; a claim that most of the inhabitants 
of the Swahili Coast would probably corroborate125. Within this chapter, I will thus make a first 
attempt at exploring some aspects of Swahili motherhood and mothering to be able to establish 
the maternal standpoint my respondents spoke and navigated from. The fact that motherhood 
and mothering were emergent themes of my research is of course a limitation, and I would 
strongly argue for the need of other researchers to engage with this topic in the future.  
 
(5.2) Sex, Gender, and Womanhood in Zanzibar 
As I already indicated in Chapter 3, and as also becomes clear in the quote at the beginning of 
this chapter, womanhood and motherhood are intimately linked in Zanzibar. Thus, a brief 
exploration of local ideas about sex, gender126 and gender relations at large is surely due at this 
point: In Zanzibar, as well as along the Swahili Coast in general, local ideas about these 
concepts have long structured and organized society in a crucial manner; in most works on 
 
125 Cf. e.g. Hirsch’s quotation of a kadhi’s ruling on a divorce case in Mombasa: “’The main aims of the marriage 
are tranquillity, mutual love and mercy and procreation.’” (1998: 9; my emphasis); Demovic (2007: 232; my 
emphasis): “’To have children together and to work together nicely.’ Those are the two reasons that women in 
Jambiani [Unguja] unanimously cite for desiring marriage.”, or Fuglesang (1994: 17): “The marriage system in 
Lamu has first and foremost functioned to ensure procreation.”. Additionally, in Islam in general, childbirth is 
regarded as the “natural outcome of marriage” (Schleifer 1996: 51). 
126 The difference between sex and gender made in feminist studies and related fields should be sufficiently clear 
to most scholars today. ‘Sex’ on the one hand, identifies the anatomical traits that mark a person as male or female, 
although there is also the possibility of inconclusive sex markers and discussions about the constructed nature of 
sex. ‘Gender’ on the other hand, refers to the social roles that people consciously and unconsciously learn to 
perform according to their (assigned) biological sex within different societies. (McHugh 2007: 124-125) In 
Zanzibar, there does not seem to be a heightened awareness of a distinction between sex and gender; with bodily 
differences commonly understood as reflecting psychological differences between men and women (Larsen 1995: 
205-206). The Swahili word ‘jinsia’ can be translated as both sex and gender (Mohamed 2011). 
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women in this area, at some point, the reader will come across a mention of sex(ual) segregation 
or seclusion (sometimes referred to as Purdah) as an important part of everyday life (cf. Askew 
1999: 74). In Zanzibar today it is, according to different scholars, still possible to speak of 
disparate, gendered life worlds and practices of women and men in the archipelago due to their 
spatial and physical separation in various contexts (e.g. Larsen 2009: 22; Stiles & Thompson 
2015: 22). Underpinning local concepts of sex, gender, and the need for sex segregation is the 
notion of a complementarity of the sexes and their fundamental ‘natural’ difference (Demovic 
2007: 15, 164-165; Fuglesang 1994: 88; Larsen 1995: 36). Respondents’ statements like “Ahh, 
because we mothers/women are naturally like this. The way we were created,”127 confirm the 
ongoing validity of this idea and add a distinctive religious component to it. The consequent 
notion, reproduced by Kjersti Larsen and Minou Fuglesang, that women are inferior to men, 
both in terms of physical and psychological power or strength (nguvu), having less akili (reason) 
and less self-restraint, thus making their subordination to male authority needed and natural 
(Fuglesang 1994: 88-89; Larsen 1995: 31; 207-201) is, I would contend, not as universally held 
in its extreme form as in the 1980s and early 1990s when these two researchers conducted their 
fieldwork on the Swahili Coast. It was certainly not voiced, and sometimes even emphatically 
challenged by the educated women and women of the younger generation within my sample. 
Some men, on the other hand, do seem to hold onto this view: Often, when I spoke to men about 
the topic of my research, I was met by a derisive smile, raised eyebrows and the suggestion to 
turn my attention to men’s ‘more valuable’ perspectives instead. These attitudes echo the 
‘devaluation of female speech’ that Hirsch (1998), Stiles and Thompson (2015), and Thompson 
(2011) outline: ‘women’s talk’ is typically thought to revolve around trivialities like gossip, 
weddings and consumer goods in contrast to men’s ‘serious’ discussions of matters like religion 
and, importantly, politics (Hirsch 1998: 65; Thompson 2011: 428).   
Moving on from the way that women are naturally thought to be, to how they should behave, 
in order to be acknowledged as honourable and respectable (ya heshima), I would agree that 
ideal ‘female’ character traits like ‘shyness, respect and passivity’, as mentioned by Beckmann 
(2015a: 119) and Larsen (2015: 227) in recent works, continue to be regarded as making for a 
‘good’ woman’s character in Zanzibar. Countless times I was told by men and women alike 
that ‘women in Zanzibar are shy’128, for instance when I narrated the challenges of my research 
 
127 “Ahh, kwa sababu naturally wamama ndo tuko hivyo. […] Tulivyoumbwa.” (Interview 1 with Bi Farida, 
Unguja, 31-10-2018) 
128 Interestingly, even if this sentiment was voiced in Kiswahili, the English word ‘shy’ was almost always used. I 
think however that the Kiswahili term ‘haya’ is much more fitting. This encompasses ‘shyness’ in the English 
sense of the word (cf. Wamtilia 2016: ‘the state of not being able to look a person in the face’), but also signifies 
‘bashfulness, modesty’, ‘humility, respect’, ‘an upright character’ or “a person's attitude to refrain from doing 
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to Zanzibari acquaintances, friends or respondents. Older informants told me about the sheer 
inconceivability of a woman standing up in front of a group of men “[…] and then just talk”129, 
or their nervousness while doing so at the beginning of their political careers. This female 
‘shyness’ seems to be the epitome of Swahili restraint and reticence that I discussed in my 
methodology. The latter examples additionally suggest that there were (and are) clear 
differences in female behaviour according to the composition of their ‘audience’ (cf. Stiles & 
Thompson 2015: 22-23) – in certain all-female settings, women’s behaviour can be quite 
different, often not ‘shy’ at all130. 
Another crucial and related component of female heshima (respectability) in Zanzibar is 
‘covered-ness’, as Nuru explained to me:  
We Zanzibaris are not used to being naked, [for] example we have gotten used to cover 
ourselves with the hijab. [If] you come across a Zanzibari, [and] she is wearing her shawl 
nicely, and is a ‘well-covered person’ (mstiri), this is a case of Zanzibariness.131 
Interestingly, the translations of ‘mstiri/msitiri’ and the corresponding verb ‘-sitiri’, seem to 
both refer to the physical act of covering-up, and to the ability to hide or protect someone else’s 
secrets or disgrace (cf. Knappert & van Kessel 2010; Mohamed 2011; TUKI 2001). I would 
thus argue that Nuru in her description means to refer to a woman who, on the one hand, covers 
herself in an aesthetic way with the different types of religious head- and body coverings in 
fashion, and, at the same time, complies with the Swahili ethics of concealment and reticence. 
The ideal Zanzibari woman is thus a ‘covered person’ in appearance and behaviour. All my 
respondents (and the overwhelming majority of women in Zanzibar) covered according to their 
interpretations of Qur’anic ordinances132. This was usually related to the deep commitment to 
 
something because of too much respect given to another person say of higher authority, status, etc.” (TUKI 2001). 
Additionally, it can also mean ‘shame, disgrace, dishonour’, which could be caused by the kind of behaviour that 
goes against the norms stipulated in the first group of translations. (TUKI 2001; Knappert & van Kessel 2010; 
Wamtilia 2016) Haya is thus something that women should possess, should act upon and should not violate - 
neither the haya of others, nor their own.  
129 Interview 1 with Bi Raissa, Pemba, 24-11-2018. 
130 Examples of this are e.g. the scenes of sexual instruction that Thompson (2015) describes, where (especially 
older women’s) language is vulgar and highly explicit (see e.g. 191, 193; also: Hirsch 1998: 65). During the 
wedding celebrations that I took part in, especially on the busses transporting the female guests of the groom’s 
side to the house of the bride, several (middle-aged to older) women seemed to be competing amongst themselves 
to make the loudest and most juicy comments. On one occasion, a popular song by the Tanzanian musicians 
Diamond Platumnz and Rayvanny, ‘Mwanza Nyegezi’ (so provocative that is was banned by the National Arts 
Council of Tanzania (BASATA); cf. Matiko 2018), was blasted on full volume, and young and old women joined 
in the chorus “Ehh nyege, nyege.” (‘Ehh, horny, horny’), while others danced suggestively in the centre aisle of 
the bus. At the end of the song a middle-aged woman hollered, “Tumepata nyege, sasa tutombowe!” (‘We have 
gotten horny, now let’s get fucked!’), reaping loud laughter and affirmative shrieks from the entire group. 
(Fieldnotes, December 20, 2018) 
131 “Wazanzibari hatukuzoea kuwa uchi, mfano kama tumezoea kujitanda hijabu. Unamkuta Mzanzibari amevaa 
mtandio wake vizuri, na ni mstiri mzuri, hilo ndo kesi ya kizanzibari.” (Interview 1 with Nuru, Unguja, 19-01-
2019)  
132 Even members of the Christian minority in Zanzibar, be they Zanzibar-born or immigrants from the mainland, 
often do cover – like e.g. my respondent Joyce, when out in public. Bi Rehema also explained covering as such a 
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Islamic identity and (global) Muslim culture that many of them felt; just like men all along the 
Swahili coast, many Zanzibari women are aspiring to become better Muslims, and thereby gain 
prestige and honour (heshima) within their society (cf. Demovic 2016: 6-7; Larsen 2013: 76; 
Larsen 2015: 210; Nuotio 2006: 206; Stiles & Thompson 2015: 1; Thompson 2011: 431). Being 
Muslim is an extremely crucial component of ‘Zanzibariness’ (cf. Demovic 2007: 156; Larsen 
2013: 76) and, as Nuru put it above, women express this publicly and proudly in the ways that 
they dress (cf. Demovic 2007: 71; Fair 1998: 84). In addition to covering in public and 
performing the required prayers at home, several of my female respondents regularly attended 
private qur’anic lessons, which speaks to these women’s profound personal commitment to 
their faith.  
Furthermore, the question of the division of labour between men and women is central to 
discussions on gender and gender relations in the isles. In my conversations with informants 
there typically was a tendency to first describe the ‘ideal’ – the norm as stipulated by utamaduni 
(culture) and dini (religion) – followed by a statement that highlighted how things had changed. 
Good examples would for instance be the following statements by Subira and Nuru, both young, 
professional, working women:  
According to culture and religion, women stay at home, they protect the family. Men go 
outside and ‘search risk’. These days things are changing a bit though.133 (Subira, 
Unguja) 
Because at first, the position of women was that they were housewives, also persons to be 
searched for. Meaning the man is roaming about and struggling for her, to bring the 
woman her needs and those of the family in general. But right now, it has become 
different. Meaning the woman is struggling, the man is struggling.134 (Nuru, Unguja) 
In these statements, the (formerly) strong connection between masculinity and the ability to 
provide is clearly highlighted (cf. Larsen 1995: 64). Sufficient maintenance of the family by a 
husband through provision of clothes and food, lead to legitimate authority over women (ibid.: 
208), and insufficient provision is a reason women could (and can) claim a divorce for in front 
of an Islamic judge (kadhi) (McMahon 2015: 34). However, due to the substantial changes 
taking place in Zanzibar since the 1980s – chronicled in Chapters 2 and 3 – the costs of living, 
as well as people’s dependency on cash have been on the rise. Consequently, nowadays a double 
 
fundamental feature of Zanzibari culture (which to her, in its essence is Muslim) that even Christians assimilate to 
it (Interview 1 with Bi Rehema, Unguja, 24-10-2018; see also: Anwar n.d.).  
133 ‘Katika utamaduni na dini wanawake wanakaa nyumbani, wanatunza familia. Wanaume wanatoka kutafuta 
risk. Siku hizi inabadilika kidogo lakini.’ (Notes from Interview 1 with Subira, Unguja, 25-12-2018) 
134 “Kwa sababu mwanzo, nafasi ya wanawake ilikuwa kama ni mama wa nyumbani pia mtu wa kutafutiwa. 
Kwamba mwanume anahangaika, ampelekee mwanamke mahitaji yake na familia kwa ujumla. Lakini saahivi 
imekuwa ni tofauti. Kwamba mwanamke anahagaika, mwanaume anahangaika […].” (Interview 1 with Nuru, 
Unguja, 19-01-2019) 
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income is often necessary to navigate financial and economic uncertainties. It is thus inevitable 
for most women to contribute to the household income – ‘to roam about and struggle’ like a 
husband. (Demovic 2007: 233 & 2016: 12, 19; Keshodkar 2013: 139, 144) These new economic 
pressures – often referred to as ‘maisha magumu’ (the difficult life) (Keshodkar 2013: 58; 
Larsen 2009: 26) – and the rising numbers of educated women, are clearly leading to a shift in 
local ideas about gender and gender relations (Keshodkar 2013: 139-141). While in the past it 
might have been honourable for women to stay inside, practice seclusion, and take care of 
‘home affairs’, the definition of heshima (honour) in terms of work and female movement 
outside of the house is transforming to include more diverse ways of life and work (ibid. 144-
147).  
It should be noted, that the concrete exercise of, and meanings accorded to seclusion or 
veiling (as a form of ‘mobile seclusion’), as well as the attached notions of female heshima and 
mobility, have always been characterized by significant variation and fluidity in Zanzibar: 
concomitant with historical developments like Omani settlement and British colonialism (cf. 
Alpers 1984: 678, 681; Askew 1999: 81; Fair 1994: 82, 84, 86), the emancipation of former 
slaves (Fair 1998: 81-84), the entry of certain groups of women into the workforce (Decker 
2014: 1, 4, 8) or economic liberalization, growing foreign influence through tourism and a re-
connection with the global Muslim world (Caplan 2015; 100; Demovic 2007: 262, 269; 
Demovic 2016: 6; Fuglesang 1994: 15, 197; Nuotio 2006: 191, 202, 206; Turner 2009: 238, 
260-261), seclusion practices increased, receded, or changed. This was (and is) also usually 
dependent on factors like urban or rural residence, class, or ethnicity, which provide for 
variation not only across time, but also space. 
Overall, it can be said that, although the premise of the ‘essential’ difference between men 
and women, dependent on their biological sex, is widely shared, the consequent gender roles, 
gender relations and surrounding religious and cultural ideologies are subject to profound 
negotiations in present-day Zanzibar. Frictions and clashes, but also overlaps and contradictory 
attitudes between and towards different currents of opinions are perceptible. I would like to 
point out here, that these tensions should not be understood over-simplistically as a clash of 
‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’; as I demonstrated above, gender ideologies and roles have always 
been in flux. They are socially and historically constructed, just as ideas about what is 
‘traditional’ or ‘modern’ at a certain point in time and space. I would thus argue that additional 
to navigating a tension-ridden, unpredictably political context and an uncertain environment, 
Zanzibari women often navigate the field of different and clashing ideas and ideologies of what 
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it means to be a good Muslim woman (read: Zanzibari woman) today – in their everyday lives, 
and in relation to ‘the political’.  
Motherhood as institution and resource, as well as mothering as a practice are central 
constitutive aspects of Zanzibari womanhood which, even though they seem quite ‘stable’ as 
concepts, have also undergone significant change in recent years. This is what I turn my 
attention to now.  
 
(5.3) ‘Who compares to mother(s)?’: Motherhood as Institution in Zanzibar  
Who compares to mother(s), honour for mother(s), 
that suffering of carrying me for nine months in your stomach, 
my compassion for you mother, 
what shall I give you, honour for mother(s), 
mother, you suffered the day you put me out in the world, 
what shall I give you, the price of your upbringing, I cannot pay it. 
Mother, who compares to mother(s), who compares to mother(s)?135 
The notion, that the ‘natural’ and biological differences between men and women translate to 
psychological distinctions and differences in the individual disposition of men and women, is 
reflected in local ideas about motherhood as well: Mothering is thought to come ‘naturally’ to 
women and to lead to their more peaceful character. While women might be thought of in a 
‘deficient’ way (i.e. less reason, less self-restraint), the more positive share of their assumed 
characteristics lies right within these ‘deficiencies’: having less self-restraint, they are more 
emotional and thus more sensitive to the needs and emotions of others. Nurturing and mothering 
are therefore thought to be ‘in their nature’. (Fuglesang 1994: 89-90) 
In general, children, and thus parenthood, are, and have been, highly desired by both men 
and women in Zanzibar in the present (Beckmann 2015b: 61; Larsen 2015: 222), as well as in 
the past (McMahon 2015: 37). For women, the importance of motherhood and childbearing is 
such that complete status as an adult woman can only be fully attained as a mother (and, ideally, 
a wife) (Beckmann 2015a: 199-120; 2015b: 61; Fuglesang 1994: 256; Keefe 2016: 123-125, 
Kielmann 1998: 141). Of course, this strong emphasis on (biological) motherhood in Zanzibar 
leaves women struggling with infertility, prolonged single status, or simply choosing to remain 
childless and/or unmarried, in a difficult position. Bi Sauda, for instance, reported to me that 
she was divorced two times – within the second and first year of marriage respectively – because 
she failed to conceive. Both her and my research assistant agreed that this was a prevalent 
 
135 Nani kama mama, heshima kwa mama/Yale mateso ulinibeba miezi mitisa tumboni mwako/pole sana 
mama/Nikupe nini, heshima kwa mama/mama, uliteseka siku ya kunitoa duniani/nikupe nini, thamani ya malezi 
yako siwezi kuyalipa./Mama, nani kama mama, nani kama mama? (Christian Bella ft. Ommy Dimpoz: “Nani 
Kama Mama”; see YouTube 2015a) 
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occurrence in Zanzibar136 (see also Kielmann 1998: 141-142). It is however commonplace for 
women who, for whatever reasons, are not biological mothers, to be involved in the raising of 
children of the extended family, who might live as permanent or temporary foster children in 
their household; a widespread practice throughout much of the African continent (Grant & 
Yeatman 2012: 279-280; Lawson et al. 2016: 2-3). The mobility of children outside of their 
birth family is quite normal in Zanzibar and is usually purpose-driven and targeted; for reasons 
like better educational opportunities and care or the divorce, migration or death of the biological 
parents (Demovic 2007: 160; 236-237; Gaydosh 2019: 1667; Kielmann 1998: 142; Lawson et 
al. 2016: 3, 14; McGruder 1999: 25). A number of my respondents talked about being raised 
by, and living with a range of different relatives throughout their childhoods when they 
recounted their life histories to me, and one of my still childless informants told me that,  
[…] in terms of children I have them, whom I raise. I have the children of my sister and 
the children of my brother. I take care of them in the mornings [to get them ready] to go 
to school, and in the evenings, I am with them there [at home]. On that account, I can 
join in childcare.137 (Nuru, Unguja)  
The high prevalence of child fostering and joint childcare might thus ‘soften the blow’ of 
childlessness in Zanzibar, while it also unburdens individual mothers from shouldering the sole 
responsibility of childbearing and -rearing (see also Demovic 2007: 236-237). 
I cannot say much about the status of women who are childless by choice or who fail to form 
a relationship with their children for whatever reasons, because only two of my 25 respondents 
did not have any children of their own (yet). Be that as it may, Bi Salama made an interesting 
remark when I asked about the whereabouts of her children after she was divorced; what I 
expected to be a painful topic, since they stayed separated from her with her ex-husband’s 
mother, did not seem to bother her much. She claims that her separation from them was due to 
the fact that, “I only knew how to give birth. […] I myself only know how to give birth”.138 The 
apparent nonchalance with which she talked about this issue, as well as the giggles her response 
subsequently elicited from herself, my research assistant and a neighbourhood woman who was 
also present during the interview, stuck with me. I suspect that the amusement was both directed 
at the fact that Bi Salama’s lack of a relationship with her children was indeed unusual, but at 
the same time not completely unheard of for those present. The implied difference between the 
‘knowledge’ required for the performance of birthing work and reproduction, and that for actual 
 
136 Interview 1 with Bi Sauda, Unguja, 24-10-2018. 
137 “[…] kwa upande wa watoto ninao, naolea. […]. Ninao watoto wa dada, […] na watoto wa kaka […] 
Nawashugulikia asubuhi kwa kwenda shule, na usiku nakuwa niko nao pale. Kwa hiyo naweza kujumuika kwenye 
ulezi.” (Interview 1 with Nuru, Unguja, 19-01-2019)  
138“[…] ilikuwa mimi najua kuzaa tu. Najua kuzaa tu miye.” (Interview 1 with Bi Salama, Unguja, 22-10-2018) 
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mothering, speaks to an acknowledgement on the part of Zanzibaris that mothering is in fact 
learned and performed, not an automatic or ‘natural’ instinct. 
There however still seems to be a degree of ambivalence, as to who ‘counts’ as a ‘real’ 
mother in the context at hand: In Swahili, the term ‘mama’ can mean mother, as well as maternal 
aunt139. It is also used as a polite address of women in general, and the term ‘akina mama’140 is 
commonly employed as a synonym for ‘wanawake’ (women). In a longer discussion about 
motherhood with one of my key informants, Bi Rehema, I asked her whether mama and woman 
are interchangeable in Swahili – giving as examples that I was often politely approached as 
mama by people who did not know my name, and that she herself in our first interview called 
several women (amongst others childless German chancellor Angela Merkel) ‘yule mama’ (that 
mother). After a moment of reflection, Bi Rehema replied by narrating the succession of life 
stages that women in Zanzibar typically pass through:  
For us here, there is the girl child, then we have the kigori [a girl before her first 
menstruation]. Then she enters into being a girl. After being a girl, she becomes a woman. 
Woman – mother; mother – grandmother. Yes. So, these are like statuses for certain times. 
But you classify her according to the age. But it can be that she is in the state of being 
only a woman, you see, and you can just call her ‘mama’, or ‘mama’ may be the same as 
woman. But a mother is the one who has given birth. She has given birth.141 
Bi Rehema did not completely resolve the vague distinction between classifying any adult 
woman as ‘mama’, or merely women who actually have had children. In practice, this is of 
course not always common knowledge, so people will use age as an orientation and assume that 
women of a certain age are most likely mothers. Therefore, I was called mama, and other 
women of a higher age are referred to as such, even though, some (like chancellor Merkel) 
might not have children of their own. In Zanzibar, the percentage of women past the child-
bearing age who have remained without children is extremely low: in 2012 it was valued at 
5,2% for the age group of 45- to 49-year olds – which can be estimated to amount to only around 
 
139 Although in this context, sometimes the qualification mama mdogo (small mother) or mama mkubwa (big 
mother) is used to specify that an aunt is meant, as well as to qualify whether it is an older or a younger sister of 
the mother. When the aunt is addressed directly however, typically just ‘mama’ is used. On the Tanzania mainland, 
and along its Swahili Coast, it is also common to address women as ‘mama’ plus the name of their first-born child 
and not with their own name, as soon as they have given birth (see e.g. Keefe’s (2016) naming of her respondents). 
In Zanzibar this does not seem to be as prevalent. The only family I knew, in which this was practiced was that of 
a Muslim migrant couple originating from the mainland. 
140 ‘akina’ usually denotes a group of people that share a certain attribute: akina mama = women, mothers; akina 
baba = men, fathers; akina Hannah = Hannah’s people, i.e. Hannah’s (extended) family. (cf. Höftmann & Herms 
2010) 
141“[…] [K]wetu sisi, […] kuna mwanamke mtoto, […] halafu tuna mwanamke kigori. Halafu anaingia anakuwa 
msichana. Msichana halafu ndo anakuwa mwanamke. Mwanamke – mama, mama - bibi. Eh. Sasa hizo ni kama 
vyeo kwa wakati fulani […]. Lakini ilikuwa ni […] zile age unampanga. Lakini anaweza akawa katika hali ya 
kuwa ni mwanamke tu, umeona, unaweza tu kumwita mama, au mama akawa ni mwamnamke. Lakini mama ni 
yule ambaye amezaa. Amezaa.” (Interview 3 with Bi Rehema, Unguja, 23-01-2019) 
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700 women in absolute figures (0,1% of the total female population in 2012142) – being a woman 
while not being a mother is certainly out of the norm in Zanzibar. For Bi Rehema, the successive 
progression from girl to woman, mother and grandmother is thus a natural evolution, in the 
sense that every woman must become a mother, as also implied in Subira’s quote at the 
beginning of this chapter.  
In her explanation, Bi Rehema firmly accentuated the centrality of experiencing birthing 
labour for attaining ‘authentic’ status as a mother in Zanzibar: “But a mother is the one who has 
given birth. She has given birth.”. Karina Kielmann (1998) confirms this, claiming that in 
Pemba, generally speaking “[…] [the infertile woman] is considered useless because she has 
not experienced labor pains and is often treated with contempt by her husband’s relatives […]” 
(141; my emphasis). In contrast to scholarly assertions that “[…] one becomes a mother by 
practicing motherhood, not by giving birth” (Beckham et al. 2015: 167; see also: Ruddick 2009: 
306), Zanzibari notions of motherhood seem to centre on the formative experience of pregnancy 
and birthing labour – the ultimate self-sacrifice of one’s own body to another being. Although 
other avenues of attaining motherhood status are practiced, this points to a somehow ‘deficient’ 
status of other-mothers without any biological offspring, after all.  
In general, mothers – be they biological, adoptive or co-mothers – are highly respected and 
idealised in Zanzibar and Tanzania as a whole (cf. e.g. Beckham et al. 2015: 170). This is for 
example reflected in the pop-song that I quoted at the beginning of this subchapter. Building 
around the adage ‘Nani kama mama?’ (Who compares to mother(s)?) it underlines the 
exceptional self-sacrifice and strength of mothers and stresses the eternal heshima (honour) due 
to them (see also Beckmann 2015a: 126; Larsen 1995: 209, 274)143. The proverb and song 
however also place the entire responsibility of caring for children exclusively with mothers, as, 
implicitly, no one else could perform mothering work like them (cf. Schalge 2004: 152). This 
illustrates the fundamental ambivalence of motherhood as an institution; it may simultaneously 
be a source of respect and high social standing, and a crushing burden that can develop into a 
‘trap’ for some women.  
In Zanzibar, with its predominantly Muslim culture, the respect and honour reserved for 
mothers might be especially pronounced, since, as Peteet writes, “Islamic discourse elevates 
mothers to near saintliness […].” (2002: 136). In line with this, Bi Rehema invoked Islamic 
 
142 This percentage is based on approximate calculations, guided by NBS (2013: 23-25) and SMZ (2019: 9) 
statistics. 
143 And it is surely not the only, or first artistic interpretation of this: a YouTube search for ‘Nani kama mama’ 
yields countless other songs, by renowned Tanzanian musicians and groups, as well as several religious lectures 
on the topic (see: https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=nani+kama+mama). 
90 
 
doctrines when I asked her about the position of mothers in Zanzibar: “We have received this 
from our Prophet Mohammed – peace be upon him,”144 she replied. She then went on to recount 
one of the most important hadiths on motherhood: 
[…] A man came to Allah’s Apostle and said, ‘O Apostle of Allah! Who is more entitled 
to be treated with the best companionship by me? The Prophet said, ‘Your mother.’ The 
man said, ‘Then who?’ The Prophet said, ‘Your mother.’ The man further said, ‘Then 
who?’ The Prophet said, ‘Your mother.’ The man said again ‘Then who?’ The Prophet 
said, ‘Then your father.’ (Schleifer: 1996: 8) 
Bi Rehema provided three arguments for the special status of mothers, which are not given 
within the hadith, but which she connected to the three ‘positions’ accorded to mothers by the 
Prophet: first, she invoked the experience of pregnancy (uja-uzito), and second the pain of 
childbirth (uchungu), qualifying them as solitary ordeals: “This is hers alone, there is no one 
that can help her […].”145 The final argument Bi Rehema gave was the breastfeeding 
(kunyonesha) of the child which is required for two years by the Qur’an (see also Schleifer 
1996: 69). Again, this highlights the exclusive self-sacrifice expected from mothers, who like 
the four “noble mothers of paradise” – Mary, Asiya, Khadhija and Fatima – are supposed to 
“[donate] their own bodies, identities and internal volition” for the higher purpose of 
motherhood (Kueny 2013: 109). 
 
(5.4) ‘The bitterness of the child is known only to its mother’: Mothering in Zanzibar 
The bodily experience of birthing labour with its transformative pain and danger (see Beckmann 
2015b: 59, 61; Haws 2009: 55) – a liminal experience par excellence – is thus a central feature 
of the practice of mothering in Zanzibar. The notion of ‘bitterness’ is central in this context: 
uchungu is the Swahili term for labour contractions and other pain associated with birth, but 
also for bitterness (both taste-wise and emotional), pain, anger or sadness (cf. TUKI 2001; 
Mohamed 2011; Murungi 2013)146. The proverb quoted in the subheading above, ‘The 
bitterness of the child is known [only] to [its] mother.’ (‘Uchungu wa mwana ajue ni mama’), 
plays on this ambiguity: meaning on one level, that only a mother could know the pain of giving 
birth (cf. Farsi (1958) 1973: 45), on another, that she knows the troubles and struggles related 
to raising a child, and on yet another level, that the mother, through the close bond formed with 
her child during pregnancy, birth and by virtue of (ideally) being its primary caretaker most 
 
144 “Hii tumepata kutoka kwa mtume wetu Mohammed, [in Arabic:] Sall'Allahu alayhi wasalam.” (Interview 3 
with Bi Rehema, Unguja, 23-01-2019) 
145 “Lile ni lake peke yake, hakuna mtu anayeweza kumsaidia […].” (ibid.) 
146 Uchungu interestingly also has a ‘political’ component: Zanzibar’s first president Abeid Amani Karume gave 
a famous speech on citizenship only being attained through feeling uchungu, i.e. the bitterness and pain of and for 
one’s country (cf. Arnold Koenings 2018: 183). 
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intimately knows his or her pains and challenges and can comfort them best147. Additionally, 
the proverb could also be related to the agony of losing children that – in the opinion of some 
– is primarily borne by mothers as well (cf. Caplan 1995: 135). 
These strong associations drawn between birth, struggle, bitterness and children are abound 
in Swahili culture. They are for instance reflected in the custom of feeding new-born babies 
honey and aloe – “to show […] that ‘life is both sweet and bitter’” (Beckmann 2015b: 64; see 
also Farsi (1958) 1971: 32) – and the practice of giving girls a bitter liquid to drink during 
female puberty rituals in Mafia, making them throw up, which symbolizes, amongst others 
“[…] the bitterness of adult life, as well as the state of pregnancy” (Caplan 1976: 27).  Askew 
(1999) cites a song that Swahili mothers sing for brides: 
Congratulations, my child, congratulations!/And I should be congratulated - 
congratulations!/The bitterness of motherhood/Silence, my child, stop crying/The womb 
that bore a daughter pains terribly/It pains terribly. (93; my emphasis) 
Another variation of the proverb above is cited in the Swahili stories collected by Edward Steere 
in the 19th century: “The bitterness of the child is on the hips of the mother.” (“[…] uchungu 
wa mwana ni katika nyongani mwa nina.”; Steere (1897)1920: 60). Steere, however, translates 
uchungu as “weight” here (ibid. 61), which, additional to the above discussed interpretations, 
invokes the emblematic (and, to a degree, stereotypical) image of the ‘African mother,’148 
carrying her child on her hips or lower back. On the other hand, it could also refer to the weight 
carried during pregnancy and to the weight of responsibility of caring for a child. References to 
the suffering of mothers are also prominently made in the pop-song quoted further above (e.g. 
‘the suffering of carrying me in your stomach […]’).  
Thus, it is the uchungu that transforms the mwanamke (woman), to become mama: the 
uchungu of birthing labour is obviously central, although the pursuit of maternal goals for a 
certain child by anyone committed primarily to these aims (i.e. mothering as a practice separate 
from birthing labour) will come with its own uchungu. Uchungu experienced for (or about) 
children in this way, ideally deepens the bond between mother and child (see Schalge 2002: 
125). This abundance of uchungu, in my opinion, constitutes the distinguishing feature of the 
 
147 Sometimes, the proverb also reads ‘mzazi’ instead of ‘mama’ (e.g. Mohamed 2011; Wamtilia 2016), so 
technically both parents could be meant. Often ‘mzazi’ is however simply translated as ‘mother’ (see e.g. Farsi 
(1958) 1973: 45). Of course, the proverb might also be deployed in a more removed sense as “the difficulty of 
[something] is best known to the sufferer” (Mohamed 2011: 782). 
148 This stereotypical image is harshly criticized by the Swazi feminist Patricia Mc Fadden (1998) who writes,  “As 
political activists, are we going to reproduce the stereotypes of African women on batiks and tapestries sold in the 
curio shops, the stereotypes of us as either pregnant, carrying a baby on our backs, or both? While African men 
are represented through images of dancers and musicians, why can't we see African women doing other things 
besides being birthers and reproducers?” (no page numbers; my emphasis) 
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mothering experience in Zanzibar, and makes for the exceptional status of mothers, as 
highlighted by the dictum ‘Nani kama mama?’ (Who compares to mother(s)?). 
Ideologically and traditionally, mothering was (and to a degree, still is) an intensely gendered 
activity on the Swahili Coast. The notions on the division of labour between men and women 
reproduced by Nuru and Subira (p. 84) are reflected in ideas about parenting as well: fathers 
are the providers that go out to struggle (kuhangaika), to be able to cater to the needs of their 
family, while mothers, as caregivers and protectors of children, stay close to the home. This 
traditional allocation of responsibilities is based on Islamic marriage laws, stipulating that the 
husband has to ‘maintain’ his wife (or wives) and children (foodstuff, shelter, clothes), while 
the wife takes care of the everyday childcare and household tasks. (Beckham et al. 2015: 166; 
Demovic 2007: 240-241; Demovic 2016: 12; Gaydosh 2017: 1370) In this model, mothers 
preserve children (maternal goal 1) by minding them, preparing food, distributing it fairly, and 
monitoring their health; they foster children’s growth (maternal goal 2) by promoting their 
enrolment and attendance in secular school and madrasa, and by involving them in a growing 
set of household responsibilities; and finally mothers ensure children’s social acceptability 
(maternal goal 3) by actively instilling them with morals, or encouraging them to imitate them, 
for instance in their own performance of heshima (c.f. Poblete 2007: 154-158). Within this 
framework, mothers are deeply dependent on the ability and goodwill of husbands to supply 
them with resources like foodstuff or cash for health and educational needs, and on the overall 
social and economic context that could for instance limit male abilities to provide, or might 
cancel out mothers’ own efforts to reach maternal goals (e.g. by presenting children with ‘moral 
temptations’, see e.g. McElroy et al. 2010: 134-135). Most authors claim that in Tanzania and 
Zanzibar today, this ‘ideal’ model is hardly adhered to anymore:  
In spite of the fact that many interviews (particularly with young, newlywed women [in 
Zanzibar]) began with the idealistic statement that the husband provided ‘everything,’ 
more detailed accounting of daily incomes demonstrated that no heartholds in my sample 
met this ideal. (Demovic 2016: 12) 
Participants [in southern Tanzania] […] described the ‘ideal’ mother as one who stayed 
at home with her children, and was financially supported by their father. However, many 
participants had sole responsibility for their children’s material needs. As […] [one 
respondent] explained, ‘If you have children, you have responsibilities.’ (Beckham et al. 
2015:170) 
Tanzanian and Zanzibari mothers overall, seem to increasingly act and see themselves as 
breadwinners; Schalge (2004: 145) asserts in this context that “[…] work is becoming an 
essential element integral to the definition of mothering” (see also Beckham et al. 2015: 170; 
Creighton & Omari 2000: 6; Demovic 2007: 233; Keshodkar 2013: 144). She explicitly 
connects this shift to the deterioration of the economic situation in Tanzania since the late 1970s 
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(Schalge 2002: 210, 212; see also 210). This means that mothers today are bearing more and 
more extensive responsibilities; the author writes that in Dar es Salaam’s informal settlements 
of the 1990s, “[…] the majority of all household work falls to female members. Additionally, 
the burden of securing adequate household funds is primarily a woman's domain” (Schalge 
2004: 153; see also 154; 2002: 134). Besides, mothers and children (and even possible 
grandchildren) remain in relationships of monodirectional (financial) care longer, as dependants 
struggle to become independent in the persistent state of economic uncertainty (Schalge 2004: 
153). For Zanzibar, an argument could be made, that this trend of female ‘self-maintenance’ is 
not necessarily new; Decker (2014) describes that from the late 1920s onwards, due to what 
they perceived as their ‘economic vulnerability’ to their husbands, female teachers already 
[…] placed enormous value on their ability to buy clothing for themselves and their 
children, pay their children’s school fees and contribute to the cost of housing, all of 
which traditionally fell under the husband’s responsibility to provide ‘maintenance’ for 
his wives and children. (2014: 9) 
This is what I will focus on in the following subchapters. 
 
(5.4.1) “Most of the time it was me alone who struggled for my children…” - Kuhangaika as 
Maternal Virtue and Capacity in Zanzibar 
Women in the islands seem to have always contributed to household maintenance, e.g. through 
horticultural or farming activities, income from rental properties, businesses, or the sale of 
prepared food (Askew 1999: 89; Larsen 1995: 89). The shift that has been observed in the 
mothering practices of women in Tanzania and Zanzibar recently is thus rather one of scale in 
times when the economic vulnerability of women to husbands has been enhanced by political 
and economic uncertainty, than an unprecedented and truly fundamental transformation of the 
gendered division of labour.  
I argue that in this context, the maternal practices and strategies of Zanzibari mothers are 
characterized by what I call ‘kuhangaika-activities’: I introduced kuhangaika in chapter 3 as a 
local equivalent of Vigh’s concept of social navigation. As should become quite clear from the 
quotes further below, the verb kuhangaika carries a myriad of meanings and possible 
interpretations. It could, for example, be translated as to go here and there without knowing 
what to do (Wamtilia 2016) and as to roam or wander about (Knappert & van Kessel 2010; 
Lazaro 2017). Another bundle of meanings lies in the semantic field of worry, anxiety and strife 
(to be worried, anxious, confused, restless, distraught, to suffer; Höftmann & Herms 2010; 
Knappert & van Kessel 2010; Wamtilia 2016), while it can also be translated as to be busy or 
to labour away (under pressure) (Knappert & van Kessel 2010; Lazaro 2017; Mohamed 2011; 
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TUKI 2001; Wamtilia 2016). TUKI (2001) further offers anxiety or worry (over affairs, much 
work etc.) as a translation for the corresponding noun (hangaiko). Which translation is suitable, 
depends very much on the context of a statement; in general, a sort of composite form of all 
these different terms – ‘to roam about and struggle’ – seems to be fitting fairly frequently.  
 In principle, most Zanzibaris today, regardless of gender or paternity status, have to 
kuhangaika in order to meet the growing need for cash in the present, as well as to gain the 
resources they require to place themselves in favourable positions to ‘get on’ in the future (e.g. 
by attaining education, or connecting themselves to the ‘right’ people; cf. Larsen 2009: 11, 18, 
20). During my research, it was nonetheless striking to me, how frequently the word was related 
to the actions of women and mothers in the interviews with my female respondents:   
Because me myself I managed my life and my children by myself. Most of the time it was 
me alone [who] struggle[d] (nahangaika) for my children and my parents. […] Now I 
myself am a ‘person who searches’, I know that I am with a husband, but me myself, [I 
am] like a man here, on the inside. Because I struggle (nahangaika) [for] myself [in] my 
life.149 (Bi Pili, Unguja, November 2018) 
Like for example me here, I am already married. I have already gotten children. So, my 
big responsibility is [that] I first take care of my children. I am already prepared, that 
[since] I am a mother, I am the guardian of the family, and that struggle and anxiety 
(kuhangaika) is there because [since I have become] a mother, I wish to always take care 
of my family.150 (Leila, Unguja, February 2019) 
But the father, he is not [the one that is] roaming about (anahangaika), you find the 
woman is the one [who] is constantly up and down, up and down. So truly it is the woman 
who has a lot of responsibilities I should say.151 (Bi Rehema, Unguja, January 2019) 
Typically, the kuhangaika-activities women are engaged in are both aimed at themselves, as 
well as at their children and other people they feel responsibility for, as becomes especially 
clear in Bi Pili’s statement. Something that is further evident is the fact that the female hangaiko 
my respondents claimed to pursue as mothers (or that they attributed to women in general), 
were explicitly and implicitly contrasted with a male failure or deficit of performing the same. 
Kuhangaika seems to have been connotated as a male activity previously, connected to the male 
duty of marital provision. Bi Pili makes this explicit by connecting her own inner ‘masculinity’ 
(“I am like a man on the inside”) to her active struggles on behalf of others. In line with Schalge 
 
149 “Kwa sababu mimi kama mimi nilikuwa namudu maisha yangu na watoto wangu peke yangu. Muda mwingi 
ilikuwa mimi peke yangu nahangaika na watoto wangu na wazee wangu […]. Sasa mimi mwenyewe ni mtafataji, 
naijua kuwa niko na mume, lakini mimi mwenyewe, kama mwanaume humo ndani. Sababu nahangaika mwenyewe 
maisha yangu.” (Interview 2 with Bi Pili, Unguja, 14-11-2018) 
150 “[…]  kama mfano mimi hapa, tayari nimeshaolewa. Nimeshapata watoto. Kwa hiyo jukumu langu kubwa 
kwanza ni kuwashughulikia watoto wangu. […]  mimi nimeshakuwa tayari kwamba mimi ni mama, ni mlezi wa 
familia, na […] ile kuhangaika kuna kwa sababu tayari nimeshakuwa mama napenda muda wote nichunge familia 
yangu.” (Interview 1 with Leila, Unguja, 16-02-2019) 
151 “[…] lakini yule baba yeye siyo anahangaika, unakuta mwanamke ndiyo saa zote yuko up and down, up and 
down. Kwa hiyo kwa kweli mwanamke anakuwa […] ana majumuku mengi niseme.” (Interview 3 with Bi Rehema, 
Unguja, 23-01-2019) 
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(2002 & 2004), I would argue that the major shifts of the 1990s, prolonged uncertainty and the 
monetarization of many of the services on which families depended, generated ‘worry, anxiety, 
or restlessness’ on the part of women, who increasingly supplemented – or bore in its entirety 
– the household income by ‘labouring away’ or ‘becoming busy’, in order to be able to ensure 
the immediate survival of children, as well as to facilitate their movement into futures as 
successful and acceptable adults.  
In Zanzibar, the kuhangaika-activities of women as mothers might increasingly entail their 
entering into public working spheres in which women’s presence was denounced as indecent 
in the past, and very commonly involves a diversified range of different smaller means of 
income ‘here and there’, often based in the informal sector152 (Demovic 2016: 10, 16). Even 
lines of work that are perceived as extremely shameful may be justified by putting them in terms 
of women acting as “[…] mothers, doing whatever was necessary to care ‘for the children’” as 
Beckham et al. demonstrate for female sex workers in Southern Tanzania (2015: 170). In 
Zanzibar, however, kuhangaika-activities are usually very carefully weighed against family and 
community dynamics, the above outlined local understandings of female respectability, 
morality, and women’s personal commitment to Islam. Demovic, for example argues that few 
Zanzibari women work in places where they would come in close contact with ‘morally 
polluting’ tourists, even though the tourist industry would be a promising source of cash 
income, as “[women] favor […] economic strategies that […] [are] viewed as congruent with 
local moralities, particularly as related to gender roles […]” (Demovic 2016: 4; see also: 2,6; 
Demovic 2007: 155-157; Schalge 2004: 151). Being considered honourable and respectable – 
a good Muslim woman – is important to mothers, especially in rural areas, as the marriage 
choices available to their children (i.e. their social acceptability) and their access to community 
land on which they can grow food for consumption (to ensure children’s preservation), are 
intimately tied to their own reputation (Demovic 2016: 7).  
Kuhangaika-practices of course differ for women of different backgrounds in the 
archipelago; while some of the women I interviewed in rural Pemba grew vegetables for 
household consumption or exchanges with neighbours, and engaged in plaiting sifting baskets 
(ungo) for sale (Fieldnotes 27-11-2018), Subira in urban Unguja had a fulltime formal job, 
toyed with different ideas how she could make economical use of a piece of land she owned on 
the edge of town, while at the same time heading her own NGO and being politically active. In 
Ruddick’s terms, I would suggest that in Zanzibar, the first component of my composite 
 
152 Schalge (2002: 212) argues that this diversification is also a strategy to cope with the inherent uncertainties of 
the informal sector. 
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translation, the ‘struggle’ became a maternal virtue, while successfully ‘roaming about’ would 
be a capacity, that, as Schalge suggests, at least in the context of (urban) informality, requires 
an attitude of ujanja (cleverness)153 (2002: 16 & 2004: 151). Overall, I would classify the 
successful struggle (hangaiko) on behalf of children through different means as an intermediate 
maternal goal, necessary to fulfil other superordinate demands in the current context by 
maintaining the material conditions for children’s preservation and growth in Zanzibar. 
Motherly hangaiko actively challenges and innovates ‘traditional’ mothering practices and 
motherhood ideology stipulating that women as mothers should be ‘people of the house’, 
restricting their care taking tasks to this space only. As such, these practices are an excellent 
example of mothers negotiating prevalent social, cultural and economic circumstances, for the 
sake of bringing about the best possible results for their children and families (cf. Maher 2010: 
835) – in short, of maternal navigation.  
 
(5.4.2) Light Men, Heavy Women? – Maternal Vulnerability in Zanzibar 
Sitting on Bi Hasnaa’s baraza in Pemba, shortly after we have been left alone by my 
nosey ‘research assistant’, I inquire whether people in the village fight because of politics. 
Bi Zahra negates. I proceed to ask whether she thinks that women are more peaceful than 
men, and she agrees. Bi Hasnaa enters the conversation and explains that this is because 
women will always stay with the children and cannot easily flee from a place. Men can 
and will readily leave everything and everyone. There is firm agreement by the other 
women around. (Fieldnotes 27-11-2019) 
Mothering work in Zanzibar not only takes place against the backdrop of economic and political 
uncertainty but often also in light of women’s considerations about the reliability and 
trustworthiness of their husbands or partners. In conversations with my respondents, the image 
of ‘wanaume wepesi’ (‘light men’) was often evoked. Like Bi Kauthir who declared that ‘[t]he 
man can run away, but a woman cannot without her children. The man is light, the woman 
needs to carry the children.’154, or Bi Hasnaa above, many Zanzibari women claimed that men 
were likely to leave women and children unsupported under the impact of stressors like 
economic or political crises. In their opinion, women as mothers had much more complex 
 
153 Schalge defines maternal ‘ujanja’ (cleverness) as follows: “Cleverness is essential for urban living and survival. 
It is based on wit and intelligence, but just as importantly, it includes elements of cunning and deceit.” (2004: 151; 
my emphasis) 
154 ‘Mwanaume anaweza kukimbia, lakini mwanamke hawezi bila ya watoto wake. Mwanaume ni mwepesi, 
mwanamke anahitaji kuwabeba watoto.’ (Notes from Interview 1 with Bi Kauthir, Unguja, 08-02-2019) 
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decisions to make in relation to their children, and often would stay put, dealing with the 
consequences of disaster and male abandonment simultaneously. 
This unfavourable image or male (un)reliability is echoed in some of the literature on 
Zanzibar and the Swahili Coast: Decker explained the immense value the female teachers in 
the colonial era accorded to their financial independence by referring to women’s ‘economic 
vulnerability’, caused by the common risks or divorce, abandonment, or widowhood (2014: 9-
10, 65). The instability of Zanzibari marriages that I already referred to in Chapter 3, may – as 
Stiles writes – be ascribed to an “inherent irresponsibility” of men, by women and kadhis alike 
(2005: 587). Additionally, husbands that women are still married to, might be perceived as 
‘errant’ (cf. Demovic 2007: 12, 128), possibly because they divide their time and financial 
resources between the households of several wives and/or possible girlfriends (ibid. 151)155 or 
because of labour dynamics, like the lengthy trips along the East African coast that some 
fishermen take, leaving their wives to cater for family needs for months on end (Nuotio 2006: 
196). Under the impact of exacerbated economic uncertainty in the region, men are increasingly 
perceived to abandon their responsibilities for family maintenance – as Schalge’s urban 
respondents on the mainland highlighted time after time: “‘The children’s fathers scorn us. 
Men run from their responsibilities.’” (2004: 153).  
The different authors however also note that women do not remain passive in the face of the 
uncertainty of men’s long-term support: Stiles outlines how elderly women in her sample began 
to develop and employ strategies in order to protect their material interests over the course of 
several consecutive divorces (2005: 587), while Demovic describes that due to the uncertainty 
“[…] whether or not an errant husband arrives with food to cook” (2007: 128), women in rural 
Unguja adopt farming strategies that favour many smaller harvests for household consumption 
in times of spousal neglect over larger harvests for cash (ibid.). 
When I confronted Leila, a young mother of two daughters living in a village just outside of 
Zanzibar City, with the image of ‘light men’, she explained and expanded it, suggesting that,  
[…] men automatic[ally] in their hearts, don’t have a lot of love for the family. That is 
why you find us women agreeing to a lot of things. I cannot go away and leave my 
children. But a man can go and leave the children.156 
Initially, I was quite surprised by Leila’s bleak reply (“men […] don’t have a lot of love for the 
family”); she had visited me together with her husband before our interview, and they had struck 
 
155 At times in quite far removed places: my landlord in Stone Town for example, alternated between the 
households of his wives in Zanzibar Town and Oman roughly every three months. 
156 “[…] wanaume automatic […] nyoyo zao wanakuwa hawana mapenzi sana na familia. Ndo maana unakuta 
wanawake sisi tunakuwa tunakubali mambo mengi. Mimi siwezi kuondoka nikawaacha watoto wangu. Ila 
mwanaume anaweza kuondoka kawaacha watoto. (Interview 1 with Leila, 16-02-2019, Unguja) 
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me as a couple that was uncommonly open in showing their affection for one another, holding 
hands throughout the evening, even when out in public. Leila was her husband’s second wife 
and when I first met her at a wedding, we broached the topic in a joking manner. I professed 
that, hypothetically, I would prefer to be the first wife in a polygamous marriage, but the women 
around me disagreed strongly: being a second wife was better ‘because she is loved more’ they 
pointed out, darting glances at the quietly smiling Leila. (Informal conversations, 28-12-2018) 
Notwithstanding, life as the supposedly ‘favourite’ wife still meant dealing with an often-errant 
husband for Leila, as he spent significant amounts of time in town with her co-wife, as well as 
on work trips. Although there was certainly love and affection in the relationship, Leila retained 
a ‘realist’ outlook on the longevity of any man’s commitment to his family and children, which 
could also be said to be reflective of the generalized lack of interpersonal trust between the 
sexes, mentioned by both Schalge (2002: 272) and Creighton and Omari (2000: 11) in their 
works on Tanzania. In our interview, Leila continued her elaborations:  
[L]et’s choose an example, maybe if an accident happens. Like there was the time when 
the ferry sank, the MV Spice. If you look inside [you will see that] many of the people who 
died are women and children. Because when the accident has already happened, the man 
saves himself, him for himself. But a lot of women died because they could not leave their 
children. Because [as] women we have accepted motherhood, [so] you must take care of 
your family. A man cannot.157 
Leila’s referral to the sinking of the MV Spice Islander in 2011 vividly underscores her point: 
the dramatically overloaded ferry was on its way from Zanzibar Town to Pemba when it 
capsized and sank in the Nungwi Channel, costing the lives of more than 1,000 people (Khelef 
2012). I could not find official numbers about the gender or age of the victims of the wreckage, 
but it is reasonable to assume that a large number of them were in fact women and children: 
few women in Zanzibar know how to swim (cf. Simai 2016), and survivors have claimed that 
a particularly large number of women and children boarded the ferry that day (Tume ya 
Kuchunguza 2012: 18). Studies confirm the generally higher risk of mortality for women and 
children in shipwrecks – despite the famous dictum ‘Women and children first!’ (Elinderand & 
Erixson 2012: 5-6, 8).  
By choosing this example, Leila made clear that, in her view, women as mothers tend to 
think of risk or hazards in an extended sense: to accept or agree to motherhood (-kubali umama), 
means to be aware of one’s primary responsibility in ensuring the preservation of children – 
 
157 “[…] hebu tuchukulie mfano, labda kumetokea ajali. […] kama kulikuwa kuna kipindi kulizama meli, ile ya 
MV Spice. Mle ukiangalia watu wengi waliokufa ni wanawake na watoto. Kwa sababu tayari imeshatokea ajali ili 
mwanaume tayari […] anajiokoa yeye kama yeye. Lakini wanawake walikufa wengi kwa sababu hawawezi 
kuwaacha watoto wao. […] Kwa sababu wanawake tumeshakubali umama lazima ushughulikie familia yako. 
Mwanaume hawezi.” (Interview 1 with Leila, 16-02-2019, Unguja) 
99 
 
which at times trumps self-preservation – set against an equally strong awareness of the lesser 
to non-existent commitment of fathers to this goal. Leila put the duties ensuing from the 
agreement to motherhood in terms of ‘tak[ing] care of [the] family’, using the verb kushugulikia 
– which in this instance refers to immediate preservation and child survival. However, both 
Mohammed (2011) and Murungi (2013), offer ‘kushugulikia’ as a synonym of ‘kuhangaika’; it 
could thus be inferred that ‘taking care of the family’ may include the whole range of maternal 
demands, activities and struggles I introduced previously.  
During our interview I missed the opportunity to probe further why Leila thought that men 
love their families or their children ‘less’; a quote from the interview with Bi Rukia in Pemba 
however provides an indication in this respect: 
So, it is the mother who knows more that bitterness and pain (uchungu) of the child, […]. 
Now if there happens to be any problem, the father is quick to be able to run away from 
it. But for the mother it is not easy, because all the children lean on her […] So, this is 
what is meant, that women, or mothers don’t like chaos because they are the ones who 
are affected more than men. So, we usually do not want confusion, chaos, trouble to 
happen because we want to protect our children.158 
It is thus again uchungu – ‘the pain and bitterness of the child’ – that is at the root of a mother’s 
stronger love and protective commitment to her children; both on the level of its meaning of 
‘birth pangs’ – as one of Schalge’s respondents claimed: “’Women are more likely to stay and 
suffer for children because they have given birth to them, there is a stronger tie, they have 
already suffered to give birth to them.’” (Schalge 2002: 125) – as well as on the level of the 
uchungu experienced in daily mothering work beyond birthing labour. If we speak in 
instrumentalist terms, Zanzibari mothers make much larger investments of their time and 
energy into care-taking activities and the ‘struggle’ for their children than Zanzibari fathers 
typically do. This, additional to the stronger affection imagined to evolve through pregnancy, 
childbirth and daily care, would make it harder to simply abandon them.  
In her statement above, Bi Rukia connected the image of ‘light men’ to the occurrence of 
‘[ma]tatizo’ (problems), ‘zogo’ (commotion), ‘fujo’ (chaos) or ‘vurugu’ (disturbances). Like 
most of my respondents, she used these terms to euphemistically refer to possible (political) 
upheaval and violence. Bi Farida was a bit more blunt in this respect, explicitly mentioning 
battles (mapigano) and conflicts (migogoro):  
If you look at countries that have battles, like look at them in Yemen right now. In Yemen 
right now the battles that happen mostly affect children. The mothers are the ones [who] 
 
158 “Kwa hiyo mama ndo anayojua zaidi ule uchungu wa mtoto, […]. Sasa likitokezea tatizo lolote, baba ni 
mwepesi kuweza kulikimibia. Lakini mama si rahisi, kwa sababu watoto wote walimelemea yeye, […]. Sasa ndo 
maana, ikawa wanawake, au wamama huwa hawapendi lile zogo kwa sababu wao ndo wanaoathrika zaidi kuliko 
wanaume.[…] Kwa hiyo sisi kuwa hatupendi kutokezee zogo, fujo, vurugu kwa sababu tunataka kuwahami watoto 
wetu.” (Interview 1 with Bi Rukia, Pemba, 26-11-2018) 
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struggle and suffer (wanahangaika) with the children, [and] the men, you don’t see them. 
So, it is you and your children. So [as] women we love peace and I think it is not [only] 
the women of Zanzibar, even in the whole world. Because the men run away from us, they 
do not remember us, [and] they are the ones who cause the conflicts.159 
Although she started out with an example from a ‘distant’ place, Bi Farida’s switch to the 
second person singular (“[i]t is you and your children”) combined with the rest of her 
statement, show that she imagined the pattern of male abandonment in conflict to be a universal 
one. She connected the observed absence of Yemeni men from the sites of their families’ 
suffering and struggle to the expected behaviour of Zanzibari men – or men in general – should 
a similar situation occur elsewhere; in the end, it would always be ‘you and your children’. 
Hence, for mothers, the consideration of their own vulnerability, i.e. the different aspects of 
their identity and social background impinging on their capacity to anticipate, cope with and 
recover from the long and short term impacts of hazards (Drolet 2015: 478) – be it in a situation 
of violent conflict or human-induced catastrophes like the sinking of the MV Spice Islander – 
involves a vision that is inclusive of children and their specific vulnerabilities. Mothers in 
Zanzibar thus recognize that vulnerability is unequally distributed and significantly influenced 
by gender and social location (Drolet 2015: 478; Neumayer & Plümper 2007: 551). What is 
also implicit in the different quotes is the fact that men, through the action of fleeing, enhance 
the exposure and vulnerability of their left-behind partners and children even further; in 2001, 
when security forces cracked down on opposition members and the general population in 
Pemba and parts of Zanzibar Town, “[..] hundreds of men fled their homes to avoid arrest, [and] 
many women who were left home alone faced violence at the hands of security forces and their 
CCM accomplices” (HRW 2002: 33). Vulnerable without a male protector, and exposed as the 
families of presumed opposition supporters, women and children were raped, beaten, and 
extorted and their property looted (Amnesty International 2002: 11, 21, 44; HRW 2002: 32-33). 
It is probable that Bi Rukia, who lived in one of the most affected areas of Pemba when I 
interviewed her, was a witness to such actions, while Bi Farida made a direct reference to the 
2001 violence in Zanzibar Town before she reached her conclusions about maternal 
vulnerability – recalling how she, heavily pregnant at the time, tried to convince male 
opposition supporters in her neighbourhood to desist from joining the protests. Given the 
frequency of low-level politically motivated clashes, and the instances of state-sponsored 
 
159 “Ukiangalia nchi ambazo zina mapigano, kama angalia Yemen saa hivi wao. Yemen saa hivi mapigano ambayo 
yametokea yanawaathirika wengi watoto. […] Waakina mama ndo wanahangaika na watoto, wanaume huwaoni 
wao. Yaani ni wewe na watoto wako. Kwa hiyo wanawake, tunapenda sana peace na nadhani siyo wanawake wa 
Zanzibar, hata ulimwengu mzima. […]. Kwa sababu wanaume wanatukimbia, hawatutambui, wao ndo 
wanaosababisha migogoro.” (Interview 1 with Bi Farida, Unguja, 31-10-2018) 
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assault detailed in chapter two, it can be reasoned that at least some of the Zanzibari women I 
interviewed spoke from experience when they constructed the image of ‘light men’ in the face 
of violent conflict. 
Some of the statements of the women I cited above, included a sort of conclusive remark; 
‘So as women we love peace […]’, ‘[…] mothers don’t like chaos […]’. This, in my opinion, 
signals an ideal of a maternal attitude of conflict avoidance, again, in marked contrast to men 
who ‘are the ones who cause the conflicts’. I would argue that this is – at least in the above 
explanations – not necessarily thought of as an ‘innate’ female or motherly quality; rather, this 
behaviour is constructed to evolve from the context of male unreliability. ‘Peacefulness’ – and 
here peace is defined ‘minimally’ as the mere absence of open conflict (cf. Ruddick 1989: 245) 
– is thus a strategy to deal with maternal vulnerabilities in the face of the always looming 
possibility of political violence in Zanzibar.  
 
(5.5) Conclusive Remarks 
In this chapter I have shown how definitions of womanhood and motherhood as institution have 
been in transition in the past few years, dependent on the overall political and economic context. 
Motherhood has been shown to be an ambivalent status and identity, that both excludes and 
includes, empowers and disempowers. Mothering as a practice in this context, is a complex and 
active endeavour that often requires a balancing of different maternal demands, ideologies of 
‘good’ mother- and womanhood, flexible reactions to the unpredictably of life and the 
behaviour of fathers and partners, and pre-emptive measures to counteract extended maternal 
vulnerabilities. In Zanzibar, motherhood and mothering are intimately connected to ideas about 
self-sacrifice and struggle, often subsumed under the term ‘uchungu’; however, positive 
emotions like love, affection or the joy motherhood could bring, should of course not be 
relegated to the margins; after all, ‘The laughter of the child is the light of the house.’ (‘Ucheshi 
wa mtoto ni anga la nyumba.’; Farsi (1958) 1973: 45). 
Nevertheless, in recent years, mothering work in Zanzibar seems to be dominated by 
different navigational activities, that are summed up under the term ‘kuhangaika’ (to struggle 
and roam about). In the last chapter of this thesis I will explore how some of these dynamics 
and symbolisms play out in the political sphere. 
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(6) Maternal Subjectivities, Maternal Thinking and Maternal Navigation: 
Politicizing Motherhood and Mothering in Zanzibar 
The tremendous reverence reserved for mothers as part of the institution of motherhood and as 
expressed in popular dictums like ‘Nani kama mama?’, can be – and has been –  a viable 
resource for women as they strive for positions of power or make 
claims for (political) rights in Tanzania, Zanzibar and other places 
around the world (see e.g. Alidou 2013: 39, 101; van Allen 2009: 
63; Chuchryk 1989: 139; Geiger 1997: 59-61,79; Kron 2016: 580, 
582; Tibbetts 1994; Tyler 2013: 213-214). Women might make 
references to actual or fictional motherhood to frame their political 
demands, giving them legitimacy and wider resonance. 
Highlighting their important social roles as mothers in public 
political discourses enables (some) women to speak from an 
extremely powerful subject position. (van Allen 2009: 63, 65-67, 
71; Kron 2016: 580, 583; Tibbetts 1994: 35, 37, 44-45) The moral 
authority attached to motherhood surely plays a role here (Marotta 2010: 992; Saint-Germain 
1993: 123, 134). At the same time, motherhood can be – and has been – a dominant reason why 
women have been side-lined in political processes (Marotta 2010: 991), which my respondent 
Bi Halima confirmed for the Zanzibari context:   
There are people whose thoughts [are] a bit limited. They feel ‘Ah, better [choose] this 
man, he is able, this woman does not have the ability.’ Now he considers that ‘Ah a 
woman [is] a housewife, [for] a woman, at times the husband will disagree, a woman 
[might have] children. But he feels that the man is always free.160 
Bi Halima referred to the responsibilities and duties mothers (and wives) are commonly 
perceived to have, which could be seen by potential voters as curtailing them in their roles as 
professional politicians.  
Additionally, it has been noted that when women make political claims from a ‘maternalist 
position’ – i.e. centring on values like care and nurturance (Kutz-Flamenbaum 2010: 713) – 
they often focus heavily on children’s needs and rights, while commitments to their own 
interests as mothering women and female citizens often come up rather short (Marotta 2010: 
991-992; Brush 1996: 430). Lastly, it is important not to overlook other reasons and drivers for 
women’s political activism, even if female political activists make explicit and implicit claims 
 
160 “[…] [K]una baadhi ya watu ambayo fikra zao kidogo finyu […]. Wanahisi ‘Ah, bora huyu mwanaume, 
anaweza, huu mwanamke hawezi.’ Sasa anakuchukulia kwamba ‘Ah, mwanamke mama wa nyumbani, mwanamke 
mara mumewe atakataa, mwanamke labda watoto.’ Lakini anahisi huyu mwanaume yuko free wakati wote.” 
(Interview 1 with Bi Halima, Unguja, 13-02-2019) 
Fig. 7: An example for 'motherist' 
campaigning strategies in Tanzania 
- election poster for Fenella 
Mukangara 2015. (Screenshot from 
Twitter 18-08-2019 (cropped); see 
Mukangara 2015) 
 
103 
 
to their motherhood in the prioritization and framing of their political demands (cf. Tibbetts 
1994: 45, 48).  
Unfortunately, I can say very little about the ways in which motherhood figures in the 
political discourse of female Zanzibari (party) activists as they enter into dialogue with each 
other, the electorate or the press: I stayed in the archipelago in an inter-election year, and 
political activities like public campaigns or rallies were largely dormant or outright forbidden 
(see Chapter 2). My plan to visit the Zanzibari House of Representatives to observe female 
CCM-politicians during sessions was frustrated by the refusal of the Office of the Second Vice 
President to grant me permission to do so (see Chapter 4).  
Based on the data I was able to collect I can however testify to the different ways in which 
Zanzibari motherhood ideology and mothering practices with their leitmotif of uchungu 
emerged in many of my respondent’s narratives, as they spelled out their political positioning 
and motivations, as well as their personal attitudes towards the high-risk context of Zanzibari 
politics to me. In the following, I will thus examine how maternal subjectivities figured in the 
political thinking of some of my respondents, and how they used motherhood as a resource to 
add legitimacy to certain demands and claims. In the second part of this chapter, I will focus on 
two varieties of attitudes and strategies that some interviewees adopted while navigating 
Zanzibari politics as maternal thinkers. 
 
(6.1) “She is the one who knows more about the problems in society” – Politicizing 
Maternal Subjectivities 
Maternal subjectivities – or ‘maternal thinking’ as Ruddick has termed it – are those attitudes, 
values, ways of looking at the world, the knowledge and standpoint that develops as people 
engage in mothering work as one of their primary daily preoccupations (cf. Ruddick 1989: 9-
10, 23-27). These subjectivities are of course also the products of discourse and structures of 
power as reflected in the institution of motherhood in society (cf. Lester 2013: 835). Maternal 
subjectivities may play a role in the political sphere, in that they might shape what demands are 
made and how they are framed by women (or people) who mother (cf. Tibbetts 1994: 45). When 
I asked my Zanzibari respondents whether they thought women ‘do politics’ differently than 
men, some suggested that the experience of mothering leads to an increased awareness of and 
familiarity with a wider range of issues in society – in contrast to men. These maternal 
subjectivities were connected to the frequent maternal encounters with pain, bitterness, struggle 
and challenge: 
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So, it is the mother who knows more [about] that bitterness and pain (uchungu) of the 
child, [she] is the one who knows more about the problems that [affect] a person in 
society.161 (Bi Rukia, Pemba) 
 
A mother has three offices162, so she can know the problems of here and there and there. 
A father only has one office. […] [A] woman is already plagued by many challenges and 
she understands many issues through [these] challenges.163 (Bi Rehema, Unguja) 
Additionally, some of my respondents – especially those who were middle-aged and still 
politically active – expressed that their political efforts principally aimed at the coming 
generation(s); speaking about the issue of youth unemployment Bi Halima for instance 
explained: 
I myself am an older person now. Even in terms of employment, I am heading towards 
retirement [rather than] to be employed. But mainly I fight for our youth, mine and those 
of my fellows.164 
Bi Rehema voiced her views in a similar manner. Lamenting the continuous loss of Zanzibari 
sovereignty within the structure of the Tanzanian Union, she argued,  
A person who has already reached an age of 50, then you look to today, tomorrow I will 
[already] depart, but our children, grandchildren, and all the generations that will come 
– we don’t want to reach a place [where] they are slaves in their own country.165 
It is clear that for these two senior party activists, the pivotal future-orientation of their private 
maternal work and maternal subjectivities became an important guide in their public political 
work and goal setting as well (cf. Cohn 2013: 55; Oyěwùmí 2016: 216). In the following two 
subchapters, I will take a closer look at the ways in which maternal subjectivities and maternal 
thinking figured in the political opinions, demands and reasonings of some of my respondents.  
 
(6.1.1) “Many of our children don’t have anything to do.” – Politicizing (Failed) Maternal 
Navigation in the Context of Youth Unemployment 
[…] many of our children don’t have anything to do. […] There are children, they have 
studied but right now they do not have work; engineers, civil engineers, I don’t know 
 
161 “Kwa hiyo mama ndo anayojua zaidi ule uchungu wa mtoto, ndo anayojua zaidi yale matatizo yanayomkumba 
mtu katika jamii.” (Interview 1 with Bi Rukia, Pemba, 26-11-2018) 
162 This was a metaphor Bi Rehema had established in the course of our interview: in Bi Rehema’s opinion, a 
mother goes to her ‘normal’ office in the context of formal employment, while at home, household work (2nd 
office) and child care (3rd office) await her. This triple burden gives her more skills and knowledge (uwezo) but 
naturally also leads to fatigue and stress (cf. Interview 2 with Bi Rehema, Unguja, 19-11-2018).  
163 “Mama ana ofisi tatu kwa hiyo anaweza akajua matatizo ya hapa na hapa na hapa. Baba ana ofisi moja tu. 
[...] tayari [mwanamke] anakumbana na challenges nyingi na anaelewa mambo mengi through that challenges.” 
(Interview 2 with Bi Rehema, Unguja, 19-11-2018) 
164 “Mimi saahivi ni mtu mzima. Hata […] kwa ajira, mimi naelekea kustaafu, siyo kuajiriwa. […] lakini kubwa 
napigania vijana wetu, wangu na wa wenzangu.” (Interview 1 with Bi Halima, Unguja, 13-02-2019) 
165 “[…] [M]tu ameshafika miaka hamsini tena, unatazamia leo, kesho nitaondoka, lakini watoto wetu, wajukuu 
na vizazi vyote vinavyokuja - hatutaki wafike pahali wao ni watumwa katika nchi yao.” (Interview 3 with Bi 
Rehema, Unguja, 23-01-2019) 
105 
 
which degrees, there are plenty, they are on the streets. Others became mamantilie166, 
others I don’t know […].167 (Bi Rehema, Unguja) 
A lot of our children have already studied, they will [just] sit around, there is no work. 
That Maalim Seif 168 told us, [if we vote for him] there will be many [new] jobs.169 (Bi 
Sauda, Unguja) 
In many interviews, I noticed that my respondents not only highlighted their identity as mothers 
when I asked them about their personal lives, but also invoked ‘children,’ when they talked 
about the issues that inspired their political activism and decision-making, as well as their policy 
preferences. An especially dominant concern and grievance – particularly for supporters of the 
opposition – was the issue of youth unemployment. Currently, about 27% of Zanzibaris 
between 15 and 24 are unemployed, while the rate for 15 to 35-year olds lies at 21,3%170 (SMZ 
2019: 7). Besides, there is also a significant number of Zanzibaris who are ‘underemployed’ 
(11,9%; ibid.) – meaning that they do not work the amount of hours they would prefer to work, 
or not according to their acquired skills (Scott 2015) – which Bi Rehema addressed in the quote 
above by referring to the absurdity of university-graduates becoming ‘mamantillie’. In the 
context of overall job-scarcity, many Zanzibaris furthermore perceive job allocation – 
especially government employment – as deeply politicized: 
[R]ight now, we have many children, they have already finished universit[y], [but] there 
are no jobs. And especially if it is known that it is a child from Pemba, or the child of an 
opposition member.171 (Bi Rukia, Pemba; see also Bakari 2001: 134, 251; Keshodkar 
2013: 143) 
Bi Hasnaa likewise claimed that – although people in principle interacted and cooperated 
amicably in her village – employment remained an area in which discrimination based on 
political alignment stubbornly persisted (Fieldnotes, 27-11-2018; see also Moss 2017: 183). 
Further, several women alleged that in order to gain (government) employment these days, a 
‘child’ would have to present their CCM-membership card172. 
 
166 lit.: ‘Mama, put [food] for me’: usually female workers in the informal sector, selling meals or pre-cooked 
snacks, typically from shacks or other non-permanent structures; profits can fluctuate tremendously, and the work 
is commonly associated with lower class women, struggling to get by (cf. Schalge 2002: 219-220; see also Lazaro 
2017; Murungi 2013). 
167 “[…] watoto wetu wengi wanakuwa hawana cha kufanya […] Watoto wapo, wamesoma saa hivi hawana kazi, 
maengineers, macivil engineers, sijui madegree gani wako tele, wako huko barabarani. Wengine wamekuwa ni 
mamantilie, wengine sijui [...]” (Interview 1 with Bi Rehema, Unguja, 24-10-2018) 
168 She means the (now former) CUF secretary-general and five-times presidential candidate Seif Sharif Hamad. 
Having worked as a teacher as a young man (Burgess 2009: 194-195), many people respectfully refer to him as 
‘maalim’.  
169 “[…] watoto wetu wengi wa[me]shasoma, watakaa, kazi hamna. Yule […] Maalim Seif alituambia […] ajira 
zitakuwepo nyingi tu.” (Interview 1 with Bi Sauda, Unguja, 24-10-2018) 
170 Both much higher than the overall unemployment rate of 14,3 % (SMZ 2019: 7). 
171 “[…] saa hivi […] tuna watoto wengi wameshamaliza universities […] hakuna ajira. Na hasa akijulikana kama 
ni mtoto wa kipemba, au ni mtoto wa mpinzani.” (Interview 1 with Bi Rukia, Pemba, 26-11-2018) 
172 see: Interview 1 with Bi Rukia, Pemba, 26-11-2018; Fieldnotes 22- & 23-11-2018, 31-01-2019. 
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After listening to several women narrate their political concerns about youth unemployment 
in very similar ways, I found it notable that even though they were speaking of young people 
who would be at least in their late teens or early twenties173, my respondents almost universally 
characterized them as ‘watoto’ (children). I think that by using this label, the women meant to 
point to the youth’s continued (financial) dependency, and thus, their incomplete status as 
adults. The possessive pronoun sometimes employed (our children) further indicates that 
concerns did not only aim at the speaker’s own offspring, but at the ‘children’ of Zanzibar in 
general. Lastly, by invoking ‘children’ and their problems as a focal point in their political 
decision making and prioritization – hence conjuring up the ideal of the concerned mother 
caring for her child(ren) – women related to Zanzibari youth and the issue of unemployment 
through the lens of their own mothering experiences and mothering aims; in short, by way of 
their maternal subjectivities. 
While most women spoke in broad terms about this subject, two of my respondents directly 
invoked their own children to me as examples: Bi Halima, referring to her son who sat with us 
during our interview, said: “Today my child – this one here – he has studied, he has numerous 
certificates, he studied a great deal. Now he [just] remained behind with his fellow destitutes 
[i.e. other unemployed youth].”174 Bi Rukia expressed her frustrations in similar terms when 
speaking about her son:   
[My son] here has a degree, he studied communication engineering. He already finished 
the year before last. He is here. There are no jobs. And every year I have paid, something 
like two million shillings for him. (embittered:) Think about that: money that you have 
lost educating a child. Now he has no job, he has his needs, a great deal of them. Isn’t it 
true that in European countries if a child is 18 or 20, they will start depending on 
themselves? This is a 27-year old child, and he still depends on his mother.175  
By referring to their private concerns with the ‘destitute[…]’, educated-but-un(der)employed 
youth, both Bi Rukia and Halima meant to illustrate the overall situation but also managed to 
convey their personal feelings of embitterment more immediately to me. Bi Rukia’s statements 
additionally directed me towards considering the wider context in which women’s grievances 
regarding youth unemployment should be examined. By citing the lost investment in her son’s 
education (“Think about that: money that you have lost educating a child.”) she alluded to an 
 
173 Given that part of the pronounced grievance is that these ‘kids’ ‘have already studied’. 
174 “Leo mtoto wangu huyu hapa, […] kasoma, [ana] vyeti tele, kasomea mambo chungu nzima. Sasa kabakia na 
wenzie maskini […].” (Interview 1 with Bi Halima, Unguja, 13-02-2019) 
175 “Huyu hapa wa kwangu, ana degree, kasomea mambo ya […] communication engineering. Kamaliza toka 
mwaka juzi. Yupo. Hakuna ajira. Na kila mwaka nilikuwa namlipia kama milioni mbili. […] Fikiri pesa uliopoteza 
kwa kumsomeshea mtoto. […] [Sasa] [h]ana kazi,[…] ana mahitaji yake, chungu nzima […] Nchi za Ulaya si 
ndiyo, mtoto akifika miaka kumi na nane, ishirini, tena si anajitegemea? Huyu mtoto wa miaka ishrini na saba 
tena anamtegemea mama bado.” (Interview 1 with Bi Rukia, Pemba, 26-11-2018) 
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important aim of maternal practice in Zanzibar: numerous of my informants remarked that a 
vital part of a mother’s responsibility and concern lies in ‘kuwasomesha/kuwaelimisha watoto’ 
(educating children)176. In general, education is highly valued in Zanzibar (Stiles 2005: 585; 
Larsen 2015: 214), and mothers – additional to teaching children good behaviour (adabu) and 
morals (maadili) at home – are expected, and pride themselves in sending their children to 
madrasa (chuo) and in taking them as far as possible through the secular school system177 
(Demovic 2007: 212-213; Larsen 2015: 277; Nuotio 2006: 199; Saleh 2004: 147). Bi Rukia’s 
comments further touched upon the – at times quite significant – costs of facilitating children’s 
education. Even though school fees for both the primary and secondary level have been 
officially abolished in all Tanzanian public schools (in 2002 and 2015 respectively), indirect 
costs for transportation, school materials, uniforms or examinations, and semi-voluntary 
‘contributions’ (michango) demanded by some teachers continue to pose a challenge for 
families (BBC 2015b; Decker 2014: 43; Gaydosh 2017: 1371; HRW 2017: 49; Salim 2019a: 
15). Additionally, many of my respondents – amongst them Bi Rukia – raised and educated 
their children precisely within the time frame between the introduction of school fees in the late 
1980s (cf. Aminzade 2003: 48-49) and their later abolishment. It can hence be imagined that 
these mothers often struggled and worked under great pressure to accumulate the required 
amounts. My respondent Nuru narrated these dynamics as follows: 
[A] child needs to be educated (anataka kusomeshwa). The father struggles and roams 
about (anahangaika), the mother struggles and roams about (anahangaika), [so] we get 
the money for the fees to go and pay [them] for the child. It is necessary (anahitajika) for 
the child to go to university, so the father struggles (anahangaika), the mother struggles 
(anahangaika), we go and obtain the tuition fees to go [and] pay [them] for the child.178 
The fact that Nuru employed the verbs kutaka (to want, need) and kuhitajika (to be necessary, 
to be needed) here, reamplifies that facilitating a child’s education through the virtue and 
capacity of kuhangaika, can be understood as a separate parental or maternal aim in Zanzibar – 
in the sense that ‘children demand that they be educated, regardless of the costs’ (cf. Ruddick 
 
176 Cf. e.g. Bi Halima, describing the lifegoals of ‘the average Zanzibari woman’ (also note her use of kuhangaika): 
“I have aims to do this, I have nothing, [I am] poor, but I have goals to educate my children, I have goals that my 
children reach the universities to study. It is these goals that will cause you to roam about (uhangaike), to struggle 
(ustruggle) to reach to the place where you want to [be].” (“[M]imi nina malengo nifanye hivi, mimi sina kitu, 
maskini, lakini nina malengo nisomeshe watoto wangu, nina malengo watoto wangu wafikie vyuo hivi kusoma 
[...]. Ndiyo [malengo haya] yatakusababisha wewe uhangaike, ustruggle kwa kufikia pale unapopataka.” 
Interview 1 with Bi Halima, Unguja, 13-02-2019; see also Decker 2014: 35). 
177 A large number of Zanzibaris seem to have, in fact, conformed to these expectations; in 2012, 84,4% of the 
population had at least finished secondary education, while net enrolment was at 83% in 2014/2015 (SMZ 2019: 
6). 
178 “[…][M]toto anataka kusomeshwa. Baba anahangaika, Mama anahangaika, tunapata pesa ya ada ya kwenda 
kumlipia mtoto. Mtoto anahitajika kwenda chuo, kwa hiyo baba anahangaika, mama anahangaika, […] tunaenda 
kupata ada ya chuo ya kwenda kumlipia mtoto.” (Interview 1 with Nuru, Unguja, 19-01-2019) 
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1989: 17) –  although the facilitation of education surely also aims at nurturing growth and 
ensuring social acceptability. Further, even though Nuru paints the picture of a coequal and 
mutual struggle of father and mother together, the unreliability of men in uncertain times – as 
lamented by many Zanzibari women and examined in the previous chapter – might often have 
left – and continues to leave – many of them to struggle on their own. As a consequence, the 
level of education that children were able to attain with their support was a source of great pride 
for many of my female respondents, which, I contend, is why they mentioned it prominently 
and frequently during interviews – for instance narrating to me which levels of education their 
children had reached so far. They clearly saw their offspring’s achievements as a testimony to 
their own successes as mothers. The insight however, that their struggles and sacrifices in the 
pursuit of this particular maternal goal have yet to pay off – or may, in fact, never do so – 
explains the frustration that Bi Rukia and Bi Halima expressed on a personal note, and that 
other women indicated as well in their concerns about youth unemployment. It seems that 
maternal efforts in navigating the uncertainty and economic decline of the past two decades for 
their children – in trying to ensure their advance into productive and self-reliant futures by 
promoting their education – have failed for a significant number of Zanzibari mothers. Many 
feel betrayed by a state and government they expected to facilitate employment, or to at least 
establish a favourable environment in which other forms of providing for oneself financially 
would be viable. “Even if we don’t get government jobs, [in the very] least, if [the youth] put 
their table of peanuts, and [they] sell, [they] should be free! But if you put something [up], the 
municipality comes, they tear [it] down, they throw [everything] out,”179 Bi Halima lamented 
in this regard. Especially to opposition supporters, it might seem that the CCM-government is 
(consciously) thwarting the efforts of mothers to mould their children into financially 
independent and acceptable adults through politically motivated, discriminatory employment 
practices and ineffective job generation policies. 
Another dimension to the maternal prioritization of the issue of youth unemployment that 
needs to be considered here is that through children, women may hope to navigate their own 
futures: as few Zanzibaris receive formal pensions and most people are dependent on children 
and other relatives to sustain them in old age (Help Age International 2017: 20-21), the 
investment in a child’s education as a pathway to their reliable and gainful future employment 
is simultaneously an investment in one’s own future preservation. This might be especially 
pronounced for women; Demovic for instance claims that “[s]uccessfully raising moral and 
 
179 “Hata kama hatupat[i] ajira ya serikali, at least, hata kama kaweka meza yake ya karanga, anauza, awe huru! 
Lakini unaweka kitu wanakuja manisipaa, wanabomoa, wanatupa […]” (Interview 1 with Bi Halima, Unguja, 13-
02-2019) 
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capable children provides the only secure old age pension available to Zanzibari women” (2007: 
114; see also Haws 2009: 7). The strain that Bi Rukia and Bi Halima expressed may thus not 
only relate to the present financial pressures of supporting their adult sons but might also be 
expressive of an anxiety about their own financial security in old age. Again, specifically 
women like Bi Rukia who lost their jobs in state-institutions (and thus most probably their 
pension rights) due to their political involvement, might have counted on their children to 
sustain them later in life. 
All in all, women’s political concern with the issue of youth unemployment in Zanzibar can 
be understood as emerging from maternal subjectivities – from their experiences as mothers 
currently struggling, or having struggled in the past, to facilitate the education,  employability 
and generally, the future of their children in pursuit of maternal goals. Maternal subjectivities 
also influenced the ways in which women expressed this concern: by invoking ‘children’, 
respondents highlighted their own positions as mothers who knew the ‘uchungu’ of the youth 
and were able to speak for them with legitimacy180. They also implicitly called on the respect 
they deserve for their maternal sacrifices (see also: van Allen 2009: 67), which should be 
rewarded by a government that ought to support mothers in their efforts to mould their children 
into adults capable of supporting them later in life. 
I would however also contend that the concern with youth (un)employment voiced by the 
Zanzibari women in my sample goes beyond protesting the state’s impingement on their 
successful mothering on an individual basis. By speaking up for all of Zanzibar’s ‘children’ 
(‘our children’), much like the members of the famous Madres de la Plaza de Mayo-movement 
during the Argentinian military dictatorship, they ‘socialized maternity’ (cf. Guzmán Bouvard 
2010: 867), protesting not (only) against individual injustices and instances of discrimination, 
but against the state of affairs on a larger scale. Their political concerns ‘about the children’ 
were thus complex, building on both maternal care and social justice (cf. Tibbetts 1994: 38).  
Different than the mothers in other well-known examples, the Zanzibari women I 
interviewed were not jointly organized in a ‘motherist’ movement calling for policies to battle 
youth unemployment; they did not campaign collectively to eliminate party-political 
discrimination in the labour market. Their individual maternal subjectivities however still 
 
180 Of course, the youth also speak for themselves on this topic, sometimes with quite a different take: my 
respondent Najima, for instance claimed that, “[…] you find a young person, she has her degree, she has her 
masters, but she hasn’t gotten employment. She sits, she waits three, four, five years. She doesn’t look for 
employment herself. She waits. For what reason? The schools that we went to, to be taught, did not teach us to 
employ ourselves, we have been taught to be employed.” (“[…] unakuta kijana ana degree, ana masters lakini 
hajapata ajira. Anakaa, anasubiri miaka mitatu, minne, mitano, […]. Hajitaftii ajira mwenyewe. Anasubiri. Kwa 
sababu gani? Shule tulivyoenda kusomeshwa hatukusomeshwa kujiajiri tumefundishwa kuajiriwa.“; Interview 1 
with Najima, Unguja, 11-01-2019) 
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represented a powerful subject position from which they launched their critique of the 
governing party. In my opinion, it is by all means possible that a formal, unified movement 
grows out of these widely shared frustrations about youth unemployment, which – incidentally 
– not only affect opposition supporters and their families181. The current overall context of 
shrinking political and civil space might even benefit such a development, as women organizing 
as mothers might be viewed as ‘unthreatening’ by the authorities and could thus be able to 
operate under the radar for longer (cf. Chuchryk 1989: 141). It remains to be seen what will 
unfold here in the future.  
 
(6.1.2) Thinking Maternally: Maternal Subjectivities as a Strategic Resource to Promote 
Peace and Unity in Zanzibar?  
The possible links between mothering, maternal subjectivities and their application on the 
political stage to promote peace have been controversially discussed in feminist literature (cf. 
Adams 2010: 727; Frazer & Hutchings 2013: 110-112; Kaptan 2010: 971). Many of my 
respondents without a doubt thought that there was something to the thesis that women as 
mothers have specific reasons to avoid conflict and reject violence, which they often justified 
with gendered vulnerabilities and attached worries about the well-being of children and the 
wider community:  
[We] women love peace because once chaos happens it is us [who] are affected from the 
onset.182 (Bi Farida, Unguja) 
[…] it seems like a woman is someone who is peacefuller [sic], she doesn’t like something 
bad to happen to her children, to her family, even to her neighbour as well.183 (Bi Raissa, 
Pemba) 
Within my sample, only one woman specified a concrete instance in which she tried to make 
use of this ubiquitous conjunction between motherhood and peace-building in the context of 
political conflict in the archipelago; whilst reflecting on her experiences as a CUF 
representative, Bi Rehema recalled a conversation she had with a female CCM-leader about 
creating a bipartisan women’s organization in Zanzibar:  
I sat her down and I told her: ‘Listen here, our problem, not only of the women, [is that] 
we plague each other with politics. Let’s take politics and put it there outside. 
 
181 In an informal conversation – before I turned on the voice recorder for our second interview – Bi Pili, a staunch 
CCM-supporter and government employee, told me about her second oldest son who had left the islands working 
on a ship and stayed back in Sweden, telling her he saw no future for himself in Zanzibar (Informal conversation, 
Unguja, 14-11-2018). 
182 “Wanawake tunapenda amani kwa sababu once unapotokea machafuko ni sisi ambao tunaathirika mwanzo.” 
(Interview 1 with Bi Farida, Unguja, 31-10-2018) 
183 “[…] inaonekana mwanamke ni mtu ambaye ni peacefuller, [...] hapendi kitu kibaya pengine kwa watoto 
wake, kwa family yake, hata kwa jirani zake pia.” (Interview 1 with Bi Raissa, Pemba, 24-11-2018) 
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(emphatically:) Let’s sit here as mothers. Let’s do this and this,’ I presented a big 
proposal. I delivered it. That we should establish a real women’s union of Zanzibar.184  
The focal point of Bi Rehema’s recollection was her emphatic plea to ‘sit here as mothers’ in 
order to forge unity between women on both sides of the political divide. In my opinion, the 
fact that Rehema explicitly emphasized shared motherhood, and not shared womanhood, is 
meaningful: it indicates a notion of common aims, interests and – importantly – morality 
imagined to develop with birthing- and mothering labour (cf. Akujobi 2014: 371), constituting 
a basis on which trust between female CUF- and CCM-politicians could be established and 
mobilization efforts could be founded (cf. Kron 2016: 589). By highlighting an overriding, 
collective identity (‘mothers’), Bi Rehema strived to initiate a shift in the boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion established by ‘politics’ (i.e. party conflict) in the House of 
Representatives and beyond. She clearly hoped that shared maternal interests in preserving 
children and upholding favourable conditions for nurturing growth and ensuring social 
acceptability, could be the basis for joint work towards mutual goals.  
The potential of female solidarity based on motherhood and shared mothering experiences 
in Zanzibar is already mentioned by Corrie Decker: During World War II, when ethnicised 
rationing policies began stirring up resentment between the members of different ethnic 
associations and groups185, female teachers were called upon by the colonial government to 
organize ‘cooking lessons’ with women all over the archipelago to demonstrate sensible usages 
of war rations. Decker argues that the sensitivity of the issue at hand would certainly have led 
to conflicts in such meetings if attended by men, but that “[…] racial and class politics did not 
disrupt the women’s work. Women could relate to each other as mothers responsible for feeding 
their families during tough times.” (Decker 2014: 104, my emphasis) Such an identification 
with each other, i.e. an assumption of shared aims and morality, can be an important basis for 
building trust and, by extension peace (cf. Kenworthy et. al 2016: 1044; Lahno 2011 :675). 
In Bi Rehema’s case, the attempt to use motherhood, mothering experiences, maternal 
subjectivities and moralities as a resource for building unity and trust among female politicians 
was not successful. She disclosed that,  
 
184 “Nikamweka kitako […] nikamwaambia: ‘Jamani tatizo letu, si wanawake tu, tunatesamana kisiasa. Hebu 
tuchukue hiyo siasa tuiweke huko nje. Tukae hapa kama mama! Tufanyeni hivi hivi’, nikatoa proposal kubwa. 
Nikafikishia. Kwamba tuweke umoja wa wanawake kikwelikweli wa Zanzibar.” (Interview 1 with Bi Rehema, 
Unguja, 24-10-2018) 
185 One of the main points of contention was who should be granted access to rice, which was only allocated to 
those islanders classified as ‘Arabs’ by the colonial authorities (Glassman 2011: 99). 
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[j]ust a few days ago when I was organizing my papers, I happened upon this proposal 
that I had written. I was told [back then]: ‘Well, we will call you, Honourable.’ They have 
not called me even a single day.186 
I can only speculate about the reasons for the ultimate failure of the initiative; since Bi Rehema 
placed the presentation of her proposal directly in, or just before an election year, it is probable 
that, facing the uncertainty of an impending election, few women were prepared to take the risk 
of investing time and effort in a bipartisan project. It further seems that identities, aims and 
shared ‘morality’187 as CCM- and CUF-members, as well as deep mutual distrust188 between 
the political parties outweighed the symbolic value of their collective identity as mothers. By 
trying to appeal to an essentialist ‘mother figure’ that must always choose harmony over conflict 
(cf. Pankhurst 2004: 20), Bi Rehema ignored the very real differences of interest that existed 
between mothers supporting and working for CUF or CCM in Zanzibar.  
Bi Rehema’s recollections already indicate that, even though many Zanzibari women seem 
to agree that, ideally, peace and non-violence could be a shared concern of mothers, in practice, 
many other factors contribute to women’s behaviour in situations of conflict and friction. 
Additionally, as I found out, references to motherhood may also be employed to promote views 
that go quite contrary to this ideal of peace and unity: When interviewing Bi Halima, I gained 
the impression that by expressing her motherly understanding and sympathy for the ‘silenced’ 
youth the way she did, she condoned the use of violence in certain situations:  
You know, if a human sees something that bothers him or her, it is better you let them say 
it. If you ‘squeeze’ them, they can bear foolish thoughts. I can give you an example. The 
youth have already gotten tired of life [under] this party [CCM]. They want change. Now 
when someone wants to express his or her thoughts, [and] you obstruct them, I tell you 
that the youngster will come with foolish thoughts now. (empathically) [This is] 
dangerous! [To have] a great percentage of young people that lose hope for [their] lives. 
This is what brings troubles. So, it is very dangerous that you obstruct them. The danger 
is that they decide to [have] foolish ideas. You don’t know what they will think. So now 
(claps) what will be? You cannot know.189 
 
186 […] Juzi nilikuwa nikipangapanga makaratasi nikaikuta ile proposal yangu ndo niliandikia. Nikaambiwa, […]: 
‘Basi tutakuita Mheshimiwa.’ […] Hawajaniita hata siku moja.” (ibid.) 
187 Here one could imagine an obligation to remain loyal to ‘one’s own’. 
188 Distrust, per se can fulfil the same functions as trust, i.e. reducing the complexity of making decisions about 
the future by “[…] dictating a course of action based on suspicion, monitoring, and activation of institutional 
safeguards” (Lewis & Weigert 1985: 969). Ruddick also mentions maternal distrust as a preservational attitude 
mothers may adopt (1989: 118, 177). 
189 “Unajua […]  binadamu, akiona kitu chake kinamkera, basi bora umwachie aseme. […] Kama unambana, 
anaweza akazaa mawazo bii. […] Mimi naweza nikakukupa mfano moja. Vijana saa hivi maisha wamechoka nayo 
[…] ya chama hichi. Wanataka mabadiliko. Sasa, anapokuwa anataka kutoa mawazo yake […], unamzuia, 
nakuambia kwamba kijana yule […] [a]takuja na mawazo bii sasa. [...] Hatari! Asilimia kubwa ya vijana 
[wanaokata] tamaa ya maisha […] ndo hivyo inayoleta mabalaa, eh. […] Kwa hiyo ni hatari kubwa sana […] 
kwamba wewe unawazuia. Hatari [ni kwamba] wakaamua kufanya wazo bii. Hujui watawaza nini. Sasa tena 
(claps) nini kitakuwa? Huwezi kujua.” (Interview 1 with Bi Halima, Unguja, 13-02-2019) 
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Bi Halima got back to this point (“they can bear foolish thoughts”) several more times 
during our conversation – claiming that opposition party leaders have always encouraged their 
followers to stay peaceful but they “[…] know that people have gotten tired, [and] they are 
capable of anything”190. Judging from the tone she spoke in, I eventually interpreted her 
statements to much rather be a barely veiled threat at an imagined CCM-audience (in the sense 
of: ‘you are the cause of the youth’s anger (“you squeeze them”, “you obstruct them”), so you’d 
better watch out…’), than a genuine expression of fear of violent conflict and its consequences. 
Both the references to motherhood and the endorsement of violence are – without a doubt – 
extremely subtle here. Read in the context of our whole interview however, I understand Bi 
Halima’s statements as being evocative of the image of the ‘enraged mother’ (cf. Mukta 2000: 
174), whose anger is powerful especially because there is a dominant notion of motherly 
peacefulness and moderation191. By presenting herself as someone who deeply cares about the 
youth, understands and emphasizes with their concerns, Bi Halima alluded to the Swahili 
leitmotiv of the caring mother who knows and feels the troubles (uchungu) of her children 
almost physically. Taking into account the later invocation of her own son, the pronouncement 
that “[…] mainly I fight for our youth, mine and those of my fellows” (see p. 104), and the fact 
that ‘the youth’ (vijana) were her go-to example throughout our entire discussion, I find it 
reasonable to argue that Bi Halima launched her critique of the status quo from a maternal 
position. Finally, it is from here that she expressed her sympathy and understanding – if not for 
violence per se – then for the justifications and reasoning of young Zanzibaris who might 
choose to act violently against the current government. Batya Weinbaum’s claim that “[…] 
when women feel they must protect space for their children, they often are led to support violent 
conflicts” (1999: 91), adds an interesting twist here: Bi Halima described the current political 
situation as one of ‘being squeezed’ (kubana) several times; Lazaro’s dictionary (2017) 
additionally proposes ‘to drive somebody in a corner’ or ‘confining someone’ as possible 
translations. By describing the current state of affairs in this way, Bi Halima figuratively 
referred to the recent reduction of political and civil space in Tanzania and Zanzibar. She 
forecasted and (again, subtly) endorsed the possibly violent escape of the youth from their 
unjust confinement.  
 
190 “[…] tunajua watu […] wamechoka, wanaweza kufanya chochote.” (Interview 1 with Bi Halima, Unguja, 13-
02-2019) 
191 See also Bi Halima’s own statements later in our interview: “And if it gets to [the point] – us women, we are 
very calm people, [in] our nature […] but if a woman gets to [the point] [that] she is so angry and loathsome that 
she speaks like me – you should know that we have gone [too] far!” (“Na ikifika […] sisi wanawake ni watu 
taratibu sana, nature yetu […] lakini mwanamke akifika kichukia akizungumza kama mimi - ujue tumefika mbali!”; 
ibid.) 
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Bi Halima’s perspective stuck out to me as in none of my other interviews or informal 
conversations anyone had ever explicitly endorsed violence, or even admitted openly to having 
participated in social or economic boycotts of ‘the other side’. Bi Halima certainly broke this 
taboo in her pronouncements during our interview. To me, our conversation and the conclusions 
and interpretations I drew from it, clearly demonstrated that motherhood and maternal 
subjectivities can also be a legitimate position from which Zanzibari women reject non-violence 
and negative peace (i.e. the absence of armed conflict without a resolution of underlying 
grievances and frictions; cf. Pankhurst 2004: 11). By making these claims as mothers, Bi 
Halima and other women may endow them with much greater moral authority (cf. Kutz-
Flamenbaum 2010: 715). The same mechanisms are of course at work in Bi Rehema’s plea for 
bipartisan unity, harmony and – by extension – peace. In the end, it is as Jacobson (2000: 181) 
argues: the relationship between motherhood and peace is complicated – even though they 
might not actively embrace violence or inflict it on others, mothers may support and legitimize 
forms of armed struggle; while others may emphatically call upon a shared morality as mothers 
that compels them to strive for peace and unity. Both do so with the exact same overall motive 
in mind – fighting for children’s future preservation, nurturance and social acceptability. 
 
(6.2) Withdrawal and Holding: Mothers Navigating ‘Siasa’ in Zanzibar 
In my theoretical framework, I established the concept of maternal navigation as a specific form 
of navigation which stands out due to the fact that people who mother navigate uncertainty 
through and for others – whom they are connected to through relations of care – in the pursuit 
of maternal goals. Above, I have already introduced one specific local strategy of maternal 
navigation in Zanzibar: facilitating education and thus future employability of children, often 
through kuhangaika-activities. These navigational practices take place against the backdrop of 
an uncertain and moving environment that influences the resources required (e.g. school fees), 
connections needed to be made (e.g. aligning oneself favourably with the ruling party which 
controls a large share of the labour market) and the resources available (e.g. financial means 
produced by only the mother vs. those produced by both parents jointly) in and for these 
navigational efforts. In the following, I will identify two strategies of maternal navigation that 
I encountered in interviews and informal conversations with several Zanzibari women. These 
navigational efforts took place in the concrete context of the uncertainties and risks of ‘the 
political’ in the islands. In these specific circumstances, navigation meant spotting risks and 
vulnerabilities, opportunities and trajectories, as well as developing attitudes and strategies to 
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safeguard oneself, but – most importantly – one’s family and children against potential political 
dangers and exposure.  
 
 (6.2.1) Withdrawal: Bi Sauda and Saida 
It is my second day of interviewing, and my research assistant Saida and I are visiting Bi 
Sauda in the Ng’ambo192 area of Zanzibar City. On the way there, Saida tells me that Bi 
Sauda hails from Pemba and is a CUF-supporter. Bi Sauda seems reluctant to be 
interviewed and interacts with me in a peculiar mix of timidity and assertiveness – 
apprehensively eyeing my tape recorder and me, she emphatically states that she does not 
want her voice to end up on the radio. I ensure her that this will not be the case, but the 
feeling that Bi Sauda does not fully trust me or my ulterior motives persists. As a 
consequence, most of her responses remain rather taciturn, but as Saida and an older male 
relative, who joins us mid-interview, take over the conversation and dig deeper with their 
questions, she eventually opens up a bit. Contrary to my expectations that I would meet 
an enthusiastic CUF-follower, as a matter of fact, Bi Sauda narrates her personal 
conversion from eagerly supporting the opposition to becoming disillusioned with politics 
altogether: 
We were told that life will be good [by the party leaders] […]. But after already 
missing [out] that first year, I started to be disheartened [lit. heart-broken]. At the 
second one [i.e. the 2000 elections], I said to myself ‘Enough, I should leave politics 
alone again.193 
After repeated probing by both Saida and her male relative, Bi Sauda highlights several 
times that she doesn’t “[…] want any party” (“Sitaki chama chochote!”) and explains 
that she didn’t even registered to vote in the last few elections and doesn’t plan to do so 
in the future, since “there is no meaning [in] politics” (“[…] haina maana yoyote 
siasa.”). At the very end of our interview, she sums up her reasons for ‘leaving politics 
alone’: 
 
192 Literally: ‘the other side’. While in colonial times this denoted the ‘African’ quarters of Zanzibar town, on the 
other side of a then-existent creek (today roughly Benjamin Mkapa road) (Glassmann 2011: 37, 66) at the time of 
my stay most people used the term to describe any ‘far out’ part of Zanzibar City beyond the historic Stone Town, 
i.e. the peri-urban areas. Faiza also related the term to issues of gentrification, implying that most ‘ordinary’ 
Zanzibaris were pushed further and further away from the city centre and old town. (Fieldnotes, 31-01-2019; see 
also Folkers & Perzyna (eds.) 2019: 20) 
193 “Tuliambiwa maisha yatakuwa mazuri. [...] Lakini baada ya kushakosa tu mwaka wa kwanza ule, nikaanza 
kuvunjika moyo. Wa pili nika[ni]ambia ‘Basi, niachie na siasa tena.’” (Interview 1 with Bi Sauda, Unguja, 24-
10-2018) 
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Firstly, I am already an older person now, I don’t want those political things again. 
There [just] comes a lot of noise, and the children are given words here along the 
way by people, in this manner. I don’t want this again.194 
The meeting and interview with Bi Sauda left a lasting impression on me. Her disillusionment 
with the unfulfilled promises of the ‘mabadiliko’ (change) expected to materialize with the shift 
to multipartyism, were carried across well; a number of times during our conversation, she 
became quite agitated and her bitter disappointment became palpable to me. Additionally, 
several of my pre-set expectations were challenged: Bi Sauda’s claim that she had not voted 
since the 2000 elections, did not only go against what Saida had mentioned on our way to the 
interview, but also against what I had read before about Zanzibari politics; namely that most 
Zanzibaris follow politics extremely closely as for instance demonstrated by their consistently 
high turn-out during elections (cf. e.g. Moss 2016: 320) 195. Still, as this interview made 
obvious, even impressive turn-out figures – a mean of 90.11% in the multiparty elections from 
1995 to 2010 (cf. Roop & Weghorst 2016: 192) – do leave a noteworthy group of non-voters. 
A few authors writing on Zanzibar, like Kjersti Larsen (2004: 132) or William Cunningham 
Bissell and Marie Aude Fouéré (2018) bring up the practice of nonvoting to avoid conflict and 
describe a growing disengagement from and a disillusionment with politics, especially after the 
2015/16 elections. Overall however, I would argue that non-voters are a group whose 
perspectives are side-lined in the narratives about politics in Zanzibar; although, as I would 
argue, their insights could be very illuminating – precisely because high political enthusiasm 
and engagement are the norm in the society at hand. 
In Bi Sauda’s reasoning for her withdrawal from ‘those political things’, she provides several 
rationales: profound disappointment and disillusionment (“I started to be [heart-broken]”), an 
emotional fatigue with the political processes as she got older, and, compellingly, an interest in 
protecting (her) children (“[…] the children are given words […] I don’t want this again’”). 
‘To be given words’ in this context, can be interpreted to mean verbal attacks196 that could also 
be targeted at kids and teenagers, or involve them as participants. The ‘noise’ she associates 
with political processes in the archipelago, like in other places (see Vigh 2009: 420), does not 
only denote auditory uproar, but tumult and trouble in general: intra-community and police 
 
194 “Kwanza saahizi nimeshakuwa mtu mzima, siyataki tena yale mambo ya siasa. Kuja sana kelele na watoto 
huku njiani kutolewa na maneno na watu hivyo hivyo hivyo. Sipendi tena.” (Interview 1 with Bi Sauda, Unguja, 
24-10-2018) 
195 With the exception of the 2016 repeat elections that were boycotted by opposition supporters. (Minde et al. 
2018: 180; Roop et al. 2018: 255) 
196 Bi Sauda gave some example as to what verbal abuse could amount to: “Let’s say [as] and example, you will 
say ‘CCM are dog[s], CCM are not people’ or ‘CUF [are] dogs, CUF are not people.’” (“Tuseme mfano, 
mtasema kama ‘CCM ni mbwa, CCM si watu’, ama ‘CUF majibwa CUF si watu […]”; Interview 1 with Bi Sauda, 
Unguja, 24-10-2018) 
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violence, or a generalized disruption of everyday life, like after the 2015 electoral stalemate 
(Ali 2015), which my respondent Faiza described as amounting to a two-week-long ‘lockdown’ 
in some areas of Stone Town (Fieldnotes, 31-01-2019). All of this would of course have an 
especially negative effect on children, who have additionally been victims of politically 
motivated violence and brutalities in the past (cf. Amnesty International 2002: 11, 21, 44; HRW 
2002: 15, 17). 
Furthermore, Bi Sauda expressed her withdrawal from politics time after time as based on a 
no longer existent ‘want’ for it (see e.g.: “I don’t want politics again” – “[…] sitaki tena 
siasa.”), which I would take to mean both a lack of desire and need for political involvement, 
as it did not and does not seem to have any positive influence on her life, that of her family or 
her immediate community (“there is no meaning in politics”). Overall, although Bi Sauda’s 
reasons for her withdrawal from politics are certainly multifaceted, concerns about (her) 
children did play a role in her justification and decision-making process, making her 
disengagement at least partly an example of maternal thinking. 
On that second day of interviewing, after Bi Sauda so firmly claims to be ‘done’ with 
politics, my research assistant Saida interjects, and challenges her. “Say, do you feel that 
losing hope is the solution? [I]f all people arrive at loosing hope, what direction will 
politics go in now?!”197 she asks in what I feel is a somewhat reproachful undertone. Bi 
Sauda deflects her question – “It’s not everyone, it’s just me.”198 – which makes us all 
chuckle a bit. Ultimately however, this exchange does not only make me draw 
conclusions about my interviewee, but also about my research assistant; I feel fairly 
certain that Saida is an opposition supporter and that she empathises with, but also slightly 
disapproves of Bi Sauda’s political retreat. To my surprise, in our own interview, Saida 
reveals quite a different perspective than what I had expected:  
So, resulting from [the fact] that the whole [political] system is not proper, on both 
sides, people who have a bit of understanding about things, they are in the middle, 
they don’t know which side [in terms of political parties] to go to, because 
everywhere truly there is not truth.199  
Saida clearly counted herself as part of the group of people ‘in the middle’ she described. She 
also shared with me that she did not vote in the last two elections – once because she was not 
 
197 “Je, unahisi kukata tamaa ni suluhiso? […] Sasa kama watu wote wanafikia kukata tamaa siasa inaelekea 
wapi sasa?” (Interview 1 with Bi Sauda, Unguja, 24-10-2018) 
198 “Si wote ni miye tu.” (ibid.) 
199 “Kwa hiyo kutokana (na) kwamba ile system nzima sasa hivi haiko vizuri kwa upande zote […] watu ambao 
wana[…] uelewa wa mambo, wanakuwa wanakaa katikati, hawajui waende upande upi kwa sababu kote kwa 
kiuweli hakuna ukweli.” (Interview 1 with Saida, Dar es Salaam, 01-03-2019) 
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in Zanzibar at the time anyways “[…] but even if I would have been there, I think that I wouldn’t 
have voted because I felt that there was no truth, that there are just lies and whatnot […]“200. 
She explained the line of thinking of non-voters like her, saying that they would typically 
reason: “‘Better, if life just goes on. If it is CCM okay, if it is CUF – okay.’ What we want is 
that people don’t fight each other, [that] they don’t kill each other, that’s is. [That] we live in 
quiet.”201 Although in this instance Saida expressed an indifference to what party would win in 
an electoral contest, in the longer passage of our interview cited in the introduction it became 
clear that Saida weighed an opposition versus an incumbent win very carefully in terms of the 
dangers that would emanate from either one for herself and her children, dreading both CCM’s 
oppressive violence (“[…] will CCM really agree to leave from power just like that?”), and the 
potential of the opposition running out of patience at their constant questionable losses (“[…this 
situation that every day CCM wins […] will it not maybe happen one day, that those of the 
opposition will also come to bring trouble?”). 
Even though – again, influenced by my own pre-set expectations – Saida’s revelations 
surprised me, it is certainly quite reasonable for both her and Bi Sauda to come to these 
conclusions and to withdraw themselves from the divisive sphere of ‘the political’ in Zanzibar 
as maternal thinkers. In her testimony, Saida also worked out well, that as a mother primarily 
committed to the aim of preservation, she was caught between a rock and a hard place – none 
of the two political options, guaranteed sustainable ‘liv[ing] in quiet’, a primary precondition 
for successful mothering. Her reflections on this complemented Bi Sauda’s testimony: instead 
of the ‘noise’, upheaval and ‘heart-break’ that politics bring, they both preferred stability and 
peace, for their own sake and that of their children, even if that would mean a departure from 
democratic procedure and principles (or what currently passes as such in Zanzibar). Their 
conclusions and ultimate withdrawal from politics derived from slightly different standpoints 
however: Saida, a middle-class academic, claimed that for her and others in her position, it is 
‘hav[ing] a bit of understanding’, i.e. an awareness of these very principles and standards and 
the ways that both political parties disregard them, that leads to disenchantment. Bi Sauda, who 
left secondary school in tenth grade upon first getting married, expressed her withdrawal as 
(amongst others) resulting from the emotional pain of seeing her preferred party loose 
repeatedly in dubious circumstances. 
 
200 “[...] lakini hata ningekuwepo nafikiri singepiga kura kwa sababu naona kama hakuna ukweli […], kama kuna 
unwongo na nini tu [...]” (ibid.) 
201 “’Bora maisha yaende tu. Ikiwa ni CCM – sawa, ikiwa ni CUF – sawa.’ Sisi tunachotaka, watu wasipigane, 
wasiuane, tu basi. Tuishi kwa utulivu.’” (ibid.) 
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It is important to note, that it would not do justice to either of the two women introduced 
here to understand their behaviour and mindset as ‘apolitical’. In fact, both women were 
politically interested and involved in the past: Bi Sauda was carried along by the excitement of 
the first and second election that promised positive change (mabadiliko), while I think that it is 
not completely far-fetched that Saida who, according to her own testimony, elected CCM in 
1995, might have given CUF her vote at least once – which is maybe why she could switch so 
effortlessly between the discourses of the followers of the opposition and the incumbent202. 
Both women were still well informed about current political developments, and Bi Sauda 
professed that she still felt pain (maumivu) when people were discriminated against or suffered 
for political reasons.  
Even though Henrik Vigh’s (2009) concept of navigation is very much connected to 
movement and motion, I feel that ‘staying put’ like Saida and Bi Sauda did in the past few 
elections, is a prime example of (maternal) navigation; as Whyte (2009: 259) states very aptly 
“[…] navigation can also involve immobility!”. Both women identified the risks that the 
political conflict posed to their lives while simultaneously considering their extended 
vulnerabilities as women and as mothers (“I am a woman. But in addition, I am a mother.”). 
Saida also expressed the uncertainty she felt about the political future and its implications very 
well – her apprehension, tentativeness and even fear about the explosive potential of Zanzibari 
politics. Becoming a political agent, especially on the side of the opposition would lead to 
exposure and increased vulnerability, which is usually transferred to one’s wider family as well. 
Due to the seemingly no-win situation that presents itself in this polarized context, immobility 
and withdrawal seem like the safest way ‘out’, although they are by no means perfect strategies. 
I would argue that that for Bi Sauda and Saida the maternal demands of preserving and nurturing 
children – which work best in stable and harmonic environments – added to their individual 
decisions to withdraw from ‘political things’ (– they were not the only reasons, however). 
Whether the women’s withdrawal is a sustainable solution remains to be seen. 
 
(6.2.2) Holding: Habiba 
One morning during my stay in Pemba, I am sitting at the back of the house in the outdoor 
kitchen with Habiba, my ‘host aunt’; her children are around, washing dishes and cleaning 
up after breakfast. We talk about the political leaning of her family, and Habiba tells me 
that she still remembers vividly how her father was taken away and imprisoned because 
 
202 This was especially noticeable in our back-to-back interviews of CCM-stalwart Bi Khadija and CUF-politician 
Bi Rehema in October 2018.  
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of his association with CUF. Other men from the neighbourhood died in police custody 
in those days. While we talk, an older neighbour enters the courtyard wearing a green 
kanga picturing the current president Ali Mohamed Shein (CCM). Knowing my research 
interest, Habiba tells the woman half-jokingly that I want to know her political opinion. 
As a response, the neighbour exclaims ‘CCM yadumu mileleeeee!’ (CCM – [may] remain 
[in power] forever!), like you could maybe hear it at an election rally, and laughs. Neither 
Habiba, nor her teenage sons join in the laughter and the atmosphere suddenly feels tense. 
After the woman has left, I tell Habiba that this kind of issues are exactly what interests 
me; how people manage to live together after all that has happened. She looks at me 
blankly and simply answers, ‘Vibaya’ (Badly). Yes, she will greet this particular 
neighbour and interact with her amicably; she even has allowed her to celebrate the 
wedding of one of her children in their large sitting room. But this is mostly because Islam 
commends that you must love your neighbours. Habiba also hopes that if she is friendly, 
the neighbour might help her out, too – but this expectation has already been disappointed, 
for example, when she had to deal with the local authorities on behalf of her sons in the 
past. (Fieldnotes, 28-11-2018) 
This encounter I witnessed in Pemba, was one that left a lasting impression on me. It was the 
very first (and only) time that I was able to observe the tension resulting from party conflicts 
openly play out in front of me in an everyday situation. The neighbour’s nonchalant wearing of 
CCM-party attire while entering Habiba’s space that day, already seemed like a provocation to 
me – given that on other occasions Habiba marked her house clearly as ‘belonging’ to CUF203.  
Habiba’s neighbour’s exclamation that day could certainly have been understood as a failed 
attempt at humour, testified to by her own laughter at the ‘joke’ – Habiba obviously did not find 
it amusing. I sensed that the sudden tension was also caused by the fact that we had just 
discussed the painful issues of political oppression and violence directly affecting Habiba’s 
family and community. The neighbour was of course not privy to this particular conversation, 
but surely had knowledge about the fact of Habiba’s father’s political imprisonment. It 
additionally seemed to me that, even though the woman as a CCM supporter clearly belonged 
to the minority in her neighbourhood (and town), she was a force to be reckoned with; someone 
 
203 On the weekend before, I had witnessed a group of neighbourhood women convening the weekly meeting of 
their saving’s group (hisa) in Habiba’s sitting room. Their cash box was prominently placed on, and later wrapped 
in a CUF-party flag. When I asked my host about this, she told me that it had been a CCM flag before. Since the 
meetings were held in her sitting room however, it had to be changed – there would be no CCM flags in her home. 
The neighbourhood lady in question was part of that saving’s group and had been attending that day, although in 
neutral clothing, as far as I could tell. (Fieldnotes, 25-11-2018) 
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to keep on the right side of, and to a degree, she acted like this. I for instance, noted down that 
she ‘behaved as if the place ‘belonged’ to her’. (Fieldnotes, 28-11-2018) 
Despite Habiba’s obvious disapproval of her neighbour’s behaviour that day, she kept quite 
in the moment and subsequently shared her plans to retain a harmonious and cooperative 
neighbourly relationship with the woman in the future – also for the sake of her children. Her 
reference to dealings with the authorities in this context is, in my opinion to be interpreted to 
imply the kind of ‘affairs’ that Faiza mentioned (see introduction), i.e. receiving a birth 
certificate or ID which would also be important in gaining access to government services like 
education. As already mentioned, the first step in most of these processes lies with regional 
authorities, the shehas or local police branches, which are tightly connected to the ruling party. 
The support in a certain matter by a well-known CCM-supporter in one’s circle of 
acquaintances could without a doubt help to have ‘affairs’ go more smoothly.  
Habiba’s behaviour in this particular situation, and the insights she shared with me directly 
after, immediately came to my mind when I read about the maternal attitude of ‘holding’ that 
Sara Ruddick describes:  
To hold means to minimize risk and to reconcile differences rather than to sharply 
accentuate them. Holding is a way of seeing with an eye toward maintaining the minimal 
harmony, material resources, and skills necessary for sustaining a child in safety. […] 
Protective mothers often take on themselves the task of holding together relationships [...] 
on which their children depend. (1989: 78-79) 
A key word that strikes me regarding the encounter I just described is the term ‘minimal 
harmony’; Habiba was not able to go as far as to laugh at her neighbour’s ‘joke’ but she did not 
reprimand her, or picked a quarrel at this point. In her envisioned future behaviour towards the 
neighbour, Habiba communicated her commitment to ‘hold’ onto the relationship, to preserve 
‘minimal harmony’. 
Mothering and its care work, as Ruddick argued, are substantially shaped by an awareness 
for the need of connection (1989: 46, 130), especially – as Schalge and Vigh would probably 
add – in uncertain times (Schalge 2004: 155; Vigh 2009: 420-422). ‘Holding’ is thus a way to 
make sure that established connections and relationships remain active and beneficial, in order 
to protect and preserve children; even if this means cutting back on one’s own needs and wants 
(cf. Ruddick 1989: 79). Holding, in my opinion, is a good example of maternal (and social) 
navigation; much like the mobilised, de-mobilized and re-mobilized youth Vigh researched in 
Guinea Bissau, Zanzibari mothers’ holding consisted of cautiously navigating social ties and 
networks constituting possible resources (or potential obstructions) in individuals’ desires and 
needs to ‘get by’ and ‘get on’ in a context of uncertainty (Vigh 2009: 421-422 & 2010: 159). 
Again, the distinctiveness of the described practice lies in its focus-setting: Bi Habiba and other 
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maternal practitioners did not primarily ‘hold’ to enable and enhance their own trajectories, but 
those of their children and others they were connected to through relations of care. 
 In her work, Ruddick considers holding onto relationships with close kin, like fathers or 
grandparents, as well as with professionals directly involved in the training and nurturance of 
children (e.g. teachers), as chiefly important for successful mothering (1989: 79). In the 
particular case at hand and – I would contend – in the Zanzibari context in general, the social 
networks to be attended to by mothers are much more far-reaching. In particular, personalized 
connections to ruling party and government institutions can be vital for ‘tak[ing] care of affairs 
in peace’ on behalf of one’s dependants or oneself. Additionally, rather than merely 
representing a ‘fundamental attitude of protectiveness’ and thus belonging to the first maternal 
goal of preservation (cf. Ruddick 1989: 79), I would argue that Habiba’s holding-strategies 
furthermore aimed at being able to facilitate her children’s transformation into acceptable and 
successful adults in possession of identity papers, a good education and favourable prospects in 
the labour market. 
Habiba’s behaviour, and holding in general, are further reminiscent of the attitude of civility 
or tentativeness, that Whyte and Siu describe: open confrontation was avoided in order to 
maintain a relationship on which Habiba and her family depended, or might become dependent 
on in the uncertain political future (Whyte & Siu 2015: 28-29). Questions of trust also suggested 
themselves to me: in her last comment, Habiba made clear that in the past, her attitudes of 
holding and civility have not yielded the results that she had hoped for. Different than in an 
ideal trust-relationship, the trustee (her neighbour) could not be held accountable for actions 
that seemed to break the trust (Lahno 2011: 675) precisely because holding onto the relationship 
took precedence in the careful navigation of local (power) dynamics. This could also explain 
the neighbour’s brazen behaviour. 
I would say that overall, Habiba’s holding-practices need to be analysed in light of her 
relative position of vulnerability in terms of power, resources and exposure. Being unwell 
healthwise and unable to work outside the house, Habiba ran a small food vending business 
from her home. She had told me, that once before the local sheha had obstructed her in these 
activities, forbidding her to set up stall on the street in front of her house (Fieldnotes 22-11-
2018). Local authorities, and by extension the ruling party, its local members and possible 
informers in the neighbourhood thus had the power to undermine her efforts in trying to provide 
for her children from her anyhow weak position. Furthermore, Habiba and her family were 
clearly exposed as prominent supporters of the opposition party, testified to by the political 
imprisonment of her father that she had recounted to me. Even though Habiba strongly believed 
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in the electoral dominance of CUF – saying for instance that CCM ‘[…] has already been 
defeated’ (Fieldnotes 22-11-2018) – she was aware of the high probability of continued CCM-
rule – demonstrated by the very act of holding onto the relationship with her neighbour.  
As Vigh argues, (social) navigation depends on an actor’s social location and his or her 
perception of their own power to control the movement of their environment (Vigh 2009: 430). 
From the specific position that she was in, Habiba was not able to socially shun her neighbour; 
an amicable relationship still represented a potential ‘way out’ of Habiba’s own situation of 
(political) exposure and vulnerability – although, a very unreliable one, as the pay-off for her 
holding-practices remained uncertain. By explicitly invoking her children in this context, 
Habiba highlighted that her decision to ‘hold’ was in large parts made from a maternal position 
and motivated by her commitment to fulfil maternal aims like preservation, fostering growth 
and ensuring social acceptability. On the whole, Habiba had to mind local power relations and 
her own vulnerabilities in her everyday (maternal) practices, even if that meant to accept 
provocative behaviour in her home and holding onto a relationship that was perceived by her 
(as of yet) as one-sided and unfulfilling.   
Still, Habiba’s characterization of the manner that people lived together in as ‘badly’, shows 
that her ‘holding’ and ‘civility’ were only able to bring about superficial harmony and 
reconciliation, in which additional small and big grievances were continuously accumulated. 
This was certainly not state of ‘active connectedness’ that Ruddick suggests as a ‘maternal’ 
definition of peace (1989: 183, 218). 
 
(6.3) Conclusive Remarks 
In this chapter, I hope to have shown the myriad and diverse ways in which motherhood, 
maternal subjectivities, and mothering may figure in Zanzibari women’s narratives about their 
political decision-making, in their critique of the current regime’s policies, or in political 
discourses about peace and radical change in Zanzibar. Likewise, I explored how their 
‘maternal standpoint’ influenced some my respondents’ navigational efforts in the environment 
of tension and uncertainty characterizing politics in Zanzibar. The different elements of 
maternity often act together, in the sense that motherhood as institution and its rich symbolism 
and ideology may serve as rhetorical means in public discourses, while concrete mothering 
experiences and ensuing maternal subjectivities can serve as the basis from which to draw 
inspiration for participating in the discourse in the first place. Motherhood and mothering 
additionally act in highly ambivalent ways, as they might push women to be become politically 
active (e.g. on behalf of unemployed youth), while, at the same time, considering their maternal 
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vulnerabilities could be the cause for certain women’s withdrawal from political matters, such 
as voting. 
The empirical examples I introduced here hopefully merely represent the beginning of a 
scholarly exploration of Zanzibari women’s perspectives and subjectivities as mothers; they 
however already demonstrate the potential of motherhood and mothering to gain power and 
relevance outside the private sphere of individual families. A thorough analysis of women’s 
rhetorical strategies during campaigning activities, e.g. in the house-to-house campaigns several 
of my respondents mentioned, or in more formal political contexts would certainly give more 
valuable insights as to how and why references to motherhood and mothering experiences are 
made. More research also needs to be conducted to assess how prevalent attitudes and practices 
like ‘holding’ or ‘withdrawal’ are in Zanzibar, and whether they are always connected to a 
maternal positioning. Other maternal navigational strategies, also of more active engagement 
with formal politics, could likewise be uncovered in the process.   
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(7) Conclusion 
For example, even me personally, I can say [that] I am a bit apprehensive about CUF 
taking a position because I fear that there will be trouble maybe. You see, eh? Because I 
don’t know. Because – will CCM really agree to leave from power just like that? You can 
ask yourself that. It is not something that is easy. […]. But I also have [these] thoughts, I 
say [to myself], on the other hand, some day really, this situation that every day CCM 
wins, CCM wins, will it not maybe happen one day, that those of the opposition will also 
come to bring trouble? (Saida, Dar es Salaam/Unguja; see p. 1 for full quote) 
The fundamental feeling of being torn between two undesirable options, and the concomitant 
experience of uncertainty expressed by my research assistant Saida above – already quoted at 
the very outset of this thesis – quite adequately sets the background against which most 
Zanzibaris must make decisions about their actions. Her fears and paralysis, confronting the 
almost inevitable ‘trouble’ emanating from actors on either side of the political divide, is 
undoubtedly shared by many female and male inhabitants of the archipelago204. The focal point 
of Saida’s account however is the proclamation inspiring the title of this thesis: “I am a woman. 
But in addition, I am a mother, who has a family, so I fear these problems.” This statement 
points strongly to the perception of a specific gendered, a maternal vulnerability in the face of 
political risks, as well as a unique perspective on one’s exposure to them, connected to 
femininity, ‘ha[ving] a family’, and wanting to shield it from harm, which represents the core 
argument of this thesis. Some might now say that the insight that a mother would want to protect 
her children under uncertain and difficult circumstances is self-evident, ‘natural’, or even 
clichéd. In my opinion, however, these matters deserve a closer examination and analysis, since 
the underlying motivations, reasons and the concrete actions mothers in different contexts take, 
are, in fact, complex and varied. Within this thesis, I attempted to untangle some of these issues. 
In the following, I trace the two main objectives I established in my introduction and examine 
how they contributed to the overall endeavour of answering my main research question:  
How do Zanzibari women navigate (political) uncertainty and what role do motherhood as 
institution, and resource, as well as mothering as practice, play in their navigation? 
 
(7.1) Re-claiming Women’s Spaces in Zanzibar’s Political Past and Present 
‘Women have no idea about politics! You need to talk to men!’  
(Fieldnotes, 28-09-2018) 
 
204 See e.g. Afrobarometer 2016/2018: 45,8% of male Zanzibari respondents and 72,66% of female Zanzibari 
respondents replied ‘a lot’ to the question whether they feared to become a victim of political intimidation of 
violence during election campaigns. 
126 
 
Even now, over a year later, I distinctly remember the smirk on the face of the employee at the 
Chief Government Statistician’s Office in Zanzibar as he delivered these words to me, and my 
own irritation, as I bit my tongue and gave the hint of a smile at his ‘joke’. Nevertheless, as 
much as I disagreed with his perspective then, there were indeed times during my fieldwork in 
Zanzibar when I came close to taking his advice; realizing how much easier it seemed to be to 
spontaneously strike up conversations about sensitive political topics with the male Zanzibaris 
I met on the streets, markets and mabaraza all over the islands, while even setting up interviews 
with women proved difficult, if not impossible, at times. But did women’s frequent silence 
concerning politics really mean that they had ‘no idea’ about it? The data I was eventually able 
to co-create with respondents suggest otherwise: as I detailed in Chapter 4, I came to see that 
in polarized and tension-filled circumstances, there is an abundance of reasons to remain 
‘silent’. For many Zanzibari women it was not their ignorance of political matters – as the 
employee at the government office implied – but actually their knowledge of the extended 
consequences of ‘exposure’ in the current political context, and their constant scrutinizing of 
the same, which made them cautious about their utterances to me.  
Despite, or maybe precisely because of my partly difficult experiences, I left the islands 
profoundly impressed by conversations and interviews with a number of highly involved female 
political activists, as well as with ordinary Zanzibari women who related to politics in unique 
ways – proving that man and many others who had met my research topic with raised eyebrows 
and wry smiles wrong. In sum, I would hope that my insights in this respect will initiate a 
rethinking in the scholarly and societal outlook on Zanzibari politics.  In contrast to suppositions 
that in Zanzibar, “[…] politics are seen as mostly reserved for men” (Moss 2016: 326), I was 
able to firmly re-establish the active and diverse roles Zanzibari women have filled in (electoral) 
politics in the islands since their onset by means of intensive literature research, interlaced with 
my informants’ testimony in Chapter 2. This showed that the active involvement of some of my 
female respondents is certainly nothing out of the ordinary. Further, the absence of other parts 
of the female population from the political sphere cannot satisfactorily be justified solely with 
a reference to confining local gender ideologies, but needs to be more closely investigated, for 
instance by reading it more carefully against the prevailing political context and atmosphere.  
Describing some of the more recent developments, I emphasized the massive shrinking of 
political and civil space in Zanzibar and Tanzania mainland since the last elections in 
2015/2016, which has significantly added to the uncertainty characterizing the everyday lives 
of Zanzibaris since the extensive economic, political and societal shifts of the mid-1990s. Most 
people in Zanzibar today must carefully navigate both economic decline and political tensions. 
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I argued that even though this holds true for both men and women, female respondents in my 
sample developed unique perspectives, attitudes and strategies in this context, in which their 
roles and identities as mothers, local ideologies of motherhood, maternal subjectivities and 
standpoints, and individual and collective mothering experiences often took centre stage.  
 
(7.2) Taking Maternal Voices Seriously 
Over the course of fieldwork and during my writing process, there were several clashes between 
what crystallized out of interviews, informal conversations and check-backs with people, and 
what I found in the scientific literature on female life and gendered identities along the Swahili 
Coast: as delineated at the beginning of Chapter 5, relatively few texts examine motherhood 
more than just in passing. It seems to be so taken for granted that Zanzibari women become 
mothers, that the meaning of this transformation is hardly ever seriously investigated. This bias 
is certainly part of the distortion and silencing of women’s voices as mothers (cf. Bush Trevino 
2010: 1005; Ruddick 1989: 127; Schalge 2004: 152) that I set out to counteract within this 
thesis as my second objective.  
Using the differentiation between motherhood as institution and mothering as practice 
established in feminist writings as an analytical basis, I engaged with their local expressions in 
the Zanzibar archipelago in Chapter 5, in order to better understand the maternal standpoint 
from which women made decisions about their political involvement. Overall, I hope to have 
made sufficiently clear that both motherhood and mothering experiences are diverse, complex, 
highly contradictory and constantly in flux, even though there are strong ideas about their 
‘naturalness’. As that, my findings line up with what feminist scholars have written about 
motherhood and mothering elsewhere (see e.g. Arendell 2000).  
In response to the demand to take the context of mothering and motherhood seriously, which 
I argued was characterized by generalized uncertainty and gendered vulnerabilities in Zanzibar, 
I developed the concept of maternal navigation, combining notions of mothering as a practice 
in pursuit of maternal goals, with ideas about how people experience and deal with uncertainty 
in their everyday lives. This was deemed especially fitting, as mothering under any 
circumstances can be understood as an activity with highly uncertain outcomes, constantly 
engaged with the unpredictability of life in general (Arendell 2000: 1197; Oyèwùmí 2016: 216; 
Ruddick 1989: 73, 209). 
Motherhood as institution in Zanzibar was shown to be entangled with notions of 
(appropriate) womanhood and full adult status, as well as connected to religious and cultural 
ideology. Zanzibari mothers who mother ‘right’ are the recipients of enormous respect and 
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honour in society. Nonetheless, the weight of these expectations can be a burden both to 
mothers and to those who ‘fail’ to become the same. Motherhood and women’s experiences 
with this institution are thus deeply ambivalent.  
My data further testified to the fact that mothering as a practice in Zanzibar is characterized 
by transformative experiences of pain, bitterness and self-sacrifice that are commonly 
subsumed under the term ‘uchungu’ – which can refer to the pain of birthing labour, but also to 
the struggle of pursuing maternal goals throughout a child’s life. These struggles are often 
described by the verb ‘kuhangaika’, denoting activities aimed at providing for children and 
their futures in the context of generalized economic and political uncertainties. Additionally, 
the image of ‘light men’ illustrated specific maternal vulnerabilities caused by unreliable male 
partners and their widely perceived failure to provide for and protect their families. Many 
Zanzibari mothers thus envision their own vulnerability to be inclusive of that of their children 
and take these extended vulnerabilities into their considerations about the future and about the 
risks of political conflict.  
As show in Chapter 6, in the wider political context, motherhood as institution and resource, 
mothering as practice, as well as ensuing maternal subjectivities, function in complex and at 
times contradictory ways: on the one hand they can be a push-factor – nudging women onto the 
political stage, e.g. to speak up for the youth (‘our children’) or to campaign for sustainable 
peace under which children could be preserved and nurtured more easily, all the while drawing 
on the rich symbolism of motherhood as a resource. At the same time, motherhood and the 
maternal aim to preserve children and uphold the conditions for their nurturance may be an 
obstacle to active involvement as Saida’s and Bi Sauda’s withdrawal tactics demonstrated.  
The question, whether maternal thinking and acting could be the key to lasting political peace 
on the islands cannot be answered conclusively. Even though some respondents made attempts 
to employ references to shared motherhood to promote peace on a political level, and the 
maternal ‘holding’ strategies I introduced could be thought of as – albeit unstable – tactics to 
create and maintain harmony on a more personal level, the record of maternalism as a force for 
peace in the archipelago is mixed, even in the small sample I examined. As the closer analysis 
of my interview with Bi Halima showed, the feeling that life chances are withheld from specific 
groups of ‘children’ only, may also entrench mothers in their polarized, partisan positions and 
might even result in them spurring youth on to take extremer measures. 
Overall, thus, the answer to my research question is that motherhood as institution and 
resource, as well as mothering as practice, are used in varying ways in Zanzibari women’s 
navigation of the tension-ridden, conflict-laden and uncertain environment. Formal politics and 
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voter decisions might be manoeuvred by making references to motherhood ideology and 
mothering experiences explicitly, giving certain demands or political priorities more weight. 
The navigation of political tension in their everyday lives may be maternal in the sense that it 
keeps in view the localized goals of maternal practice, takes into consideration concomitant 
extended vulnerabilities, as well as the overwhelming need for connection for successful 
mothering as a whole. Mothers think and actualize possible ‘ways out’ of uncertainty that 
benefit and protect both themselves, their children and other people they are connected to 
through relations of care, depending on their own social and political standing.  
My data and analysis have clearly shown that even though the concrete manifestations of  
maternal positioning, thinking or navigation differed and were at times contradictory, for most 
of my informants, their status as mothers and their experiences of mothering in Zanzibar were 
central to their outlook on the world and, often, for their sense of connection with other women. 
By taking maternal voices seriously and examining them more closely, my research showed 
that there still remains a lot to uncover concerning this aspect of gendered lives in the Indian 
Ocean and beyond.  
 
(7.3) Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The limitations of my research project are clear – I have only talked to a small sample of local 
women, 25 in total, most of whom, moreover, were located in the urban centre of only one 
island of the archipelago, Unguja. How much and in what ways my insights are generalizable 
surely warrants more research. Methodologically, a longer immersion into the life of a host 
family would certainly have yielded different insights about political tensions and 
(maternal/female) strategies of easing them in everyday life than the relatively inflexible 
method of formal interviews205. Finally, motherhood and mothering were emergent themes in 
my research, which means that there is still much to be desired in terms of the depth of my 
examination of these topics in the local context. Taking into account the shortcomings in terms 
of sample size, methodology and depth, further inquiries in the same direction are certainly 
relevant.  
Another angle of inquiry, that is often bypassed in studies on gender is the investigation of 
male perspectives as gendered, not as ‘the norm’ (cf. Clifford 1986: 18-19; Stiles & Thompson 
2015: 12, 18-19). As I mentioned in the introduction, the more I occupied myself with maternal 
thinking and mothers, the more questions I asked myself about fathers and their ‘paternal’ 
 
205 Although in the polarized context of Zanzibar, staying with a host family, would also involve the danger of 
potentially only gaining access to ‘one side’ of the divide. 
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outlook on the world. It would certainly be extremely interesting to examine paternal self-
image, subjectivities, positioning and thinking, which – given the cultural and religious 
emphasis on male provision and maintenance in Zanzibar – have probably undergone massive 
change recently, alongside the shifts in mothering practices.  
All in all, despite the shortcomings and the many “stones left unturned’ (cf. Berckmoes 2013: 
128) during my fieldwork and within this thesis, I hope that my study is nonetheless valuable. 
By putting women back into the picture and taking the maternal voices I heard seriously, I hope 
to have added a new angle to scholarly thought about politics, gender and gender relations in 
Zanzibar and to have challenged common assumptions about the same. My analysis also shows 
that the subject matter at hand is complex; there are no simple or straightforward answers here, 
e.g. in terms of the potential of maternal ‘peace politics’. Given that childbearing and child 
rearing will most probably remain a central part of ordinary people’s lives all around the globe, 
I can only agree with Sara Ruddick’s hope that she expressed in 1989, imagining “a future in 
which maternal thinkers [of all genders] are respected and self-respecting […]” (Ruddick 1989: 
127) and in which their perspectives and attitudes are taken into account in scientific debates 
and analysis. 
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(9) Appendix 
 
(9.1) Annex 1: Translation of the Inscription of the ‘agitation board’ at Maskani 
ya Kisonge 
(see p. 2, figure 1) 
 
Sauti ya Kisonge 
Hongera Dr. Shein kwa kutekeleza 
asilimia zaidi ya 70 ya ilani ya CCM 
ukiongeza upanuzi wa barabara ya 
Mwanakwerekwe na Ujenzi wa 
mtaro wa maji taka mji mzima[.] 
Tuwaache wapinzani wahangaike 
na sare zao kama wasambazao 
vijora mitaani[.] CCM Daima 
Kisonge oyee Tz oyee! 
 The Voice of Kisonge 
Congratulations Dr. Shein for 
accomplishing more than 70 percent 
of the CCM manifesto if you add the 
broadening of Mwanakwerekwe206 
street and the construction of the 
sewage system in the entire city. 
Let’s leave the opposition to roam 
about with their uniforms like 
vijora-sellers207 in the streets. CCM 
forever, Kisonge oyee, T[an]z[ania] 
oyee! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
206 Mwanakwerekwe is a district of Zanzibar City. One of the main roads leading out of town to Western Unguja 
goes through Mwanakwerekwe.  
207 Vijora are a type of house dress, made from cheap fabric; often said to be see-through and thus without heshima 
(honour) (see e.g. YouTube 2019a). The insult here clearly refers to the practices of parties to pass out clothes or 
cloth in party colours for free during campaigns. The message claims that in contrast to the concrete achievements 
of the CCM-government, CUF politicians are desperately trying to lure in voters with cheap, low-quality gifts or 
promises that no one wants.  
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(9.2) Annex 2: “Wanawake na Harakati” 
 
 
Fig. 8: “Wanawake na Harakati”/“Woman [sic] in Movements”; Museum of the Revolution, Zanzibar City 
(Photograph by the author 19-02-2019) 
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(9.3) Annex 3: Information Document given to Prospective Respondents208 
 
Information on Research Project “Women, Politics and Community Relations in 
Zanzibar” (MA Thesis) 
Background and Purpose 
I am a Master’s Student of African Studies at Leiden University in the Netherlands. As part of 
my studies I am conducting research in Zanzibar, which will be the basis of the master thesis 
that I will compose upon return to the Netherlands.   
There is a striking gap in research about Zanzibari politics and community relations: the roles 
and perspectives of women. Most studies on modern Zanzibari politics have not been able to 
include an equal number of men and women in their samples. In my thesis I want to explore the 
lives of women in Zanzibar, their views on and experiences with politics, social issues and 
community relations in their everyday lives. I am also interested to know how women reach out 
to formal politics with their problems. I have decided to conduct interviews in several rounds 
(three at least) which will build upon each other.  
I want to cover questions and learn about topics like: 
- women’s lives/life experiences in Zanzibar 
- What are women’s issues here? 
- What role do women play in politics? What role does politics play in women’s lives? 
- What are the views of Zanzibari women on Zanzibari politics? 
- How do women see community relations? What role do women have in maintaining 
and stabilizing these relationships? 
- How do women reach out to formal politics? 
I hope to interview 10 women in each of the five regions of Zanzibar (Urban, Unguja North, 
Unguja South, Pemba North and Pemba South), totalling around 50 respondents. Respondents 
are chosen based on their place of residence and their willingness and availability for 
conducting interviews. I would also be happy to participate in ‘women’s activities’ (whatever 
that would include in the view of my respondents) and conduct participant observation.  
What does participation in the project imply? 
For the most part, data will be collected during several interviews, which will last around an 
hour each. They can be held in English or Kiswahili, according to your own preference. In the 
first rounds of interviews there might be a research assistant present in order to help me with 
the interviews. If you object to this, please let me know in advance.  
The interviews will be conducted in a place of your own choosing, which can be at your home 
or mine, in a public place like a café or restaurant, etc.  
Due to the fact that I am a student I will unfortunately not be able to remunerate you for your 
time. I can try and shorten or divide up interviews so that you only have to spend half an hour 
of your day.  
What will happen to your data?  
Your name will be anonymized in my thesis or any other writing produced from the data. This 
means that I will either refer to you by an alias or with your respondent number. I would 
 
208 Most respondents received a translated version in Kiswahili. 
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however like to include some key information about you (e.g. XY is a 35-year-old married 
woman, lives in X with her husband and three children. She does Z for a living). You can decide 
after the interview which facts I may include and which I should anonymize. 
I will either record the interview on my audio recorder or take notes during the interview. You 
decide which you would prefer. Both notes or audio recordings will be kept safe and I will make 
sure that no one has access to them but me. Audio recordings will be transferred to an external 
hard drive after the interview, which is secured with a password and locked away in my room. 
The same goes for notes. If you wish to see and edit my transcripts and notes before I use them 
as data, I will bring them by for you to access them. 
Your interview recordings, transcript or notes will be given a unique number that will help me 
in matching personal information and interview. A list with these numbers and the personal 
information (name, age, nationality, place of residence, occupation) will be kept separately from 
recordings, transcripts and/or notes on an USB stick, again secured with a password, and locked 
away safely. 
Please know that your participation in the interviews is voluntary. You can drop out at any point 
in the process, without giving me reasons. That means terminating an ongoing interview at any 
point, or dropping out of the research entirely. This is completely up to you. You can decide 
whether you want me to be able to use the data collected up to this point or delete it completely. 
You can also decline to answer questions. 
I have obtained a research permit for this project by the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar 
which has approved of my topic and my research questions.  
If you agree to participate or have any other questions, please feel free to contact me:  
Hannah Schild  
WhatsApp, Text, Call: +255 624 217 471 
Telegram: +49 151 216 79730 
Email: ha.schi1@web.de 
Facebook: Hannah Schild 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
